

SADĀNANDA'S
Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

VEDĀNTA SĀRA

HARAMOHAN MISHRA

CC-0. Prof. Satya Vrat Shastri Collection.

‘ Vedānta Sāra ’ of Sadānanda is a Preliminary manual on Advaita Vedānta. Though small in form still it is regarded as an important work as it contains in nutshell all the important aspects of Advaita philosophy. It serves as a necessary introduction to Advaita literature. Its author Sadānanda was a preceptor of Advaita, belonging to the sixteenth century A. D., who was also the grand preceptor of the great Advaitin Nṛsiṃhāśrama.

This present edition, which contains an exhaustive introduction, Sanskrit commentary, English rendering of the text, English commentary and the text, is intended to serve as a simple and lucid introduction to the subject.

Presented to

Dr. Satyabrata Shastri

Vice Chancellor

Sri Jagannath Sanskrit
University,
Puri



SADĀNANDA'S

VEDĀNTA SĀRA

WITH

INTRODUCTION, SANSKRIT COMMENTARY,
TRANSLATION AND ENGLISH COMMENTARY

By

HARAMOHAN MISHRA, M. A.

Published by

P. K. Mishra,
Achyutapur (KONARK)
PURI

Available from—

**Sadgrantha Niketan,
Sri Jagannath Temple
Ananda Bazar, PURI-752001
(Orissa)**

Also can be had from—

**Haramohan Mishra
Dept. of Sanskrit
F. M. College, Balasore-756001
(Orissa)**

Published—1983

Price—Rs. 16-00

Printer—

**Balasore Workers' Co-operative Press Society Ltd.
Balasore.**

DEDICATED TO
DR. T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

ये वै तेद्वान्ततत्त्वे परिणिहितमतयो शास्त्रतत्त्वार्थविज्ञाः
अद्भुताम्भोजहंसाः प्रगलितकलुषा देशिकेन्द्रा जयन्ति ।
विद्वद्बृन्दायगण्याः शमद्रमधृतिभिर्मण्डनैर्मण्डिता ये
तेषां पाण्यब्जयुग्मे भवतु कृतिरियं वाक्यपुष्पोपहारः ॥
महादेवास्मिन्ति स्याता ये विद्यापरिनिष्ठिताः ।
अद्भुतिनां वरेण्येभ्यस्तेभ्यो ग्रन्थोऽयमर्प्यते ॥

Dr. T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

PREFACE

It is a conspicuous fact that mankind is passing through a pervasive moral crisis and spiritual bankruptcy. We have become more conscious of the body and the senses and have forgotten the spirit, which underlies them. With a growing tendency towards industrialisation, which prompts the materialistic attitude towards life, there is a total degeneration of standards and values. Everywhere, in social, political, moral and intellectual aspects of life, we find chaos, confusion, indiscipline and distrust, caused by selfishness and lack of mutual good-will. Nowadays, sycophancy is deliberately encouraged; hypocrisy is preferred to truth and pornocracy is mistaken to be culture. Norms and standards of society are undergoing changes, which is encouraging promiscuity and unchastity. With the economic interpretation of values man is becoming more and more commercial. The spiritual background of human relations being ignored, discordance is taking hold of both our personal and social life. To get rid of these what we need at present is a re-assertion of life-values, according to the Advaitic standards, which vedānta preaches. *Ātman* is the indelible basis of life. Philosophy, science, technology, arts, architecture, literature, society, family and government, whichever is destitute of this is imperfect and soulless, for which

it cannot be conducive to the total uplift of man. Modern man has reached the moon, but he has yet to reach man-hood. That, which makes him reach this, is the spiritual value of life, which vedānta preaches. This is neither a sort of revivalism nor a form of radicalism. Both the revivalists and the radicalists come to an understanding on this principle of the *Ātman*, which is neither old nor new. Vedānta is not the exclusive possession of the Hindus only, but all the great mystics and saints of the world, whichever country they may belong to, live the ideals of vedānta. A man, who realises his identity with the limitless *Ātman*, the basic truth of vedānta, ceases to be an Indian or an European and so on. What we need at present to make our life more valuable is the assertion of this truth of Advaita. Vedānta is a panacea for all the evils.

This truth, which vedānta preaches, is not speculative but experiential. Experience, on the otherhand, is based on reality. This experience is not the sense experience of the empiricists but the direct realisation or *aparokṣānubhūti* of the mystic, a sort of self-recognition, which destroys a long self-forgetfulness. Mysticism here does not mean something irrational or absurd, as some so-called rationalists think it to be. It is mystical as it does not come under either empiricism or rationalism. So far as we are grappling with ignorance, it seems to be absurd, but whenever we come to realise the truth, it becomes spontaneous and natural. That which is beyond reason is not necessarily irrational. Vedantic truth is not

only cognitive and factual but also verifiable, but with the condition that verification should not be taken in an ordinary sense. As the truth of the scientific theories cannot be experimented without proper scientific method with the help of proper equipments, so also the verification of the spiritual truth cannot be made without proper spiritual method. Thus the truth of vedānta is not opposed to reason and yet in agreement with its revelatory character. To quote Dr. Mahadevan, a reputed Advaitic thinker of the modern age, 'Far from being dogmatic and dictatorial, the philosophy of vedānta is rational and yet in harmony with revelation'. (The philosophy of Advaita, P-62, Ed. 1967). Scepticism about the fundamental truth of spiritualism is a sort of blasphemy, based on a deliberate ignorance and lack of insight. Sceptics from the sophists of the past upto the scientific materialists and the logical positivists of the present, with all their fallacious arguments, have not yet become successful in refuting spiritualism, as they are far from touching even the periphery of spiritualism proper. There are also some critics who say that spiritualism has no cognitive-value, the theories of God, soul etc. being intended to lead people along a moral path. But they are mistaken in thinking the means to be the end. A life of spiritualism is much more than a moral life, though the latter is a necessary antecedent of the former. By vouchsafing the experiential ground of spiritualism vedānta has done away with all such misconceptions which have no *locus standi* in the genuine spiritual pursuit. The

spiritual path, advocated by vedānta is neither an empty intellectual pursuit nor a mere armchair-speculation, which is much beyond intellect, for which it cannot either be established or be refuted by reasoning. To ignore this is just to see the things with closed eyes.

Nowadays, there are some critics, who compare Advaita with other systems of thought of the west. There are some self-appointed judges of Advaita who get a pleasure in denouncing traditional interpretations, with which they are not acquainted properly. To our surprise we see that Advaita is compared with the most diverse and conflicting thoughts of the west, beginning with neo-platonism and ending with linguistic analysis. Some see in it a grand system of speculative metaphysics, others think it to be a system of values. There are also some who find in it the linguistic analysis of the modern analysts. It is not improbable that in the future some may try to find out in it the tendency of materialism. All these interpretations, which cannot be correct at the same time make it clear that the upholders of these views fail to understand the spirit of Advaita. Though the comparative method is a necessary one to bring about international understanding still we should not lose sight of the difference, as it may distort and misrepresent a philosophy. Advaita is not a system of philosophy. It is the fulfilment of all systems. The truth of it can only be realised by a man who has the necessary qualifications of an *adhikāri* and has undergone thorough spiritual and intellectual training in Advaita.

It is not proper to think that Advaita as it is interpreted by Śankara is alien to the upaniṣads. Nor is it sound to maintain the view of some critics that neo-Advaitic dialecticians of Post-Śankara age differed from Śanakara substantially. The fact is that the same Advaitic doctrine persists through all the ages beginning from the early vedic age upto the age of the neo-Advaitins, though the ways of exposition are not similar. The difference amongst the neo-Advaitins is only in the way of exposition or *Prakriyā*, which aims at making others understand the truth of Advaita (vide, Pañcadasi, 8-73), for which eminent Advaitic thinkers like Appaya Dikṣita and Madhusūdana have tried to defend the validity of all those views.

The present book 'Vedānta Sāra' is a preliminary manual on Advaita Vedānta, which is recommended as a text book for M. A. students in sanskrit by most Indian Universities. Not only for the students of the universities but also for others, who want to undertake a study of Advaita Vedānta, this book is said to be a necessary introduction to the subject, as it contains in a nutshell all the aspects of Advaita Vedānta. Its author Sadānanda belongs to the sixteenth century A. D., as it is evident from the Subodhinī commentary of Nṛsiṃhāśrama, the grand disciple of Sadānanda. He says that he has written this commentary in 1510 Śaka, which corresponds to 1588 A. D. (vide, the concluding verse of Subodhinī). So Sadānanda must have flourished in the first part of sixteenth century A. D. The two famous commentaries on Vedānta Sāra

are Subodhini of Nṛsiṃhāśrama and Vidvanmanorajanī of Rāmatīrtha. Good and authentic translation of the text into English with notes are also made by M. Hiriyanna and Swami Nikhilananda. But their works are very short and contain no sanskrit commentary. The extensive study made by colonel G. A. Jacob (vide his work entitled 'A Manual of Hindu Pantheism') is fraught with all sorts of misinterpretation of Advaita, as he wrote at a time when the philosophy of Advaita was not fully understood in the west. In view of this I have tried to expound the passages of the text very lucidly and clearly and also have added a sanskrit commentary of my own named *Gūḍhārthabodhini*. I hope it will be useful for the understanding of Advaita philosophy.

It is a pleasure to acknowledge my gratefulness to my teacher Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, National Professor in philosophy and Professor Emeritus, philosophy, university of Madras for his blessings for the completion of the work. I am greatly benefited by his contact and writings. Dr. Mahadevan not only occupies the foremost position amongst the present Advaitic thinkers but also exemplifies by his life the ideals of Advaita.

It is my pleasant duty to acknowledge my indebtedness to my father-in-law Pandit Kulamani Mishra, formerly Head of the Deptt. of Dharmaśāstra, Sadasiva Kendriya Vidyapitha, Puri, who is the embodiment of wisdom and virtues, for helping me in various ways for bringing out the present work.

I also express my gratitude to my teacher Dr. A. C. Swain, Professor and Head of the Deptt. of Sanskrit, Utkal University, Bhubaneswar for giving me encouragement.

I am grateful to my teachers Sri S. R. Das, Haranath Mishra, Mrs. Sakuntala Mohanty and P. R. Ray for encouraging me to make a study of Indian Philosophy. I am grateful to Sri P. C. Samantaray, former Superintendent, Sanskrit Studies, Orissa and Smt. Shobha Ray, former Principal, Women's College, Balasore for their appreciation and encouragement. I am particularly indebted to my brother-in-law Sri R. C. Mishra who has impressed me greatly by his deep interest in Indian Philosophy and culture. I also express my thanks to my Colleagues Dr. M. J. Das, P. K. Rath, B. G. Murti, C. C. Kar and my friends M. N. Das, Ashutosh Mishra, L. D. Sethi and P. K. Acharya and others for their appreciation and encouragement. I express my thanks to all authors and publishers whose works I have referred to.

My thanks are due to my wife, Mrs. Minati Mishra, whose spiritual and intellectual friendship has been a constant solace and encouragement for me and who has taken the pains of preparing the manuscript of this work.

F. M. College,
Balasore (Orissa)

Haramohan Mishra

I also express my gratitude to my teachers
Dr. A. C. Swain, Professor and Head of the Department
of Sanskrit, Oriental University, Bangalore for
giving me encouragement.

I am grateful to my teachers Mr. R. B. Datta
H. N. Mishra, Mr. Sankar Das, Mr. S. K. Das and
P. B. Ray for encouraging me to make a study of
Indian Philosophy. I am grateful to Mr. P. C.
Bhattacharya, former, Departmental Secretary,
Orissa and late Shri P. B. Ray, former
Principal, Women's College, Cuttack for their
guidance and encouragement. I am particularly
indebted to my brother-in-law Mr. R. C. Mishra
who has inspired me greatly by his deep interest
in Indian Philosophy and culture. I also express
my thanks to my colleagues Mr. M. J. Das, P. B.
Das, R. C. Mishra, C. O. Kar and my friends
Mr. N. Das, Ashutosh Mishra, Mr. B. Sengupta and
T. K. Chakravarty and others for their appreciation
and encouragement. I express my thanks to all
authors and publishers whose work I have
referred to.

My thanks are due to my wife, Mrs. Sankar
Mishra, a devoted spiritual and intellectual friend who
has been a constant source of encouragement
for me and who has spent the hours of preparing
the manuscript of this work.

Bharatpur, 1954

S. M. Das
Bharatpur (U.P.)

INTRODUCTION

Philosophy, which deals with the most fundamental problems of existence, knowledge and value is an attempt to explain the riddles of life. This attempt is not a new phenomenon, but it is as old as life itself. Notwithstanding the success and failure of these attempts, we find that there are different philosophical systems, which seek to explain these riddles. Some of them are more speculative by nature, while others are more critical. There are contradictory views like empiricism and rationalism, realism and idealism etc.; but with their mutual conflict and contradiction they retain some relative values always. But, in so far as they are fraught with limitations and give importance to some aspect or other, they cannot explain the entire problems. Speculative metaphysics cannot satisfy human quest for knowledge nor can scepticism be the ultimate answer to it. The language philosophers, who limit the scope of philosophy to language and think that different philosophical problems are due to faulty linguistic uses only, are far from even touching the real problems of life. Philosophy and life, knowing and being, values and facts, essence and existence are two sides of the same coin. Any attempt to separate them is based on an unfounded scepticism and cannot be conducive to the ultimate good of life.

In *Advaita* all these partial views are transcended. *Advaita*, which is the essence of the teachings of the *upanisads* as interpreted by Śāṅkara and his followers literally means non-dual or the negation of duality. Sometimes it is translated as monism, but it cannot be properly expressed through the convenient philosophical terms as monism, pluralism, idealism, realism, atheism, theism or even pantheism. Śāṅkara describes it beautifully in his *Daśaślokī*¹ : 'This is not even one, how can there be a second other than this ? It is neither oneness nor not-oneness. It is neither void nor non-void as it is *Advaita*. How can I speak that which is the end of all the *vedāntas* ?' Monism is contrary to pluralism, but *Advaita* is contrary to none. It is as Dr. Mahadevan says² : 'We believe that *Advaita* is not a sectarian doctrine. It is the culmination of all doctrines, the crown of all views. Though other views may imagine themselves to be opposed to *Advaita*, *Advaita* is opposed to none. When we translate *Advaita* as non-dualism, the negation signified by the suffix *non-* applies not only to duality but also to *ism*.' It is this highest point of view, beyond all conflicts and contradictions, which Gauḍapāda describes as the spirit of *Advaita Vedānta*³ : 'The dualists, firm in their own views conflict with each other,

1—*Daśaślokī*, vs. 10. 1

2—T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Ramana Maharshi and His Philosophy of Existence*, P. 25 (Sri Ramanasramam, 3rd Ed. 1976).

3—Gauḍapāda's *Maṇḍukya Kārikā*, 3.17.

but this (Advaita) has no conflict with any.' Advaita is not a system of thought but the fulfilment of all the systems.

This non-dual Existence or the Plenary Experience, which *Advaita* means, is the final point of investigation. All the great teachers of Advaita vedānta, beginning with the seers of the upaniṣads upto the great Advaitins like Śrī Śaṅkara and his followers preach this truth. Asked by Gārgī about what exists beyond this, answered Yājñavalkya¹: 'Do not ask, O Gārgī, about something more than this deity, beyond which nothing more can be asked'. When we say that Advaita means the Plenary Experience, it does not mean that Advaita vedānta is destitute of analysis and methodological subtlety. We really find in Advaita literature numerous dialectical works, replete with such subtle analysis, which is unparallel in the philosophical tradition of the world. But methods, systematisation and analysis etc. are only secondary. These are accepted so far as they are conducive to the understanding of the basic truth of Advaita. The ultimate truth transcends all the categories, concepts, methods and systems, in as much as it is free from differences and beyond the limitations of space and time.

In view of this, Vedānta has got no history. It is endowed with the perennial value, which neither diminishes nor increases with the passing

(—Bṛhadāranyaka upaniṣad, 3.6.1, *anātipraśnyāṃ vai devatām atipṛcchasi gārgi mātiprākṣh,*

of time. Truth is as old as the origin of the world and as modern as modernity itself. It is noteworthy to quote Paul Deussen's remark on vedānta¹ : 'We are unable to look into the future, we do not know what revelations and discoveries are in store for the restlessly inquiring human spirit ; but one thing we may assert with confidence, — whatever new and unwonted paths the philosophy of the future may strike out, this principle will remain permanently unshaken and from it no deviation can possibly take place.' Historical method of investigation, which pre-supposes that progress commences with some unknown and uncertain point, proceeding towards no end, is nothing but grappling with utter absurdity, which is further based on an unfounded scepticism. Such a defective and sweeping method of criticism was so much prevalent amongst the orientalist of the recent past like Max Muller, Roth, Wilson, Winternitz, including some of the native Indian scholars, who were swayed away by the apparent glamour of the western interpretation, that the whole Vedic literature, excluding the Upaniṣads, was thought to be the product of a group of ignorant and Semi-civilised people. The whole super-structure of the theory of progress from polytheism to monism via henotheism and monotheism and the hypothesis of the origin of the Upaniṣads in the supposed conflict of the priestly class and the warrior class are the most misleading outcome of such a defective method of

1—Paul Deussen, The Philosophy of the upaniṣads, P. 40.

criticism, which has not only no link with the unbroken spiritual tradition of India, but which also violates the whole spiritual truth of mankind. However, with the progress of time this naivete is gradually being discarded. And it is proved that the old saying 'the only thing we know from history is that we know nothing from it' is not without any truth. To penetrate into the depth of vedānta, the method of inward expansion is the only one method, which has nothing to do with the extensive search of our historical method nor is it dependent on the achievements of our scientific investigation.

The investigation for something more or the urge of becoming something more is inherent in the very principle of life. It is because this, that even the most crude of the utilitarians and the pragmatists cannot deny it without doing injustice to truth. The insatiable qualms of conscience can never be satisfied by such deceptive make-shifts without the vision of truth, which lurks behind the displays of relativity.

This urge of becoming more, the quest for knowledge, commences with the world of experience. What is the nature of the world? What are the limits of its existence? How far our knowledge about this world is adequate? How far can it satisfy our wants? These are the most fundamental questions regarding the world, which we are confronted with. Whatever may be the details of investigation, it is conspicuous to a little reflection that nothing in this world is absolute. Everything, whatever we perceive through our

senses or think through our discursive intellect, is nothing more than a mere relative existence. It is not only due to the fault of our discursive thought, but this, the principle of relativity, is the very nature of things in the world. Nothing in this world can exist *Per Se*, without dependence on other. It is because that the causal law, which implies a necessary connection with something other, falsifies the absolute existence of the things in the world. The world exists in principle, but not in space or time, as space and time are not independent of the world. This inexplicable law of causality is that principle, to which the world owes its existence. Thus says Gauḍapādācārya¹ : 'So far as this law of cause and effect extends there exists *Samsāra* and whenever the operation of the causal law ceases, one never gets the *Samsāra* there.' It is described as *Samsāra*, because it is flowing without cessation—'*Samyak Sarati iti Samsārah*', the beginningless and endless flow of the causes and effects, the eternal flux, for which Heraclitus lamented.

If, on the otherhand, we take that the effect is not different from the cause, then invariably we land in the shore of the doctrine of apperance. The diversity of the world is due to names and forms or *nāma* and *rupa*, which is relative to their real substratum.² This is the famous *Vivarta*

1—Māṇḍukya Kārika, 4.56,

'*Yāvaddhetuphalāveśaḥ samsārastāvadāyataḥ
kṣiṇe hetuphālāveśe Samsāraṃ na Prapadyate*'

2—Chāndogya upaniṣad, 6. 3. 2, *nāmarūpe
vyākaraṇāṇi*. Also Bṛhadāraṇyaka up 1. 4. 7.

*Vāda*¹ of Advaita Vedānta. The jumbling of this phenomenal appearance of names and forms with the reality is known as *adhyāsa*,² *adhyāropa* or superimposition, which is the root of *Samsāra*. This world of relativity can never exist nor can be thought apart from the underlying substratum.

It is not only that from the ontological point of view the world has relative existence, but also from other angles of vision, all our wordly knowledge and values are nothing but relative in character. Alike the empirical existence, all sorts of empirical knowledge and values are also fraught with serious limitations. Our senses can work in a very limited field, so the empirical knowledge which we obtain through the avenue of the senses, can never give us the knowledge of the interminable Absolute. The senses can perceive their objects like sound, touch etc., but they can never grasp that which is beyond their capacity. Our rational thought, working in a relational way, can only operate within the extension of our empirical knowledge, beyond which it cannot be applied. As the Taittirīya upaniṣad says³ : 'whence do the speeches return with mind.'

So also the empirical values are ephemeral by nature. They cannot satisfy all our wants for ever. The values of worldly nature come to an end with their momentary satisfaction,

1—Vedānta Paribhāṣā, Chap. 1, P. 37, Adyar library Ed. 1942. Also Vedānta Sāra, Passage 21, '*atattvato'nyathā prathā vivarta ityudīritḥ*'

2—Śarīraka Bhāṣya of Śankara, *adhyāso nāma atasmin tadbuddhiḥ*, Introduction. Also vedānta sāra, Passage, 6, *asarpabhūtāyām* etc.

3—Tait upaniṣad, 2. 4. 1, *Yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha*.

resulting thus in hopelessness and despair. All our sense enjoyments can give us only momentary relief, but they can never cure the malady of this craving for enjoyment. Thus being limited by space and time, they can have nothing save the relative value. As Śrīkṛṣṇa says in the Bhagavadgītā¹ : 'the contacts of the senses with their objects give rise to pains, pleasures, heat and cold, which are with beginning and end, so O descendant of Bharata, try to endure them'. Anything, which has a beginning and an end, can never possess any permanent value. We need something more valuable, which has the intrinsic value, neither relative to space nor to time

This world of diversity, with its cause *avidyā* is said to be *anirvacanīya* or indescribable, in as much as it can never be absolutely determined, excepting the mode of relativity. However, it does not mean agnosticism, that which is accompanied with the name of Immanuel Kant in western philosophy, as unlike the latter, the reason of indescribability is never attributed to the defective categories of understanding but it is thought to be the very nature of the worldly things.² So this world of relativity, with its relative existence, knowledge and values can never be the end of investigation. The inner quest of life tends us to find out something beyond the

1—Bhagavadgītā, 2. 14.

2—Khaṇḍna khaṇḍa khādyam, chap.-1,
'meyasvabhāvānugāminīyam anirvacanīyateti'
 etc.

limitations of space, time and causality, which is, at once, the abnegation and the fulfilment of our former quests, the urge for transcending and subsuming the world of phenomena. This quest for something more than this relative world of phenomena, the quest for the Absolute, is thus expressed in the first aphorism of Bādarāyaṇa¹ — ‘*athāto brahmajijñāsā*’ ‘After this, therefore, is the inquiry regarding the Brahman’.

The Absolute is beyond this phenomenal world, beyond the range of space and time and the law of relativity. It is the boundless Being, untouched by the limitations of space and time and free from the display of the causal law. As there the causal law cannot operate, it is never entangled with pleasures and pains, which are the effects of good and evil deeds Śāṅkara describes² it as : ‘Ultimate, unmodified Reality, all-pervading like space, free from all changes, ever-fulfilled, partless and of the nature of self-illumination, where both *dharma* and *adharma* (merits and demerits) with their results and the three times (past, present and future) never exist’. The Upaniṣads describe it as infinite, consciousness and bliss.³ Sadānanda says⁴ that Brahman, which is Truth, consciousness, bliss, infinite and non-dual is the Reality and all others, beginning with

1 Brahma Sūtra, 1. 1. 1.

2—Sārīraka Bhā, 1. 1. 4,

‘*idaṃ tu Pāramārthikam Kūṭasthanityam*’ etc.

3—Tait up., 2 1.1, *satyaṃ jñānamanantaṃ brahma*.

4—Vedānta Sāra, Passage. 6, *vastu saccidānanda* etc.

ajñāna, which are insentient by nature, are not real. It is beyond all the distinctions or *nirviśeṣa*, formless or *nirākāra* and also free from all the qualities or *nirguṇa*. It is to be borne in mind that this conception of the Brahman as *nirguṇa* and *nirviśeṣa* is not incompatible with its conception as the infinite consciousness and bliss, as consciousness and bliss are not the qualities nor the ingredients of the Brahman, but these are the very essence of it. Thus it is the transcendental Reality, which is like the Being of Parmenides and the substance of Spinoza, untouched by the vicissitudes of the world of becoming. This transcendent being is the *nirguṇa* Brahman of Advaita vedānta, which is said to be completely free from *avidyā* and its product, the world of becoming.

Reality is not only conceived as the transcendent being, it is also said to be immanent in all the universe through its power of nescience (*avidyā*). It is the support of the whole universe, with the manifold objects. It is the unity which acts as the link of the diversities of the world. The Taittirīya Upanisad¹ says that the diverse objects of the universe emanate from it; they are also sustained by it; and at last, they submerge in it at the time of dissolution. It is described both as the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) and the efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) of the universe in contrast to the doctrine of Nyāya, according to which God is only the efficient cause.²

1—Tait. up., 3. 1. 1,
'*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*' etc.

2—Vivaraṇa Prameya Sangraha, P. 673.
Achyutagranthamālā Ed.

Both the *Brahman* and *Māyā* are accepted as the material cause of the universe.¹ Some vedāntins say that *Brahman* is the efficient cause and *Māyā* is the material cause. Sadānanda says that *Brahman* is the material cause of the universe in relation to its adjunct *avidyā* and by itself it is the efficient cause.² Thus the Brahman, qualified by *Māyā* is said to be immanent in the universe, which is also described as *saguṇa Brahman* or *Īśvara*.³ The concealing aspect of *avidyā* or *āvaraṇa śakti* being inert in *Īśvara*, he is never touched by the faults of *avidyā*. When this pure consciousness, the Brahman, is conditioned by the aggregation of the gross objects, forming the gross universe, it is described as *Vaiśvānara*. When the conditioning adjunct is the subtle universe, which is the aggregation of the subtle objects it is known as *Hiraṇyagarbha*. Both these universes, viz. the gross universe and the subtle universe are the products of *Māyā*, and the consciousness immanent in them is the same pure consciousness. Thus the unqualified Brahman forms the ground of the appearances in the shapes of *Īśvara*, *Hiraṇyagarbha* and *Vaiśvānara*. These three conditions of the universal consciousness correspond to the three stages of *Jīva* viz. deep sleep, dreaming and waking stages respectively.

1— ibid, pp. 684—685

2—vedānta sarā, passage—11

3—Svetāśvatara upaniṣad, 4. 10,

‘*māyām tu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt māyinaṃ tu*

maheśvaram’

Thus, *Māyā* is the principle of self-expression of the Brahman, through which it projects the universe or as Prof. Hiriyanā puts it 'grows self-conscious'.¹ Dr. Radhakrishnan, describes it as 'the principle of self expression', by which the Absolute becomes the universal subject.² It is like the justification of the principle of contradiction in Hegelian thought, according to which a thesis comes to synthesis only through an antithesis. Thus, the *Saguṇa* Brahman of śāṅkara agrees with the conception of Brahman of Rāmānuja. Only it differs from the latter in mentioning that this is not the ultimate reality, as it rests on the *nirguṇa*-Brahman, the unqualified non-dual consciousness.

Sometimes, it is said that according to Advaita vedānta *Īśvara* is a figment of thought. It is described as a concept, where as Brahman is said to be Experience or *anubhūti* itself.³ *Īśvara* is also described as the Brahman cast in the moulds of logic.⁴ It is due to the fact that the categories and concepts of mind being unable to picture the reality present it through the vestiments of names and forms. However, it should not be confused

1—Vide, Hiriyanā's Introduction to his Vedānta Sāra, P. XVI.

2—S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol-II, P. 554.

3—Hiriyanā's Introduction to vedānta sāra, P. XVI

4—S. Radhakrishnan, Indian philosophy Vol. II, P. 553,

with our subjective imagination. *Īśvara* is not created by the categories of our understanding, nor does it mean that our subjective forms, imposed on the reality, give rise to *Īśvara*. The fact is that the same Reality is said to be Brahman when it is free from *Māyā* and when associated with *Māyā* it is described as *Īśvara*.¹

Though the Brahman or the Pure consciousness is associated with *Māyā*, still then non-dualism is never affected as *Māyā* is not a separate real entity. It is ontologically lower than the Brahman and completely dependent on the latter. It is true that *Māyā* always depends upon the Brahman and can never exist apart from the latter but the reverse is not true, as the appearance of the serpent cannot exist without the rope, whereas the rope can exist without the former.

Māyā can neither be described as real nor as unreal; so it is said to be indescribable². However, it does not mean agnosticism, but it simply means that the concepts of reality and unreality cannot be applied to it. In the Advaitic terminology, real means that which is never sublated and unreal means that which never appears.³ Brahman is only real as everything

1—See T. M.P. Mahadevan's 'The Philosophy of Advaita' Chapter-7.

2—Citsukhī, chap. 1, vs. 13.

Also see 'Vivekacūḍāmaṇi' vs. III,

Gita Press Ed.

3—Advaita Siddhi, PP. 34-35.

Also see M. M. Yogendranatha's Comm. on Advaita Siddhi P. 50, Ed. Tara Publications, 1971, Also see Pañcadāsī, 3.29, 'Satyatvaṃ bādharāhīyam' etc.

else undergoes modifications. The objects of the pseudo-concepts like the son of a barren lady, or a sky-lotus can never appear, so they have no claim to reality. The appearance of the serpent in the rope or the silver in the nacre does not fall under any of the mentioned categories. The appearance is not real as it is sublated afterwards ; nor is it unreal as it does appear. So, it is declared to be *anirvacanīya* or indescribable or false. Thus, falsity (*mithyātva*), according to Advaita vedānta, is different from both reality and unreality.¹ For the reasons stated above, the world of experience (*dṛśya prapañca*) is also said to be false. It can never be unreal as it appears ; nor can it be real as it is sublated at the time of knowing the Brahman. Though the phenomenal world and the shell-silver are false alike, still they do not belong to the same grade of existence. The former is empirical (*vyāvahārika*) whereas the latter is apparent (*Prātibhāsika*).

This is the famous *anirvacanīya khyāti* of Advaita vedānta. According to the Prābhākaras there is no error at all. What we call error is nothing but the non-apprehension of the non-relation between two sorts of knowledge viz. cognition and memory. So their doctrine is known as *akhyāti*. But this is not tenable as non-apprehension of non-relation only cannot explain error. Error also implies apprehension of some relation. The erroneous cognition 'This is silver' cannot be

1—Advaita Siddhi, P. 40

See the discussion on the first definition of falsity.

possible only by non-apprehension of non-relation without any positive relation. The knowledge of the silver as existing in front cannot also be possible only by non-apprehension.¹ *Asatkhyāti*, upheld by the Mādhyamikas, according to which the silver that appears in the error is unreal, is not tenable. Unreal silver cannot be apprehended as existing in front, nor can there be any relation between the unreal and its knowledge. It cannot be said that the silver in the erroneous cognition being not real it is said to be unreal, as absence of reality does not necessarily imply unreality.²

Anyathā khyāti of the Naiyāyikas is also unsound. The Naiyāyikas say that the shell appears as silver, which is real and exists elsewhere. But this is not tenable as the erroneous knowledge grasps the silver in front but not elsewhere. Sublation, which sublates the silver, does not confirm this view.³ *Ātmakhyāti*, upheld by the vijñānavādins, according to which the *vijñāna* appears as the erroneous object cannot also explain error. If this were true then there would be no sublation, as the erroneous object *viz.* silver, which is said to be the transformation of *vijñāna*, being real would not be sublated by right knowledge. It is not even proper to maintain that the sublating knowledge only sublates the *this-ness* or the *externality* (*vahiṣṭva*) but not the silver, as this is not supported by our experience. The vijñānavādins cannot consistently maintain this externality. If it is not the transformation of *vijñāna* then

1 – citsukhī, P. 110, vārāṇasī Ed. 1974

2 – ibid, PP. 119-121,

3 – ibid, P. 123

the thesis of the Buddhist idealists that all are the transformation of *viññāna* is violated. On the other hand, if it is the transformation of *viññāna* then it cannot be sublated. Thus, the thesis of the *viññānavādins* is not tenable.¹ Other theories being unable to explain error and its sublation consistently the Advaitins expound their doctrine *anirvacanīya khyāti*, according to which the silver apprehended in the rope is *anirvacanīya*, which is the modification of *avidyā* that rests in the consciousness.²

Some later Advaitins differentiate between *Māyā* and *avidyā* amongst which the former is ascribed to the Brahman and the latter is thought to rest in the *Jiva*.³ Here the individual *avidyās* are thought to be the limiting adjuncts of the *Jivas* or the individuals. According to another view, *Māyā* is identical with *avidyā*, which rests in the Brahman or the pure consciousness, whereas the internal organs, which are the products of *avidyā*, act as the limiting adjuncts of the individuals. However, this apparent contradiction has nothing to contradict the main thesis of Advaita. They are just only *prakriyās*, which are all valid as they are intended to make others understand the truth of Advaita.⁴ The writer of

1—ibid, PP. 127-129

2—For detail discussion see T. M. P. Mahadevan's 'The Philosophy of Advaita', chap 2 P. 82.

3—Pañcadasi, 1. 15-17,
'*Sattvaśuddhyaviśuddhibhyām māyāvidye ca te mate*'.

4—Vivarana Prameya Saṁgraha, P. 737,
'*Prakriyāṇām tattvābodhāya kalpitvāt*' etc.

vedānta Sāra, following the above two views, distinguishes two kinds of *ajñāna* as *vyāṣṭi ajñāna* and *samaṣṭi ajñāna* but yet maintains that this division is only due to different angles of vision.¹

The view, according to which *avidyā* rests in the individual, is upheld by the followers of *Bhāmatī* school and the other theory, which holds that *avidyā* rests in the *Brahman* belongs to the school of *vivarāṇa*. The charge, made against this former school that *avidyā* cannot rest in the individual or *jīva* as the latter is the product of *avidyā*, is untenable, as the view of *vācaspati* is that individuality and *avidyā* are related in a beginningless series like the seed and the plant (*bījāṅkura nyāya*).² It cannot also be asked, against the view of *vivarāṇa* school, how can *Brahman*, which is the essence of pure knowledge, be the locus of *avidyā*, as, according to this school, pure knowledge is not thought to be the annihilator of *avidyā*, but the revealer of it. There is no opposition between pure knowledge and *avidyā*, but only the modified knowledge (*vṛttijñāna*) is the sublator of the later.³ So *sadānanda* adduces direct experience or *anubhava*, which means here *sākṣi pratyakṣa*, as

1—Vedānta Sāra, Passage-7.

2—*Bhāmatī*, P. 235, Nirṇaya Sagar Ed.,
'*na cāvidyām satyaṁ jīvāt mavibhāgaḥ*' etc.

3—*Vivarāṇa*, P. 266—267, Calcutta Ed. of
Anantakrishna Shāstri,
'*nāpi svaśrayacitprakāśena virudhyate ajñānaṁ*'
etc.

the proof in the existence of *ajñāna*.¹ The learned commentator Rāmatīrtha, says that the cognition 'I am ignorant' cannot have absence of knowledge as its object, as the existence of knowledge, implied by this very judgment, repudiates its absence, an absence and its counter-positive (*pratiyogin*) being unable to co-exist cannot be possible at one place.² *Ajñāna* is not merely nonapprehension, but it is also misapprehension. A mere non-apprehension can never account for appearances, so *ajñāna* is not the absence of knowledge, but is positive in character or *bhāvarūpa*.

The Absolute is individualised through this power of *avidyā*. To explain this act of *avidyā* two theories viz-(i) the theory of limitation or *avacchedaka vāda* and (ii) the theory of reflection or *pratibimba vāda* are formulated by the *Bhāmanī* school and *vivarāṇa* school respectively. Some say that another view, the theory of appearance or *abhāsa vāda*, is propounded by the writer of *vārtika*, Suresvara.³ However, all these apparent divergencies have nothing to differentiate the main thesis, but they are only the various explanations of the same problem. As Dr. Mahadevan says :⁴ 'It does not matter whether the example of

1—Vedānta Sāra, passage—6

'*ahamajñā ityādyanubhavāt*'.

2—Vidvanmanorañjanī, P. 88
chowkhamba Ed. 1975.

3—See Siddhānta bindu, Madhusūdana's comment the first vs. of Daśaślokī,

4—T. M. P. Mahadevan's 'The philosophy of Advaita', P. 226.

the pot-defined either be given or the analogy of reflection be cited. What the preceptors of Advaita aim at teaching is the non-difference of the *Jiva* from the Brahman'. Sadānanda,¹ following both the views, gives the illustrations of space and its limitation by forest, trees etc. and sky and its reflection in reservoir, water drops etc., which only manifests his tolerant attitude towards all the schools. The one universal spirit appears as the individual self through the limitation of *avidyā*.

Thus, the Brahman or the Absolute is not proved on the basis of speculation' but it is determined on the basis of the self-certitude of the self. The ontological argument, which proceeds from idea to existence, the causal argument, which proceeds from the effect to its cause, the teleological argument, which proceeds from the design of the world to its antecedent purpose; and the cosmological argument, which proceeds from the limitations of the world to the unlimited, can only suggest but they cannot prove the existence of the Absolute. Our discursive understanding, trying to go beyond its limitations, is fraught with the antinomies, as Kant puts it. Even though, we identify our subjective categories with the objective existence, as Hegel does, it can never explain the mysteries of the world and we can never find out the fountain-head of experience by such a speculation. Our thought can only operate in the world of relations and attempting to go beyond it,

1—Vedānta Sāra, Passage-7, 8, 9.

as Bradley says, thought commits suicide. The senses can only perceive their own objects but they cannot grasp the Absolute. So we have to go beyond the senses, thoughts, mind, reason, and have to find out their origin, something more certain and more fundamental than them. It is just what vedānta preaches. It is the self-certitude of the existence of the self which provides, according to vedānta, the criterion of certitude of the Absolute. Brahman is not something alien to us but it is the very self, which is the nearest of all. Man can realise the universal spirit within the core of his own existence by getting rid of his limited personality. Śāṅkara says that the existence of the Brahman is proved undoubtedly as it is the self of all.¹ The self is that which can never be doubted, as he who doubts is the very self. This principle is very akin to the cartesian criterion '*cogito ergo sum*', 'I think therefore I am', but it is more fundamental and more realistic than that of Descartes. Unlike the cartesian principle, it does not deduce the existence of self from its thinking but its existence is self-valid, which only makes thought possible. In fact, vedānta has found out something, which is never thought through the mind, as Kena-upaniṣad puts it, but only through which mind can at all think.² It is much beyond

1—Śārīraka Bhāṣya, I-I-I,

'*Sarvasya ātmatvācca brahmāstīva Prasiddheḥ*'

2—Kena upaniṣad, 1.5,

'*Yanmanasā na manute yenāhur mano matam*'
etc.

thought, reason, concepts and judgments, where vedānta takes its stand. The Absolute is not only the end, the fulfilment of the world-process, the ultimate destiny of life, but it is also the very beginning, the source of all existence and values, which is not to be sought for in the illusory displays of the phenomenal world, but can only be felt or realised in the depth of inner existence. Discovery of this identity with the Absolute is the fulfilment of the quest of life, which is the import of the great saying, *Mahāvākya*, 'Tattvamasi', 'That thou art'.

Alike speculative theology, dogmatic theology also cannot penetrate into the realm of spirit. It is fully exhausted in explaining the traditional doctrines and dogmas, without any reference to the empirical ground. No truth can be based on mere faith in the dogmas. The scriptures can only be the record of the spiritual revelations of the ancients, but they cannot be valid with no empirical base. It is noteworthy to remember Śāṅkara's saying that even by hundred examples nobody can prove that fire is cold or the sun does not heat.¹ If it is taken for granted, as it is upheld by the vedic tradition, that the vedas are self-valid or *svataḥ pramāṇa*, still then the experiential ground is not at all repudiated. By the word 'Veda' no set of doctrines and dogmas is ever meant. By all the great authorities of the vedic tradition this word is explained in the sense of the eternal

1—Śāṅkara's comm. on Bṛhadāranyaka upaniṣad, P. 474, Gita Press Ed.

knowledge, manifesting in the shape of spiritual revelation. Manu says that the seers see the *Śruti* but memorise the *smṛtis* according to their recalling capacity.¹ So no dogmatism is meant by admitting *Śabda Pramāna*; on the other hand it only broadens the scope of the experiential ground and vouchsafes the spiritual experiences of the seers, which ordinarily cannot be obtained by others without the required spiritual disciplines.

When all the senses, mind, reason, speculations and dogmas fail to reach the *Brahman*, according to vedānta, there is only one avenue, *aparokṣānubhūti*, through which it can be realised. It can only be realised within the depth of one's own existence, as the individual is nothing but an expression of the Absolute. It is *avidyā* or nescience, which causes this limitation. When *avidyā* is dispelled through right knowledge, which can only be achieved through direct experience, the individual, being free from his fetters and limitations, discovers his identity with the universal. So, knowledge in this sense is not the acquisition of something alien to the self, but it is the rediscovery of the self, as self is the essence of knowledge. Intuition which reveals the reality is not something different from it, but identical with it. Intuition, self and reality are one and identical. The *ātman* or the self is not to be experienced, as it is experience itself. The doctrines of the

1—Manu *smṛti*, P. 40, chowkhamba Ed. 1970.

‘*Śrutim paśyanti munayaḥ smaranti tu yathāsmṛti*’
etc.

Naiyāyikas and the Prābhākaraś, which hold that *ātman* is the substance of the attribute knowledge, are based on the hypothetical division of substance and attribute. No experience is there to prove that *ātman* is different from knowledge and is revealed by knowledge, but all our experience only confirms the fact that *ātman* itself is of the essence of knowledge.¹ It is self-luminous (*svataḥ prakāśa*) and self valid (*svayaṃ siddha*), as to require anything other than this to prove it will lead to infinite regress.

In this connection sadānanda refutes the various theories of self, upheld by different systems of thought. He says that the various theories of the self, given by so many people, from the laymen to the philosophers of different schools, which identify the self with the body, the vital force, the senses, the mind, the momentary *viñāna*, and emptiness, based on false reasoning and erroneous experiences, are eliminated by stronger and profounder experiences. The *ātman* only manifests through direct experience, which in itself is the essence of experience. So, knowing the self here only means the removal of ignorance, but not knowing it as an object.²

In this connection it is necessary to discuss the vedantic process of perception and how knowing the *Brahman* is different from knowing any

1—Vivarāṇa prameya saṃgraha, P. 202.

2—Bṛ. upaniṣad comm. of Śankara, P. 263.

‘tasmāt ajñānādhyāsanivṛttireva ātmānamevāvet ityuktam, nātmano viśayīkaraṇam’.

other object. Sadānanda, the writer of vedānta sāra considers this epistemological question in brief in his work and says that *Vṛttivyāpyatva* is accepted in the case of knowing the Brahman, but not *phalavyāpyatva*.¹ According to Advaita vedānta the one *Brahman—consciousness*, which forms the ground of the universe, illuminates all the things of the world. Though all the things of the world are always superimposed on the Brahman and are capable of being illumined by it, still then owing to the concealment of ignorance they are not always known to us. When the concealment (*āvaraṇa*) of ignorance is overpowered (according to some destroyed) the object is illumined by consciousness.²

For the overpowering (*abhibhava*) or destruction of *avidyā* the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) assumes the shape of the object, which is known as modification, psychosis or *vṛtti* of the *antaḥkaraṇa*.³ This psychosis or *vṛtti*, prompted by the reflection of consciousness, destroys the concealment of ignorance. This modification of the internal organ, assuming the shape of the object is known as *vṛttivyāpti* or pervasion by the *vṛtti*. When the concealment is destroyed the object is immediately illumined. According to some Advaitins like Madhusūdana, the consciousness

1 – Vedānta sāra, passage – 29.

Also pañcadaśī, 7.90-92.

2 – See Advaita siddhi, patikarmavyavasthā chap.

3 – Vedānta paribhāṣā, 1st chap.

Also pañcadaśī, 7. 91,

that illumines the object after the suspension of ignorance is the Brahman-consciousness, which is the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of all.¹ According to others like *vidyāraṇya*, the reflection of consciousness (*cidābhāsa*) that prompts the psychosis manifests the object.² This Brahman-consciousness, which forms the ground of the world, according to the former view, or the reflection of the consciousness according to the latter, is termed as the *phala caitanya*.³ This pervasion by the *Phala* consciousness is known as *phalavyāpti*. *Nṛsiṃhāśrama*, the writer of *Subodhinī* on *vedānta sāra* accepts the former view, where as *Rāmatīrtha*, another commentator of this work upholds the latter view⁴. However, there is no difference in the result. All the preceptors of Advaita agree with this that one undifferentiated consciousness manifests the whole universe.

In the case of knowing the Brahman *Vṛttivyāpti* is accepted, as the psychosis is necessary to remove the concealment of ignorance. But there is no necessity of *phala* consciousness, in the case of the Brahman, to manifest it, as it is illumination itself. The difference between other objects of knowledge and the Brahman is that in the case of other objects some illumination apart from the

1—Advaita Siddhi, PP.755, 841, 875.

2—Pañcadaśī, 8.4.

3—See M.M. yogendranatha's comm. on Advaita Siddhi. PP. 171-172,

4—See Subodhinī and vidvanmanorañjanī on *vedānta sāra*, passage—29.

destruction of concealment is necessary, where as in the case of the Brahman no illumination is necessary as it is illumination itself.

But the true essence of the self never manifests in the ordinary stage of living. The conditions of waking, dreaming and deep sleep are caused by ignorance, where as the real *ātman* is concealed by them. In these three stages of living, the *ātman*, which is of the essence of consciousness, is associated with the gross body, the subtle body and *avidyā* respectively. According to Advaita vedānta, the true nature of the *ātman* only manifests in the fourth condition or *Turiya*. Gauḍapāda says that when a thing is perceived wrongly it is the condition of dreaming and when it is not perceived at all it is the condition of deeps, sleep, but when both of them are absent it is the condition of *Turiya*.¹ Here both waking and dreaming conditions are taken by the word dream (*svapna*) says the commentator Śaṅkara as wrong perception is common to both of them. It is the condition, when the internal organ is not lost in *avidyā* as it is in deep sleep nor is distracted as it is in the states of waking and dreaming, but is absorbed motionlessly in the *Brahman*.² Here knowledge makes itself free from the duality of object (*grāhya*) and subject (*grāhaka*). Consciousness and Being become one.

1—Māṇḍukya kārīkā, 1.15.

‘*anyathā grhṇataḥ svapno nidrā tattvāmajānataḥ viparyase tayoḥ kṣiṇe turīyaṃ padamaśnute*’.

Aśo Śaṅkara’s comm. on this verse.

2—Māṇḍukya kārīkā, 3.46.

Thoughts, feelings, desires and emotions lose their separate existence and fuse into the integral experience. This state of consciousness is different from the cognitive, emotive and conative functions of the internal organ or mind, as in this system these functions are assigned to the mind but not to consciousness.¹ It is noteworthy to see that in western philosophies these above functions are assigned to the self, as in them mind is always confused with the self.

This condition of consciousness, known as *Turiya avasthā* is not something, which can only be attained somewhere beyond this empirical life. It can also be realised in this mundane life through the cultivation of spiritual disciplines. In the contemplative moods in intense absorption, which can obly be achieved after the purification of mind through the cultivation of the noble qualities, we go beyond the mind. This is known as *Samādhi* or absorption, where the self-luminous light of consciousness shines forth in its ineffable illumination. In this esoteric experience, we get into the ultimate depth of our existence, become one with the source of all knowledge, energy and bliss, rise above the world of becoming and behold the unalloyed eternal beauty. In the words of the great neo-platonic mystic plotinus :² 'Oftentimes when I awake out of the slumber of the body and

1—Bṛ. upaniṣad. 1.5.3,
,*kāmaḥ saṁkalpaḥ.....sarvaṁ mana eva.*'

2—Quoted by S. Radhakrishnan in his
'An idealist view of life'. P. 88, 1979. Ed,

come to a realising sense of myself, and, retiring from the world outside, give myself up to inward contemplation, I behold a wonderful beauty. I believe, then, that I belong to a higher and better world, and I strive to develop within me a glorious life and to become one with the Godhead.' In this state of existence we become free from the boundaries of our limited personalities and find our identity with the unlimited. However, it is not to be confused with self-annihilation. On the otherhand, it is a sort of expansion' which is the inherent nature of the self, but which remains suspended provisionally, owing to the compulsion of *avidyā*. This state of being one with the Absolute is not the condition of frigidity, but a condition full of vivacity. Instead of coldness we find there intense ferment, though paradoxically marked with intrinsic tranquillity. It is the extension of human love, the transformation of human love into divine devotion. In the words of Plotinus : 'It is that union of which the union of earthly lovers who wish to bind their being with each other is a copy'.¹ Dr. Radhakrishnan says :² 'To have one's heart and mind absorbed in love seems to unveil the mystery of the universe. We forget the sense of the outward world in our communion with the grandeur beyond. Religious mysticism often falls into the language of passionate love'. This contemplative state of living

1 – Enneads, vi. 7. 34.

Compare, Bṛ. upaniṣad, 4. 3. 21.

2 – An Idealist view of life, p. 73.

is the highest state of life, in which man lives in the awareness of the *Satyam, Sivam, Sundaram* of Truth, Auspiciousness and Beauty. This is a sort of life which Plato describes¹ as the 'life above all others which man should live in the contemplation of beauty absolute.'

Now in considering the implications and the validity of such an experience it is to be remarked that this sort of experience is felt to be self-sufficient and self-complete. It needs nothing second to prove its validity, as in it the self-luminous light of consciousness shines with its spontaneous illumination. Our conventional psychology with its method of psycho-analysis, which explains every psychic phenomenon in the terms of complexes is too gross to reach its subtlety. The method of psychoanalysis being itself hypothetical cannot be categorically applied to it. On the other hand a complex is an abnormal psychic phenomenon, which is always accompanied with a mental disturbance. But this sort of experience does not create disturbance but harmonises all the aspects of life. It is the basic experience, which gives value and meaning to all other experiences. It is the condition which lies beyond all the doubts and discrepancies, as it is described in the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* :² 'This Absolute, which is both the higher and the lower, being seen, the knot of ignorance of the heart is dispersed, all the doubts are dispelled and all the actions are destroyed.'

1—Vide 'The Symposium' of Plato.

2—Muṇḍaka upaniṣad, 2.2.8.

The validity of such an experience can never be doubted as this experience is nothing other than the very self of the agent who experiences. On the other hand, the invalidity of an experience is proved when it is contradicted. But this sort of experience once achieved is never contradicted subsequently, for which it can never be said to be invalid. The theory of correspondence, which is adduced to prove the truth of knowledge, is utterly meaningless in this case, as this sort of experience has nothing to correspond with, it being free from all objective contacts. The theory of coherence is inapplicable alike, as this experience has got no inherent divisions to cohere. In view of the intrinsic validity of knowledge, accepted by Advaita vedānta, and as this experience is not contradicted afterwards its validity cannot be questioned. However, it should not be thought that this sort of experience is only an imagination, as, like other objective cognitions, it is also said to be factual. In fact, Śāṅkara distinguishes it from *Puruṣavyāpāratantram* (determined by the effort of the individual) and says that it is *vastu tantram* (determined by the fact) alike other forms of cognition.¹ So its factual character can never be questioned.

Not only it is factual, it is also transformative by nature. Spiritual experience transforms the whole personality of the person who undergoes it. It gives an indelible mark even on the outward

1— Śārīraka Bhāṣyam, 1.1.2,

‘*brahmajñānamapi vastutantram eva.*’

behaviours. Such a person always lives in the inward bliss, untouched by the worries and anxieties of the external world. Tensions are lessened and evil attachment disappears. After getting this nothing more seems to be worthy of attainment. It is always marked with a spontaneous satisfaction and an inward sense of fulfilment. Such a man never delights in appreciation nor feels miserable in denunciation. This is 'the condition of *Sthitaprajña* or the man with steadfast mind, as he is described in the Bhagavad-Gītā. In this stage of living all the actions, thoughts and speeches spring from the bottom of truth. The gloom of ignorance is dispelled through the inner illumination. Such a man whose ignorance is destroyed is known as a *Jivanmukta* or one who is free in this very life. Thus, emancipation, according to Advaita vedānta, is not some utopian attainment, it is realistic and practical. The absolute value also satisfies the criterion of utility, although it has nothing to do with the shallow utilitarianism aiming at the satisfaction of the trifle wants of the day-to-day life. So Advaita vedānta is not only a mere system of thought, but it is also a way of life. It is not to be rationalised only, but to be lived also.

This unique experience is also marked with universality. Spiritual experience is not that which can only be achieved by a selected few. Each and every individual has got birth right to it, only that he has to cultivate the prescribed spiritual disciplines. This experience being the very self of

the individual manifests spontaneously when the veil of ignorance is shifted. Śāṅkara says¹ that there is no difference between the great-souled seers like Vāmadeva etc. and the ordinary people of the present time with regard to the knowledge of the Absolute, as it is common to all. This is resounded in the voice of the great vedantin of modern India Swami Vivekananda :² ‘..... religion is not only based upon the experience of ancient times, but that no man can be religious until he has the same perceptions himself.’ This assertion at once repudiates myths and legends in the field of spiritualism and also provides it with an adamant ground to defend its validity. So, according to Advaita Vedānta, religion is not based on faith, there is also the experiential ground of it, which can be verified in the proper method. Thus providing a criterion of verification it defends spiritualism from the attack of the agnostics and the positivists.

Although this condition of the Absolute is the essential nature of the individual, still it is not possible to realise it, unless the veil of ignorance is shifted. To reach this the individual has to pass through a successive process, that is the process of evolution. The doctrine of *Karma* and reincarnation accounts for this. The belief that the individual attains either eternal heaven or eternal

1—Br. upaniṣad comm. of Śāṅkara, P. 267.

2—Vide Introduction, ‘Raja yoga’ by Swami Vivekananda.

hell for his good and evil actions respectively sounds absurd. It cannot explain why for a momentary mistake a man should be doomed to eternal misery. It also does violence to the goodness of the merciful God, whom the adherents of the doctrine make responsible for this sort of unreasonable judgment. There is not even an individual, who is absolutely good or absolutely bad, in the face of which this belief in the eternal reward or eternal punishment seems absurd.

According to the doctrine of *Karma* the individual enjoys the results of his actions either in this birth or in the subsequent births. It holds that the individual does not come into existence accidentally with his birth, but has got a long history behind this. If the individual is brought into existence by chance and is destined to enjoy eternal hell or eternal heaven, then all our theories of essences and values, all our higher pursuits of life, and also hopes and desires are crumbled into pieces. So, the doctrine of *Karma* is not a doctrine of fatalism. On the other hand, it gives us hope and encouragement. Even the lowest of the sinners has this undying possibility of reaching the godhead through this process of evolution. Only we have to quicken this progress by adding to it a bit of consciousness. When we become aware of this process and endeavour to control this evolution, then we cease to rely upon the blind forces of nature for our progress. As Dr. Radhakrishnan says¹ : 'Progress happened in the

1—S. Radhakrishnan's 'The future of civilisation,'
P. 49.

sub-human world, it is willed in the human.' The present condition of the individual is the outcome of his past actions and the future depends upon his present actions. The individual can change his future, but, so far as his present state of existence is concerned he is not free. Thus, the doctrine of pre-destination does not interfere with the acceptance of free-will. So the controversy between determinism and indeterminism does not arise in this case.

To account for this, Advaita vedānta classifies actions into three categories viz-*Prārabdha*, *Sañcita* and *Kriyamāṇa*. *Prārabdha* is the sort of action, which has already begun to give its result. *Sañcita* is that which is stored up but has not yet started to give its result. *Kriyamāṇa* is that which is now being done, whose result will come in the future. Amongst these three categories of *Karma*, *Sañcita* and *āgāmi* or *Kriyamāṇa* can be avoided, as they are still under the control of the individual. *Sañcita* in its seed form can be destroyed by the help of knowledge. *Kriyamāṇa* depends upon the free will of the individuals. When Bhagavadgītā says that the fire of knowledge destroys all the actions, only the actions excepting *rPārabdha* are meant by this.¹ Knowledge cannot obstruct the results of *Prārabdha*, as the arrow, already left to strike some object cannot be withdrawn by the knowledge that it is left towards a wrong object.²

1—See Śankara's Comm. on Bhagavadgītā, 4.37.

2—Vivekacudāmaṇi, vs. 452-453.

So, the man, whose ignorance is destroyed, has also to enjoy the fruits of the *Prārabdha*. Such a man, who only continues his bodily existence for the enjoyment of his *Prārabdha* is known as *Jīvanmukta* or free in life.

Our actions give rise to impression in the mind. These subtle impressions are known as *vāsanās* or *saṃskāras*, which also cause the actions. The actions and impressions reciprocally create each other. The actions create impressions and the impressions create actions. Thus the flow of the world continues. When the fire of knowledge burns the impressions, then only this incessant process comes to an end. Sadānanda says¹ that after the destruction of *ajñāna* and its effects, the *saṃskāras*, the *Brahman*, free from all appearances, remains alone.

Thus, evolution is a process, through which the individual proceeds towards godhead, which is his real state of existence. Everybody is a world in himself and is proceeding towards this universal end, the attainment of Brahmanhood. However, this word 'attainment' should be understood in a figurative sense, as strictly speaking there is no such attainment in the sphere of Advaita vedānta, inasmuch as, this Brahman is the very self of the individual. So, it is nothing more than the sublation of ignorance and its effects. This state of existence is known as emancipation or *Mukti* or *Mokṣa*, which is the end or the fulfilment of this process of evolution. It is the state of enlightenment

1—Vedānta sāra, Passage—38.

and freedom, in which the individual is not bound by the fetters of *Karma*.

Unless one is free from the impurities of *Karma* he is not qualified to pursue the quest for the ultimate truth. The *vāsaanās* work as hindrances in the path of spiritual pursuit. To get rid of them man has to practise certain mental and moral disciplines like restraint of senses and mind, discrimination between eternal and transitory things, detachment from enjoyment, concentration etc. Morality in the vedantic sense is thus only a means but not an end, which only gives the individual spiritual fitness for the attainment of the ultimate truth. It is as Prof, Hiriyantha says:¹ '.....The goal of Indian Philosophy lies as much beyond Ethics as it does beyond logic'. The Taittiriya Upanisad confirms the same when it says that a man who has realised this is never troubled by the thought of doing wrong or not doing right.² Our moral laws are significant for the man, who is bound up in ignorance, but they lose their significance for him, who has already crossed this boundary of *Samsāra*. Sadānanda says³ that humility and the rest which are useful in acquisition of the qualities like absence of enmity etc. follow him as mere ornaments. So a man who has gone beyond morality should not be confused with an immoral man

1—Introduction to Hiriyantha's 'outlines or Indian Philosophy', P, 23.

2—Tait. upaniṣad, 2. 9.

3—Vedānta Sāra, Passage — 37.

However, it does not mean that from the vedantic point of view ethical laws are merely pragmatic or utilitarian in character. The intrinsic values do not vary with the variation of space and time. Utility is too limited a standard to judge the value of the things. On the other hand, the conception of utility of the utilitarians is too gross. Morality is not even the product of our social conventions. Social customs and conventions may change from place to place but it remains constant, as it has got some intimate relation with the inner being of man. When it is said that the ethical laws are not ultimate, it only means that they are the means for the attainment of knowledge, but not end in themselves. As the Bhagavadgītā says :¹ 'All the actions, O Pārtha, end in knowledge.' But, so far as the empirical reality or *vyāvahārika sattā* is concerned moral laws retain their invariable value. They, like the categorical imperative of Kant, do not vary from place to place or time to time. But from the Kantian position the vedantic conception of morality differs in this that according to Vedānta it is not an end in itself. Moral life may be the antecedent of spiritual life, but it is not identical with the latter.

Another fact to be borne in mind is that vedānta upholds a teleological view of the world. Nothing happens without a definite purpose

1—Bhagavadgītā, 4.33.

'Sarvam karmākhilam Pārtha jñāne parisamāpyate'.

behind it. The world is not the blind play of mechanical laws. There is no chance in nature. Everything or every event is the outcome of a certain purpose. Both ethical laws and natural law are the manifestation of a supreme law. This moral order of the world is described as *Rta* in the vedas. The same causal law which governs the physical universe and forms the foundation of the material sciences also governs the ethical world. Thus, the doctrine of *Karma* is explained on the basis of the inviolable law of causality. So far as there remains *avidyā*, there operates this causal law, whose domain is the *Samsāra* only. So, from the ultimate point of view, teleology vanishes with the operation of the causal law, as in the Advaitic conception no ultimate purpose can be found out of the world, it being an endless and beginningless process of *adhyāsa*.

A charge is often made against it that illusionism, preached by Advaita vedānta, falsifies all the moral values. If the world is an illusion then what is the necessity of leading a moral life with so many difficulties? All our intellectual and scientific pursuits are without value if everything is illusory.

But such a charge is based on lack of proper understanding. The critics, who make such a wrong charge forget to know that the philosophy of Advaita cannot be described as illusionism, as it does not aim at the establishment of illusion. The aim of Advaita vedānta is not the nihilistic end of illusionism, but the *Brahman*, which

provides a stable ground for the world of appearance. All our ethical, intellectual, social and scientific values are vouchsafed by Advaita vedānta by accepting threefold reality viz. *Pāramārthika*, *Vyāvahārika* and *Prātibhāsika*. So far as *Vyāvahārika* or empirical world is concerned all these values retain their validity. As Śāṅkara says :¹ "Upto the attainment of self-knowledge, so far as the knowledge of the self as the body is accepted, it is known as *Laukika Pramāṇa* or empirical proof." As Kant has vouchsafed the scientific truth by advocating phenomenal reality, so also vedānta accepts all these values from the empirical point of view, though the phenomenon of Kant differs fundamentally from *Vyāvahārikā sattā* of Śāṅkara. So to say that Advaita vedānta falsifies all our empirical values is based on a lack of insight into the true import of it. The ultimate truth is not contradictory of the empirical truth, it only fulfills the lacunae of the latter. A life beyond ethics is not necessarily an immoral life, nor a life beyond intellect is the life of an ignorant.

Some critics think that the doctrine of *adhyāsa* in Advaita vedānta, according to which, attachment with mind, body, wife, children and other things of the world is due to wrong identification of them with the self, crumbles all our human love and affection into pieces. But such a wrong

1—Śārīreka Bhāṣya, l. l. 4.

*dehātmapratyayo yadvat pramāṇatvena kalpitaḥ
laukikaṃ tad vadevedaṃ pramāṇaṃ tvāmaniścayāt.*

conception is due to lack of proper understanding of the doctrine of *adhyāsa*. Śāṅkara says in his introduction to *Śārīraka Bhāṣya*, when expounding this doctrine, that a man superimposes the external qualities on him and thinks himself to be miserable or happy, when his son, wife etc. are miserable or happy respectively.¹ But this explanation does not really repudiate the justification of all love and affection, as it merely sublates the notion of narrowness or limitedness, through which man is lost in the limitation of the body and the senses. It only says that what we call love in the ordinary sense is not true love, but a sort of selfishness, based on the gratification of human desires, which are created out of ignorance. True love is expounded in the vedantic doctrine '*ātmavat sarvabhūteṣu*'—the feeling of one's own self in all—which is based on Advaita or non-dualism. When one finds himself in other and other in himself there only true love is possible. In this sort of love there is no distinction of sex, no doubt, nor any misery. Neither is it fraught with the limitations of space and time nor there is any touch of impurity. As at the time of perception the external object loses its separate existence in the being of the knower, so also the inner beings of two persons become one in true love. When one loves another and there is a true mingling of their inner beings, the ignorance, which differentiates them before-hand, is provisionally or temporarily suspended, giving rise to the feeling

1—*Śārīraka Bhāṣya*, see Introduction.


of oneness. So true love in the vedantic sense can be defined as the discovery of the unity which underlies the world of diversities. Thus a personal love, which is true by nature, is a step through which man can ascend to the state of universal love. It is as *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* describes:¹ 'He who finds all other beings in himself and himself in all other beings does not have hatred for anybody.' The bond of this true love is the all-pervading limitless, consciousness, the Brahman. As Swami Vivekananda, the modern exponent of vedānta says², 'What is human love? It is more or less affirmation of that unity'. Only worldly people assert this unity ignorantly but they cannot do it consciously for which their love is not everlasting. Thus we have seen that instead of falsifying human love and affection Advaita vedānta provides an adamant ground for them.

When through intuition the direct knowledge of the identity between the individual and the Absolute is achieved, *ajñāna* with its effect, the manifold *saṃsāra*, is dispelled, as the serpent, which is perceived in the rope owing to ignorance, is no more seen when the right knowledge of the rope is ascertained. This state is not a new attainment but is the very essence of the self, which has been forgotten for the time being owing to the concealment of *avidyā*. In this condition man is no more bound by the ties of *Karma*; no more he is the servant of the blind forces of nature, but

1—*Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*,

2—Vide 'Is vedānta the future religion :

becomes independent. This state of enlightenment and freedom is known as '*Mokṣa*' or emancipation, where all the fears of *Samsāra* are sublated. It is the condition which *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* describes:¹ 'You have attained the state of fearlessness, O Janaka, said Yājñavalkya'. This is the ultimatum of the pilgrimage of life, the *summum*, *bonum*, above which nothing is to be achieved. Thus Advaita vedānta is not only to be rationalised but it is to be lived also.



1—*Bṛhadāraṇyaka upanishad*, 4. 2. 4.

'*abhayaṃ vai Janaka Prāpto'sīti hovāca yājñavalkyaḥ*'.

वेदान्तसारः

गूढार्थबोधिनीसहितः

अखण्डं सच्चिदानन्दमवाङ् मनसगोचरम् ।
आत्मानमस्वित्ताधारमाश्रयेऽभौष्टसिद्धये ॥ १ ॥

नित्यं विज्ञानरूपं निखिलगुणगणान्मुक्तमात्मस्वभावं
निर्धूताज्ञानमेकं शमितजलनिधिप्रख्यमानन्दकन्दम् ।
नित्यानन्दं निरीहं निरुपमममलं सर्वधीसाक्षिरूपं
निर्मुक्तं निर्विकल्पं श्रुतिशिखरगणैर्लक्षितं तन्नमानि ॥ १ ॥

जगत्सर्वं यस्मिन् भुजग इव रज्जौ प्रकटित—
सत्त्वव्यावृत्त्या यत् सफलमभिधेयं श्रुतिमुखैः ।
परं ब्रह्माभिरूपं निरुपमसुखं ज्ञानमचलं
परं ज्योतिर्वन्दे परमभरणं क्लेशहरणम् ॥ २ ॥

यस्याः सुरासुरगणैरतुलः प्रभावोऽ—
शक्योऽभिधातुमिति वेदविदां प्रसिद्धिः ।
सन्तापसञ्चयहरां सकलार्थसिद्धि —
दात्रीं महेशतरुणीं सततं भजामि ॥ ३ ॥
वेदान्तार्थं समुद्धर्तुं जातं ब्रह्माण्डमण्डले ।
शङ्करं तमहं वन्दे शङ्कराचार्यविग्रहम् ॥ ४ ॥

नत्वा देवं जगन्नाथं नीलाद्रयुज्ज्वलमण्डनम् ।
कुर्वे वेदान्तसारस्य व्याख्यां गूढार्थबोधिनीम् ॥ ५ ॥

शिष्टाचारमनुसन् ग्रन्थादौ मङ्गलं निबध्नाति अखण्डमिति । अखण्डत्वं
नाम सजातीयविजातीयस्वगतभेदराहित्यम् । ब्रह्मणश्चिदेकरूपत्वाज्जात्यादि-
रहितत्वाच्च भेदत्रयस्य नात्रावकाश इत्यर्थः । अथवाखण्डशब्दोऽनन्तशब्दपर्यायः ।
अन्तवत्त्वं नाम देशावच्छिन्नत्वं वा कालावच्छिन्नत्वं वा वस्त्ववच्छिन्नत्वं वा ।
ब्रह्मणस्तु देशकालादिभिरनवच्छिन्नत्वादनन्तत्वम् । एतावदखण्डमित्युक्ते शून्ये अति
व्याप्तिः स्यात्, तद्व्यावर्तयितुमुच्यते सदिति । सत्त्वमिति त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वं नाम
बाधविरहितत्वं वा । आहार्यसंस्कार्यादिसर्वपरिणामरहितमित्यर्थः, यत् सत्यं तन्न
त्रिपर्येतीत्यर्थलाभात् । एतेन परिणामिनित्यमपास्य कूटस्थनित्यं लक्षयति ।

सदित्युक्ते जडेऽतिव्याप्तिः स्यात्, तद्व्यावर्त्तयितुमुच्यते चिदिति । ज्ञानस्वरूप-
मित्यर्थः । न तु वैशेषिकाणामिव ज्ञानाधिकरणम्, गुणगुणिनोर्भेदाभावात् ।
तयोः सम्बन्धान्तरस्वीकारेऽनवस्थोपपत्तेः । ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानरूपत्वेऽपि तस्मिन्
काचित्पुरुषार्थता नास्तीति पक्षं निरस्यति आनन्दमिति । सुखस्वरूपमित्यर्थः ।
सुखप्राप्तदुःखपरिहारयोः सर्वेषां जन्तूनां निसर्गत एवेष्टत्वाद् ब्रह्मणि सर्वेषामपि
प्रवृत्तिर्युक्तेति भावः । 'यत्र नान्यत् पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति
स भूमा । यत्रान्यत् पश्यत्यन्यच्छृणोत्यन्यद् विजानाति तदल्पं', यो वै भूमा
तत्सुखं नाल्पे सुखमस्ती" त्यादि¹ श्रुतेः । आत्मतः सर्वेष्वपि प्रियतमत्वं दर्शयति
"आत्मनो वा कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवती" ति² । नन्वेवं सुखस्वरूपत्वेन प्रतिपत्ति-
विषयत्वे सिद्धे ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणान्तरगोचरत्वापत्तिः स्यादिति सन्देहं दूरीकरोति
अवाङ्मनसगोचरमिति । वाक् च मनश्च वाङ्मनसे, तयोरगोचरोऽविषयः ।
जातिव्यक्तिगुणादीनादाय शब्दप्रवृत्तिर्भवति । ब्रह्मणस्तु जात्यादिरहितत्वेन
शब्दाविषयत्वमिति भावः । सर्वविकल्परहितत्वात् स्वतःप्रकाशरूपत्वाच्च
जडत्वभास्य मनसस्तत्प्रकाशने सामर्थ्यं नास्तीत्यर्थः । तथा च श्रुतिः 'यतो वावो
निवर्त्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह' ।³ अखिलाधारमिति । ब्रह्मविवर्त्तस्य सकलप्रपञ्च-
स्याधिष्ठानत्वेनाधारः । 'अस्मिन् सर्वमोतं च प्रोतं चे'ति श्रुतेः ।⁴ एवंभूतं
ब्रम्हाभिन्नमात्मानमाश्रये । कुतः । अभीष्टसिद्धये । अभीष्टं फलं चात्र
ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्राप्तिः सर्ववेदान्तानां प्रतिपाद्यत्वात् (1)

Translation—For the accomplishment of desire I resort to the self, which is partless, existence, knowledge, bliss, beyond words and mind, and the substratum of the whole universe. (1)

Comm.—In this benedictory verse the writer describes the Brahman, which is, according to Advaita Vedānta, the final beatitude of life and the last explanation of the riddles of the world. Here accomplishment of desire means the attainment of emancipation, which is the highest good of life.

1—Chāndogya up., 7.23.1.

2—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up., 2.4.5.

3—Taittirīya up., 2.9.1.

4—Śvetāśvatara up., 6.23.

अखण्डम्—This word, which is the adjective of Brahman, according to 'S' means 'devoid of three sorts of differences'. The first is the difference within the same class or *Sajāṇīyabheda*, which exists between two things of a particular class. The second is the difference between two persons or things of two different classes or *Vijāṇīyabheda*. *Svagatabheda* is the difference between the limbs of a particular thing. So, according to this commentary this word means 'undifferentiated'.

'V' takes it to signify the sense infinite or *ananta*, which means limitless. Limitation is of three kinds viz. spatial limitation, temporal limitation and limitation due to individuality (*Vastutah Pariccheda*). All things of the world are fraught with the limitations of space and time. When we say that a particular thing is of such and such dimension or a particular thing exists in a particular time, we really assert its spatial and temporal limitations. The abstract facts, which have got no spatial existence, certainly exist in time. Moreover, everything in this world is different from any other thing of the world. Thus, the very notion of individuality implies limitations. Both the interpretations intend to show that Brahman is the impartite, undifferentiated Reality.

सच्चिदानन्दम्—Now, by saying 'Partless' or unlimited, 'void' or '*śūnya*' may be meant, to exclude

'S' means *subodhinī* comm, of Nṛsiṃhāśrama.

'v' means *vidvanmanorañjanī* comm. of Rāmatīrtha.

which, another adjective '*Sat*' or real is given. This epithet means that Brahman is Reality or Existence or Being. It is not, however, the Predicate of the Brahman, but the essence of it. '*Sat*' in the vedantic sense, signifies that which is never sublated afterwards (*bādharahitam*). Thus, the principle of non-contradiction is the criterion of reality, provided that it should not be thought to be a mere axiom of thought or logic. *Bādha*, in the vedantic sense, not only signifies logical contradiction, but sublation of something whether it is actual or apparent. So strictly speaking, *sat* means, in this context, that, which never undergoes changes (*yat satyam tat na viparyeti*).

By saying reality or existence, an insentient or lifeless bare existence may be meant, to exclude which, another adjective is given. This second word '*cit*' means knowledge or consciousness, which is not the characteristic of the Brahman, but the very essence of it, as the heat of fire is one with it. 'V' argues that there is no proof to establish the difference between an attribute and its substratum, where the former never varies with the existence of the latter. Knowledge is self-revelatory (*Svaprakāśa*) as to require anything other to establish it will lead to infinite regress.

If it is asked, what is the necessity of knowing the Brahman, then it is said that this Brahman is not only Existence and knowledge, it is also of the essence of bliss. The desire of all in the world is the attainment of happiness and the avoidance of misery. Whatever may be our

ideals and values, everybody is basically hedonistic by nature, provided that it is not understood only in the gross sense. By the third adjective 'Bliss' it is intended to be said that the inquiry regarding the Brahman is not merely an intellectual quest, but it is the end which all of the world aim at. The happiness, which we get in the world, is not free from misery, which does not last for all the times. Only true happiness can be achieved in that, which surpasses the limitations of space and time, what the upaniṣad says ; 'which is plenitude is happiness, as happiness does not lie in the limited.'¹ The state of being one with the Absolute or *Mokṣa* is the state of highest bliss, unmixed with the miseries of the world, which is described as the highest attainment of life or *Paramapuruṣārtha*.

It is rightly shown by Śaṅkara that the words 'real' and 'knowledge' can signify finite things and limited knowledge, but when these are taken with the word 'infinite', then Brahman is only signified.² In fact, 'v' takes all these words in one compound '*akhaṇḍa-saccidānanda*.. It is to be borne in mind that these adjectives are not deduced from a Pre-conceived idea of the Brahman, as the adjectives of the substance, conceived by spinoza, are deduced from the *a priori* idea of the substance. Śaṅkara says that these terms like '*satya*', '*jñāna*' (existence, knowledge) etc. do not have any mutual relation within themselves, but each of them is related with

1—Chāndogya up., 7.23.1.

2—See Śaṅkara's Comm on Taittirīya up., 2.1.1.

the other so far as they qualify the Brahman¹. So, no charge can be made that these adjectives are merely the analytic description of a Pre-conceived idea, as, far from being speculative, the knowledge of the Brahman is based on the adamant and unique ground of self-realization.

अवाङ्मनसगोचरम्—It exists beyond the reach of words and mind. Our language and mind can work within the boundaries of the empirical world. Language can operate through the application of different categories of words like quality, quantity, individuality, form, relation and class. That which is devoid of all of them, can-not be expressed through language. So also mind can work within the boundaries of the sensible world with its categories and concepts. But it cannot work beyond the reach of its concepts. In the vedantic sense, the mind or the internal organ, being itself insentient, which works through the illumination of consciousness only, cannot penetrate the realm of the self. Thus the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* says : 'By what the knower can be known ?'² The *Kena Upaniṣad* describes the self as that which is not known through the mind, but through which only the mind can know.³

Then it may be asked, how can it be described as Existence, knowledge, infinite etc. ? The fact is that these words only negatively describe

1—Śaṅkara's Comm. on Taittirīya up., 2.1.1.

Ātmyādisabdā na parasparam Sambadhyante etc.

2—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up., 4.5 15.

3—Kena up., 15.

the Brahman by discarding unreal, insentient and finite things of the world. However, it does not mean that these are mere empty concepts with nothing to signify. A concept is a Pseudo-concept or empty concept, when it signifies nothing either positively or negatively, which is not the case. So, knowledge regarding the Brahman as existing beyond speeches and mind is not speculative but factual.

अलिङ्गधारम्—Substratum of the whole universe. In the previous adjectives Brahman is directly expressed. Definition, in which some thing is directly expressed, is known as *svarūpa lakṣaṇa* and the indirect definition is made through the help of something else, which is related to the thing in such a way that the one can be understood by the other. This is known as *tatastha lakṣaṇa*. The term substratum of all indirectly signifies the Brahman. 'S' takes it to mean the substratum of the appearance of the whole universe (*vivartādhiṣṭhāna*). 'V' takes it to mean the cause of creation, subsistence and destruction. The Upaniṣad also describes the Brahman as that from which all the things come out, in which all of them take rest and to which they return at last.¹ In the context of causality, *vivartavāda* being accepted by Advaita Vedānta, it also means the same, the substratum of the appearances.

आत्मानम्—Here the word *ātman* signifies the Brahman but not the *Jīva*. 'V' interprets it as the indicated meaning of the term '*tvam*' in the

1—Taittirīya up, 3.1.1.

Mahāvākya 'tattvamasi'. This indicated meaning (lakṣyārtha) is the Pure Consciousness or the *Turiyacaitanya*, which is nothing other than the Brahman.

मूलम्—अर्थतोऽप्यद्वयानन्दानतीतद्वैतमानतः ।

गुरुनाराध्य वेदान्तसारं वक्ष्ये यथामति । २।

व्याख्या—न केवलं ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रैकगम्यत्वम्, अपरोक्षानुभूतिरपि तस्मिन् प्रमाणमिति जिज्ञापयिषुः, 'यस्य देवे परा भक्तिर्यथा देवे तथा गुरौ'¹ इति शास्त्रोक्तिं प्रतिपालयन्नाह अर्थत इति अद्वयानन्दाख्यानं गुरुनाराध्य यथामति वेदान्तसाराख्यं ग्रन्थं वक्ष्ये । नाश्रो दित्थादिवत् संज्ञामात्रतां व्यावर्त्तयन्नन्वर्थसंज्ञकत्वमाह अर्थत इति । अद्वये भेदरहिते ब्रह्मणि आनन्दो यस्य सः अद्वयानन्दः । तस्य हेतुमाह अतीतद्वैतमानत इति । निरस्तसमस्तभेदप्रत्यय-त्वादित्यर्थः । २

Translation— Having revered the adorable preceptor, who is not only *Advayānanda* by name but also in reality owing to the transcendence of the appearance of duality, I shall expound the essence of vedānta to the best of my knowledge. (2)

Comm — In this verse the writer salutes his preceptor, named *Advayānanda*. The writer says that the name is a significant one, as his preceptor is one of those who find happiness in the non-dual Brahman, which can only be achieved after the sublation of the appearance of duality. When ignorance is got rid of, the attachment for the worldly enjoyments loses its hold on the individual, who being free from all the bindings, finds the highest bliss in the non-dual Brahman. Such a man is known as *Jīvanmukta* or free in this very life. This verse testifies to the fact that the ideal

1—Śvetāśvatara up, 6.23.

of vedānta is not something utopian, but very much factual and practical.

मूलम्—वेदान्तो नामोपनिषत्प्रमाणं तदुपकारीणि शारीरकसूत्रादीनि च । अस्य वेदान्तप्रकरणत्वात्तदीयैरेवानुबन्धैस्तद्वत्तासिद्धेर्न ते पृथगालोचनीयाः । तत्रानुबन्धो नामाधिकारिविषयसम्बन्धप्रयोजनानि । ३

व्याख्या—वेदान्तो नामेति । मुख्यवृत्त्या वेदान्तापरपर्यायोपनिषच्छब्दो ब्रह्मात्मैक्यसाक्षात्कारविषयः, अविद्यादेः, संसारबीजस्य विशरणाद्विनाशनाशनादित्यनेनार्थयोगेन उपनिषत्स्य क्षिप्रप्रत्ययान्तस्य सदेर्धातोस्तदर्थोऽङ्गमात् । गौणवृत्त्या तु तत्प्रतिपादको ग्रन्थोऽप्युपनिषदित्युच्यते । तदुपकारित्वेन अयातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति¹ सूत्राणि साध्यादयश्च ग्रन्था अपि वेदान्तशब्देन परामृश्यन्ते । ३

Translation—Vedānta means the means of right knowledge in the form of the Upaniṣads and other scriptures like *Śārīraka Sūtra* etc, which are conducive to their understanding. The present work being a manual on vedānta with the same *anubandhas* (the accompanying considerations) as the others are, there is no need to consider them separately. The *anubandhas* "are the person qualified, subject matter, relation and necessity. (3)

Comm.—According to Advaita vedānta there are six pramāṇas, amongst which scriptural testimony is one. The other five are *Pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi*. *Vedānta Paribhāṣa* differentiates two sorts of *Prāmāṇas* viz. the *Pramāṇas* which give the empirical truth and the *pramāṇas*, which give the ultimate truth.² The upaniṣads form the *Pramāṇa* of the second category. The supra-sensical facts

1—Brahma sūtra, 1.1.1.

2—Vedānta Paribhāṣā, P. 113, Adyar lib. Ed. 942.

cannot be known by *pratyakṣa* 'or perception. The facts which are non-perceptual by nature cannot be also known through reason, as reason operates in the sphere of 'perceptual knowledge. The word *upaniṣad* primarily means the intuitional knowledge of Brahman, which sublates or destroys *avidyā*, as the word is derived from the root $\sqrt{\text{sad}}$ with the affixes 'upa' and 'ni', which means that which destroys¹. Secondarily it means the books, in which this is written. This is rightly shown by 'V'.² The writer says that the aphorisms of Bādarāyaṇa and others, which include the commentaries, those are conducive to the proper understanding of vedānta are also included in this *pramāṇa*.

अनुबन्ध—*Anubandha* is a necessary pre-consideration, which gives a primary idea about the scope and limitations of the work.

मूलम्—अधिकारी तु विधिवदधीतवेदवेदाङ्गत्वेनापाततोऽधिगता-
खिलवेदार्थोऽस्मिन् जन्मनि जन्मान्तरे वा काम्यनिसिद्धवर्जनपुरःसरं नित्य-
नैमित्तिकप्रायश्चित्तोपासनानुष्ठानेन निर्गतनिखिलफलमषतया नितान्तनिर्मलस्वान्तः
साधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्नः प्रमाता । काम्यानि स्वर्गादीष्टसाधनानि ज्योतिष्टोमीमादीनि ।
निषिद्धानि नरकाद्यनिष्टसाधनानि ब्राह्मणहननादीनि । नित्यान्यकरणे
प्रत्यवायसाधनानि सन्ध्यावन्दनादीनि । नैमित्तिकानि पुत्रजन्माद्यनुबन्धीनि जाते-
ष्वादीनि । प्रायश्चित्तानि पापक्षयसाधनानि चान्द्रायणः दीनि । उपासनानि
सगुणब्रह्मविषयमानसव्यापाररूपाणि शाण्डिल्यविद्यादीनि । एतेषां नित्यादीनां
बुद्धिशुद्धिः परमं प्रयोजनम् । उपासनानां तु चित्तैकाग्र्यं 'तमेतमात्मानं'
वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन' इत्यादिश्रुतेः³, 'तपसा कल्मषं हन्ति'

1—Śaṅkara's introduction to his Comm. on kāṭha up.

2,—Vidvanmanorañjanī, pp. 66-67.

3—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up. 4.4.22.

इत्यादिस्मृतेश्च ।¹ नित्यनैमित्तिकप्रायश्चित्तोपासनानां त्ववान्तरफलं पितृलोक-
सत्यलोकप्राप्तिः 'कर्मणा पितृलोको विद्यया देवलोक' इत्यादिश्रुतेः ।² साधनानि
नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकेहामुत्रार्थफलभोगविरागशमादिषट्कसम्पत्तिमुमुक्षुत्वानि ।
नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकस्तावद् ब्रह्मैव नित्यं वस्तु ततोऽन्यदखिलमनित्यमिति
विवेचनम् । ऐहिकानां लक्ष्चन्दनवनितादिविषयभोगानां कर्मजन्यतयाऽनित्य-
त्ववदामुष्मिकाणामप्यमृतादिभोगानामनित्यतया तेभ्यो नितरां विरतिरिहामु-
त्रार्थफलभोगविरागः । शमादयस्तु शमदमोपरतितितिक्षासमाधानश्रद्धाख्याः ।
शमस्तावच्छ्रवणादिव्यतिरिक्तविषयेभ्यो मनसो निग्रहः । दमो वाह्येन्द्रियाणां
तद्व्यतिरिक्तविषयेभ्यो निवर्तनम् । निवर्तितानामेतेषां तद्व्यतिरिक्तविषयेभ्य
उपरमणमुपरतिरथवा विहितानां कर्मणां विधिना परित्यागः । तितिक्षा
शीतोष्णादिद्वन्द्वसहिष्णुता । निगृहीतस्य मनसः श्रवणादौ तदनुगुणविषये च
समाधिः समाधानम् । गुरूपदिष्टवेदान्तवाक्येषु विश्वासः श्रद्धा । मुमुक्षुत्वं
मोक्षेच्छा । एवंभूतः प्रमाता अधिकारी 'शान्तो दान्त' इत्यादिश्रुतेः³ ।
उक्तं च—⁴

‘प्रशान्तचित्ताय जितेन्द्रियाय प्रहीणदोषाय यथोक्तकारिणे ।

गुणान्वितायानुगताय सर्वदा प्रदेयमेतत् सततं मुमुक्षवे ’ ॥ इति ।

विषयो जीवब्रह्मैक्यं शुद्धचैतन्यं प्रमेयं तत्रैव वेदान्तानां तात्पर्यात् ।
सम्बन्धस्तु तदैक्यप्रमेयस्य तत्प्रतिपादकोपनिषत्प्रमाणस्य च बोध्यबोधकभावः ।
प्रयोजनं तु तदैक्यप्रमेयगताज्ञाननिवृत्तिः स्वस्वरूपानन्दावासिश्च 'तरति
शोकमात्मविद्' इत्यादिश्रुतेः⁵ 'ब्रह्मविद् ब्रह्मैव भवति' इत्यादिश्रुतेश्च⁶ । ४ ।

व्याख्या—प्रेक्षावतां प्रवृत्तिमनुकूलयितुमनुबन्धचतुष्टयं विवृणोति
अधिकारीति । यथोक्तसाधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्न एव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायामधिकारी,
अधिकार्यपेक्षात्वात् फलसिद्धेः । विषयसम्बन्धादयस्तु यथोक्तलक्षणाः । ४

Translation—The knower, who has already possessed the general knowledge of the vedas

1—Manusmṛti, 12. 104.

2—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up, 1. 5. 16.

3—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up., 4. 4. 23.

4—Upadeśasāhasrī, 16. 72.

5—Chāndogya up., 7.1.3.

6—Mundaka up., 3. 2. 9, modified.

'brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati.'

through the proper study of the vedas and the vedāṅgas; whose mind is purified with the cleansing of all the sins by the performance of obligatory, occasional, purificatory rites and worship, either in this birth or in the previous birth, with abstinence from the forbidden and optional actions; who is endowed with the four-fold aid is qualified (in the inquiry of the Brahman). The optional actions like '*Jyotiṣṭoma*' are means for the attainment of desired ends like heaven. The forbidden like the assassination of a *Brāhmaṇa* are cause of undesirable results like hell. The obligatory actions are those, the non-performance of which incurs sins. The occasional acts are like the birth rites, which are performed owing to the birth of a son etc. The purificatory rites are *Cāndrāyana* etc., which are means for the destruction of sins. Worship is the mental act, having the qualified Brahman as its object, like *Śāṇḍilya-vidyā* etc. The supreme necessity of these rites like obligatory etc. is the purification of intellect. The need of worship is concentration of mind as it is said in the *Śruti*: 'The *Brāhmaṇas* seek to know this *ātman* through vedic study and sacrifice' etc., and also in the *Smṛti*: 'One destroys the sins through penance'. The incidental result of the obligatory, occasional and purificatory rites as well as of worship is the attainment of the world of the fathers and the world of *Brahmā*: 'Through actions the world of the fathers is obtained and through knowledge the world of the Gods'. The four aids are discrimination between eternal and ephemeral, detachment from enjoy-

ment in this world and hereafter, the six possessions like equanimity of mind, control of the senses etc. and desire for emancipation. Discrimination between eternal and ephemeral is to think that Brahman is only eternal and all else are transient. Detachment from enjoyment in both the worlds is abstaining from the enjoyment, having the thought in the mind that as the enjoyment of garlands, sandal paste, women etc. in this world, comes to an end, so also the relishing of the heavenly things like nectar etc. comes to an end. The third category, the restraint of mind and the rest, consists of *śama*, *dama*, *uparati*, *titikṣā*, *saṁādhāna* and *śraddhā* etc. *Sāma* of these, is the restraint of mind from other things, save the study of vedānta. *Dama* is the withdrawal of the external senses from others excepting the said aspect. *Uparati* is the abstinence of them when they are withdrawn or it is the renunciation of the actions in the formal way. *Titikṣā* is the capacity to tolerate the duals like cold and heat etc. *Samādhāna* is the fixity of mind in the hearing (of vedānta) etc. and its helping matters when it is brought under control. *Śraddhā* is the faith in the teachings of vedānta as explained by the teacher. *Mumukṣutva* is the desire for emancipation. This sort of knower is qualified, as it is said in the *śruti* : 'Calm, having the senses controlled' etc. It is said : 'This knowledge is to be imparted to one, who has the peaceful state of mind, having subdued the senses, free from sins, dutiful, having the possession of virtues, devoted and who seeks always emancipation.'

Now the subject matter (of vedānta)—The knowable is the identity of the individual self and the Brahman, which is the pure consciousness, as there lies the import of the vedāntas. The relation is the state of being described and describer of this knowledge of identity and the means of knowledge that is the upaniṣads, respectively. The necessity is the sublation of ignorance, pertaining to this identity and attainment of bliss, that is the essence of the self. as it is said in the *Śruti* : 'A knower of the self surpasses the sorrows' and 'He who knows the Brahman, becomes himself the Brahman'. 4

Comm—Unless the mind is purified one cannot get the steadfastness, which is required to make *samādhi* possible. The impure impressions cause mental distraction. To purify the mind certain mental and moral disciplines are to be practised, as in the impure mind the spiritual truth cannot be reflected. Such a man, whose impurities are washed away, is said to be qualified for the pursuit of self-knowledge.

Amoungst the sets of actions, the optional actions or the actions that are performed with a view to attaining a desired object and the forbidden actions, the performance of which incurs sins, are to be avoided, as they act as hindrances in the path of spiritual life. But other sets of actions like obligatory rites purify the mind. When the mind is purified through them, a man can achieve the four-fold aid (*sādhana-catustaya*), by which he becomes eligible to make *brahmajijñāsā* or the inquiry regarding the Brahman.

शाण्डिल्यविद्या—This is a reference to the way of worship, which is mentioned in the chāndogya upaniṣad (3.14). In this worship the aspirant has to meditate upon the *saguṇa Brahman*, immanent in the whole universe, in his own heart. Other forms of worship like *virāṭkoṣa upāsanā* (chāndogya up. 3.15) etc. are also found in the upaniṣads.

मूलम्—अयमधिकारी जननमरणादिसंसारानलतप्तो दीप्तशिरा जलराशिमिवोपहारपाणिः श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठं गुरुमुपसृत्य तमनुसरति, 'समित्पाणिः श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठम्' इत्यादिश्रुतेः¹ । स परमकृपया अध्यारोपापवादन्यायेनेनमुपदिशति 'तस्मै स विद्वान्मुपसन्नाय प्राह' इत्यादिश्रुतेः² । ५ ।

व्याख्या—यथोक्तप्राधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्नोऽधिकारी संसारानलसंतप्तः सन् ब्रह्मात्मैक्यविज्ञानयुक्तं गुरुमुपगम्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां कुर्यात्, 'आचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेद' इति श्रुतेः³ । विरक्तस्यैव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेरविरक्तस्य विषयापहतचित्तस्य तदभावादुच्यते संसारानलसंतप्त इति । परमरहस्यत्वाद् ब्रह्मविज्ञानं येन केनचिदपि पुरुषेण प्राप्तुं न शक्यत इत्यर्थः । ५ ।

Trans —As a man with burning head (owing to the heat of the sun) runs towards a reservoir of water, so also this person, having the requisite qualification, tormented by the fire of the world of birth and death, with an offering in the hand (as a token of reverence) approaches a preceptor, well-versed in the vedic lore and devoted to the Brahman and follows him, as it is stated in the *Śruti* : 'He approaches with fuels in hand a preceptor, well-versed in the scriptures and established in the Brahman.' He, out of deep compassion, instructs him by the method of *adhyāropa* (superimposition) and *apavāda* (negation), as it is stated in the *śruti* : 'To him, who

1—Muṇḍaka up., 1 2 12.

2—Muṇḍaka up., 1. 2. 13.

3—Chāndogya up., 6. 12. 2.

has approached him, the knower explains it' etc. (5)

Comm.—Without a spiritual preceptor it is difficult to make progress in the spiritual path, as the aspirant is not yet acquainted with the ultimate truth. *Kaṭha upaniṣad* describes it as a path difficult to tread, which is sharp like the edge of razor,¹ for which the help of a *guru* is exteremely required. *Chāndogya upaniṣad* says that a man, who has a preceptor can only know it.² (5)

मूलम्—असंप्रभूतायां रज्जौ सर्पारोपवद्वस्तुन्यवस्त्वारोपोऽध्यारोपः । वस्तु सच्चिदानन्दानन्ताद्वयं ब्रह्म । अज्ञानादिसकलजडसमूहोऽवस्तु । अज्ञानं तु सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वचनीयं त्रिगुणात्मकं ज्ञानविरोधि भावरूपं यत्किञ्चिदिति वदन्त्यहमज्ञ इत्याद्यनुभवान् 'देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगूढाम्' इत्यादिश्रुतेश्च^३ । (६)

व्याख्येयम्—अध्यारोपापवादव्याधेनोपदिशति इति प्रागुक्तम् । अध्यारोपं दशयत्यसंप्रभूतायामिति । वस्तुनि सत्यस्वरूपे ब्रह्मणि अवस्तुत्वेनाभिमतस्याज्ञानादिसकलसत्सारस्यारोपः अध्यारोपः । अध्यारोपोऽध्यासो भ्रान्तिरित्यनर्थान्तरः शब्दः । इदमेव दार्ष्टान्तिकं दृष्टान्तेन ब्रूयति असंप्रभूतायां रज्जौ इति । व्यावहारिकवस्तुत्वेनाभिमतायामसंप्रभूतायां रज्जौ प्रातिभासिकसर्पस्यारोपोऽध्यारोपः । एवं पारमार्थिकवस्तुत्वेनाभिमते ब्रह्मणि व्यावहारिकस्य जगतोऽप्यध्यारोपः । तत्र दृष्टान्ते रज्ज्ववच्छिन्नचैतन्यनिष्ठादिद्या संस्कारादिदोषैर्बुद्धबोधिता सती सर्पाकारेण सर्पज्ञानाकारेण च परिणमति । सर्पाकाराध्यासोऽर्थाध्यासः सर्पज्ञानाकाराध्यासश्च ज्ञानाध्यास इति अभिधीयेते । द्विविधोऽयमध्यासोऽधिष्ठानरज्जुपाक्षात्कारेण निवर्तते ।

वस्तुत्वावस्तुत्वयोर्लक्षणे स्फुटीकरोति वस्त्विति । अध्यासं व्युत्पाद्य तत्कारणमज्ञानं लक्षयति अज्ञानं त्विति । किमिदमज्ञानं सद्रूपमसद्रूपं वा । नाद्यमभावानुपपत्तेः, न द्वितीयं प्रतीयनुपपत्तेः । नाप्युभयरूपं विरोधापत्तेः । तथा हि अज्ञानस्य सद्रूपत्वे बाधानुपपत्तिः, बाधविरहितत्वमेव सत्त्वमिति

1—Kaṭha up, 1 3 14.

2—Chāndogya up., 6.14.2.

3—Śvetāśvatard up., 1.3.

लक्षणात् । असद्रूपत्वे च बन्ध्यापुत्रवत् प्रतीयमानत्वं न स्यात् दाहप्रतीत्योः
सद्भावादनिर्वर्तनीयत्वम् । तथा चोक्तं तत्त्वप्रदीपिकायाम्¹—

‘प्रत्येकं सदसत्त्रयस्यां विचारपदवीं न यत ।

गाहतेतदनिर्वाच्यमाहुर्वेदान्तवेदिनः’ ॥

न च सत्त्वासत्त्वयोरेकतरस्य निषेधेऽन्यतरस्य प्रतिपत्त्युपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम्,
परस्परविरहव्याप्यतास्वीकारे तदनापत्तेः । गोत्वाश्वत्वयोः परस्परविरहरूपत्वे
सति तदापत्तात्रपि परस्परविरहव्याप्यतास्वीकारे विरोधाभावात् । तथा
चोक्तमद्वैतसिद्धौ²—‘नापि तृतीयः, तस्य व्याधाताप्रयोजकत्वात् ।
गोत्वाश्वत्वयोः परस्परविरहव्याप्यत्वेऽपि तदभावयोः उद्घादादेकत्र सहोपल-
म्भात् ।’ प्रकृते च सत्त्वासत्त्वयोः परस्परविरहव्याप्यत्वमेव । तस्माद् द्वयोरेकत्र
निषेधे न काचिद्भानिः । मिथ्याज्ञानमज्ञानमिति पक्षं निरस्यति त्रिगुणात्मक-
मिति । कार्यतत्त्वत्वादिगुणत्रयमादाय कारणमध्याकृतमपि त्रिगुणात्मकमित्युच्यते ।
ज्ञानाभावं व्युत्पद्यति भावरूपमिति । भावरूपत्वे ब्रह्मवद् बाधितत्वं न
स्यादिति कथयति ज्ञानविरोधीति । ज्ञानं विरोधि निवर्त्तकं यस्य ।

नन्वज्ञानस्य ज्ञानाभावरूपत्वे लाघवात् भावरूपत्वे चानुभवविरोधात्
कयं भावरूपतेति चेत् उच्यते—अज्ञानस्याभावरूपत्वे श्रुतियुक्त्यनुवादिविरो-
धात्तत्र प्रतिपादयितुं शक्यते । तथा हि ज्ञानाभावोऽज्ञानमिति पक्षे अभाव-
प्रतियोगि यज्ज्ञानं तत् किं साक्षिचैतन्यं किंवा वृत्तिज्ञानमथवात्मगुणः । साक्षि-
ज्ञानस्य ज्ञानस्वरूपस्य नित्यत्वात् ‘सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तमिति क्षुतेर³भावानुपपत्तिः ।
अन्तःकरणवृत्तौ ज्ञानशब्दस्यौपचारिकतया तस्याभावस्याज्ञानत्वे यथार्थतो
ज्ञानाभावस्यासिद्धत्वात् । तृतीयपक्षे किं ज्ञानविशेषाभाव एवाज्ञानमथवा
ज्ञानसामान्याभावः ? ज्ञानविशेषाभावस्याज्ञानत्वेऽपि ज्ञानान्तरसद्भावाज्ज्ञाना-
भावो न सिद्धः स्यात् । ज्ञानसामान्याभावस्य तत्त्वेऽपि न ज्ञानाभावग्रहः,
अभावज्ञानस्य धर्मिप्रतियोगिज्ञानसापेक्षत्वादात्मनि धर्मिणि ज्ञाने च प्रतियोगिनि
स्फुटतरं विज्ञायमाने कथं वा ज्ञानाभावग्रहः ? ‘सुखमहमस्वाप्सं न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्’
इति परामर्शसिद्धसौमुक्षिकानुभवोऽपि भावरूपाज्ञाने प्रमाणम् । न च तस्या-
भावरूपता पूर्वोक्तदोषप्रसङ्गात् । न चेदं सुषुप्तिकालीनज्ञानाभावानुमानम्,
तदनुमापकस्य लिङ्गस्याप्रसिद्धेः । सामग्र्यभावस्यापि लिङ्गत्वानुपपत्तेः, सामग्र्य-
भावेन ज्ञानाभावो ज्ञानाभावेन च सामग्र्यभाव इति परस्परान्योऽन्याश्रयापत्तेः ।

1—Citsukhi, 1.13,

2—Advaita siddhi, pp. 38-39.

3—Taittiriya up, 2.1.1.

तथा चोक्तं तत्त्वप्रदीपिकायाम्—¹ 'नायं सुषुप्तिकालो नानुभवजपरामर्शः, किन्तु स्थितस्येदानीमेव सौषुप्तिकज्ञानाभावानुमानमिति च न वाच्यम्; तदनु-
मापकलिङ्गासिद्धेः' इति ।

ननु तस्य भावरूपत्वे निर्वचनीयत्वं स्यात् कथं तर्ह्यनिर्वचनीयत्वमिति
कथयति—यत्किञ्चिदिति । भावरूपमिति लक्षणं केवलमभावनित्यर्थं न तु
ब्रह्मवद्भावरूपत्वं प्रतिपादयितुम् । वस्तुतस्तु अविद्याया सकलव्यापविरोधित्वात्
लक्षणैः प्रतिपादयितुं न शक्यते । तथा चोक्तम्—²

‘अविद्याया अविद्यात्वमिदमेवात्र लक्षणम् ।

यद्विचारासहिष्णुत्वमन्यथा वस्तु सा भवेत्’ ॥

तस्माद् यत्किञ्चिदिति वचनमविद्याया अनिर्वचनीयत्वं द्रष्टव्यमेवोपपन्नम् ।
अनिर्वचनीयत्वे भगवत्पादोक्तिः³—

‘सन्नाप्यसन्नाप्यभयात्मिका नो

भिन्नाप्यभिन्नाप्यभयात्मिका नो

साङ्गाप्यनङ्गाप्यभयात्मिका नो

महाद्भूतानिर्वचनीयरूपा’ ॥

ननु निप्रमाणकत्वात्, प्रामाणिकत्वे च न्यायविरोधित्वानुपपत्तेः,
वन्ध्यापुत्रवदसत्त्वं कथं न स्यादिति सन्देहं दूरीकर्तुं साक्षिप्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणयति—
अहमज्ञ इति । अस्यानुभवस्याभावविषयकत्वं पूर्वमपास्तं प्रतियोगितदभावयोः
सामानाधिकरण्यस्वीकारे व्याधातापत्तेः । न प्रत्यक्षेण नाप्यनुमानेन ज्ञानाभावः
प्रतिपादयितुं शक्यत इति प्राक् प्रतिपादितम् तस्मादहमज्ञ इति ज्ञानं
भावरूपाज्ञानसद्भावे मानम् । तच्च ज्ञानं साक्षिरूपमेव न तु वृत्तिरूपम् ।
न च भावरूपाज्ञानस्थीकारेऽपि ज्ञानस्वरूपे आत्मनि तत्प्रतिपादेन व्याधाता-
पत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, वृत्तिज्ञानेन सह विरोधात् साक्षिज्ञानप्रकाशत्वाङ्गीकारे न
कापि हानिरिति सर्वमवदातम् । श्रुतिं प्रमाणयति—देवात्मशक्तिमिति । (६)

Trans.—*Adhyāropa* is the superimposition of
some thing not real on the real, as the serpent on
the rope, which is in itself not a serpent. The real is
the Brahman, which is Existence, Knowledge, Bliss,
infinite and non-dual. All other insentient things,

1—Citsukhī, p. 99.

2—Bṛhadāraṇyaka vārtika, 181 vs.

3—Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, 111 vs.

beginning with *ajñāna* are not real. *Ajñāna*, they say, is some thing positive, neither describable as real nor as unreal, possessing three *guṇas*, opposite to right knowledge (or sublated by right knowledge), based on the basis of experience 'I am ignorant' and on the scriptural testimony ; 'The power of the lord, hidden by its *guṇas* etc. (6)

Comm — It is said that the preceptor instructs the disciple through the method of *adhyāropa* and *apavāda*. In this passage the writer gives the definitions of *adhyāropa* and its cause *avidyā* or *ajñāna*. An erroneous knowledge, in which some thing is wrongly imposed on some other thing, is called *adhyāropa adhyāsa* etc. According to advaita vedānta the Brahman is only real, on which the whole universe is superimposed through ignorance. Real is that which defies all changes. Nothing in this world can be so, as everything undergoes modifications. As a pot is nothing more than earth in reality, its potness (*ghaṭava*) being a mere imposition of name (*nāma*) and form (*rūpa*) only, so this universe of manifold phenomena is a conglomeration of names and forms, which are superimposed on the Reality. An appearance can not be possible without a substratum. So the thesis of the nihilists cannot be logically tenable. The substratum of the appearance of the world is the Brahman, which is the only *vastu* or real in-as-much as it is not limited by time or *kālāna-vacchinna*. 'S' says that the word real means that which is not sublated in any one of three times (*Kālānapāyi*).

The cause of superimposition is *ajñāna*, *avidyā* or nescience. *Ajñāna* not only conceals the reality, it also causes the false appearance. The part of *ajñāna*, which conceals is known as *āvaraṇa śakti* and the aspect, which causes the appearance, is known as *vikṣepaśakti*. It is not the secondary cause of superimposition but the *upādāna kāraṇa* or material cause. 'S' following the school of *vivaraṇa* says that appearance is made of the material *avidyā*, which resides in the consciousness that is limited by the rope.¹ *Avidyā* or nescience gets modified in the forms of both the apparent object and its knowledge, the first of which is known as *arthādhyaśa* and the second is known as *Jñānādhyaśa*.²

सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वचनीयम्— This *ajñāna* is neither real nor unreal for which it is known as indescribable. '*Sat*' or real is that which is never sublated (*bādhita*); *asat* or unreal is that which never appears. Non-contradiction is the criterion of reality and non-appearance or *apratīyamānatvam* is the criterion of unreality. An unreal object as the son of barren lady or *bandhyāputra* cannot be presented to consciousness. Neither can it be both *sat* and *asat* as it is contradictory. 'V' argues regarding *ajñāna* that if it were real then it would never be sublated afterwards like the *ātman*;

1—Subodhinī, P. 7, chowkh. Ed. 1975.

2—Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṁgraha, P. 91, Achyuta-granthamala Ed.

'*dvividho hyadhyāśo jñānaviśiṣṭo'rtho'rthaviśiṣṭam jñānam ca*' etc.

on the otherhand, if it were unreal it would never appear as the son of a barren lady. So, both sublation and appearance being present in the case of *ajñāna*, it can aptly be described as indescribable. It cannot be asked, if it is indescribable how is it described as indescribable. So, it only means 'not describable either as real or as unreal'. 'S' argues that nescience cannot be unreal, as, if it is unreal then it cannot be the cause of the world of appearances.

It cannot be argued, the absence of any one of the pair, reality and unreality, necessarily implies the presence of the other, as absence of both these cannot be possible at the same time. 'V' says that *ajñāna* can be different from both real and unreal, as in the neuter, the absence of both feminine and masculine character is possible. This theory is the famous doctrine of *anirvacanīyakhyāti* of Advaita Vedānta.

Not only *ajñāna* is *anirvacanīva* or indescribable, its effect *adhyāsa* and the erroneous object, presented to consciousness at the time of error are also indescribable. By saying it indescribable, Advaita Vedānta differentiates its position from other doctrines of error, upheld by different systems of thought. According to the doctrine of *asatkhyāti*, upheld by the nihilistic school of Buddhism, the erroneous object is unreal by nature. *Vijñānavādins*, who uphold the doctrine of *ātmakhyāti*, say that the erroneous object is the modification of *vijñāna* or consciousness (which in this system only means the intellect). The

Prābhākaras, who hold the doctrine of *akhyāti*, say that an error is nothing other than the non-apprehension of the difference between two sorts of knowledge viz. cognition and memory. The *Naiyāyikas* opine that error takes place owing to the apprehension of a thing wrongly as other, which is known as *anyathākhyāti*. The Nyāya system of thought, which is realistic by nature, takes both of them, that which is imposed and on which is imposed, to be real. The *Rāmānujists* advocate the real origination of the so-called erroneous object for which their doctrine is known as *Satkhyāti*. *Sadāsatkhyāti* of *vijñānabhikṣu* is nothing more than the presentation of *anyathākhyāti* in a different manner. All these doctrines can never do justice to the direct presentation of erroneous object and its sublation, for which Advaita vedānta advocates *anirvacanīyakhyāti*, according to which the erroneous object is neither real nor unreal, and is the modification of *avidyā* only.¹

त्रिगुणालम्बम्—Nescience is of three qualities viz-*sattva rajas* and *tamas*, the signs of which are illumination (other than that of consciousness), activity and inertia respectively. Unlike the qualities of the *vaiśeṣikas*, they are not categorically different from a substance, in which they inhere, nor they are the sole constituents of a substance like that of the *Sāṅkhys*. They only manifest in the objects of the world, which are the effects of nescience, but they remain unmanifest in nescience.

1—Citsukhī, P, 136.

‘V’ explains that *ajñāna* is said to be of three qualities in reference to the three qualities of its effects.¹ ‘V’ says that this adjective differentiates *ajñāna* from *mithyājñāna*. It is to be borne in mind that *mithyājñāna* means erroneous knowledge, or *bhrānti*, where as *ajñāna* signifies its cause.

ज्ञानविरोधि—*Ajñāna* is opposed to knowledg. So far as there is nescience there can be no proper Knowledge. This word is explained in another way—‘*Jñānaṃ virodhi nivartakaṃ yasya*’ whose destroyer is knowledge. If this *ajñāna* continues for ever, then there can be no end of the world. In response to this, it is said that nescience is sublated by knowledge.

भावरूपम्—*Ajñāna* is not absence of knowledge, but it is positive by nature. ‘V’ following the arguments of *vivaraṇa* and *citsukhī* says that absence of knowledge cannot be logically established. It says that in the consideration of absence of knowledge, the word knowledge may have three meanings (i) Primarily the word knowledge means *sākṣi caitanya* or witness—consciousness, which is the Pure consciousness, in contradistinction to *Jīva* (ii) or it may mean the modification of the internal organ or *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*; (iii) or it may mean, according to the *vaiśeṣika*, the quality of the self or *ātamguṇa*. In the sense of the first alternative, absence of knowledge is impossible, as knowledge in the sense of consciousness being eternal can never be the counterpositive of absence (*nābhāvapratiyogi*). In the second alternative, the

1—Vidvanmanorañjanī, P. 87.

word 'knowledge' being used in a secondary sense, its absence cannot be termed as absence of knowledge primarily.

In the third sense, as the quality of the self, absence of knowledge cannot be established. It is to be asked, whether absence of knowledge here means absence of a specific knowledge (*Jñānaviśeṣābhāva*) or absence of knowledge in general (*Jñānasāmānyābhāva*). If the first meaning is accepted then it cannot prove absence of knowledge conclusively, as the absence of a specific knowledge does not exhaust absence of knowledge in general. In the second sense, absence of knowledge in general cannot be established, as at the time of establishing it, its inhering substratum (*dharmi*) and counterpositive (*Pratiyogin*) are known conspicuously, the knowledge of absence being dependent on the knowledge of the *dharmin* and the *pratiyogin*. The upaniṣad also confirms this view: 'There is no loss of the seeing of the seer; there is no loss of the knowledge of the knower.'¹

वदन्त्यहमज्ञ etc.—After defining nescience the writer gives here proofs for the positiveness of it. He says that the experience 'I am ignorant' gives evidence to the existence of positive nescience, as it cannot have absence of knowledge as its object for the reasons stated above. This is to be borne in the mind that nescience or *ajñāna* is directly perceived by the witness without the interference of the modifications of the internal organ, as modi-

1—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up., 4.3.23.

fication is the destroyer of nescience. This sort of perception is technically known as *Sakṣi Pratyakṣa* or witness-perception. The charge that nescience cannot be known by knowledge, as it is destroyed by the latter, is not tenable. Modificatory knowledge or *vṛttijñāna* is the destroyer of nescience. *Sakṣijñāna* or witness-knowledge being not hostile to nescience does not destroy it but proves it. The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, which is quoted in the text, also bears testimony of it. (6) .

मूलम्—ईदमज्ञानं समष्ट्यभिमप्रायेण कमनेकमिति च व्यवहियते ।
 तथाहि-यथा वृक्षाणां समष्ट्यभिमप्रायेण वनमित्येकत्वव्यपदेशो यथा वा जलानां
 समष्ट्यभिमप्रायेण जलाशय इति तथा नानात्वेन प्रतिभासमानानां जीवगता-
 ज्ञानानां समष्ट्यभिमप्रायेण तदेकत्वव्यपदेशः 'अजामेकामि'त्यादिश्रुतेः¹ । इयं
 समष्टिरुत्कृष्टोपाधितया विशुद्धसत्त्वप्रधाना । एतदुपहितं चैतन्यं सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वेश्वर-
 त्वसर्वनियन्तृत्वादिगुणकमव्यक्तमन्तर्यामी जगत्कारणनोश्चर इति च व्यपदिश्यते
 सकलाज्ञानावभासकत्वात् । 'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववत्' इतिश्रुतेः² । ईश्वरस्येयं
 समष्टिरखिलकारणत्वात् कारणशरीरमानन्दप्रचुरत्वात्कोशवदाच्छादकत्वाच्चानन्द-
 मयकोशः सर्वोपरमत्वात् सुषुप्तिरत एव स्थूलसूक्ष्मप्रपञ्चलयस्थानमिति चोच्यते ।
 यथा वनस्य व्यष्ट्यभिमप्रायेण वृक्षा इत्यनेकत्वव्यपदेशो यथा वा जलाशयस्य
 व्यष्ट्यभिमप्रायेण जलानीति तथाज्ञानस्य व्यष्ट्यभिमप्रायेण तदेकत्वव्यपदेशः 'इन्द्रो
 मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयत' इत्यादिश्रुतेः³ अत्र व्यस्तसमस्तव्यापित्वेन व्यष्टिसमष्टि-
 ताव्यपदेशः । इयं व्यष्टिर्निकृष्टोपाधितया मलिनसत्त्वप्रधाना । एतदुपहितं
 चैतन्यमल्पज्ञत्वानीश्वरत्वादिगुणकं प्राज्ञ इत्युच्यते, एकाज्ञानावभासकत्वात् । अस्य
 प्राज्ञत्वमस्पष्टोपाधितयाऽनतिप्रकाशकत्वात् । अरयापोयमहंकारादिकारणत्वात्-
 कारणशरीरमानन्दप्रचुरत्वात्कोशवदाच्छादकत्वाच्चानन्दमयकोशः सर्वोपरमत्वात्
 सुषुप्तिरत एव स्थूलसूक्ष्मशरीरप्रपञ्चलयस्थानमिति चोच्यते [७]

व्याख्या—एकाविद्यावादनानां विद्यावादादीनि सर्वाण्यपि मतानि
 प्रमाणयितुं पूर्वप्रतिपादिता विद्याया एकत्वं बहुत्वं च दर्शयति इदमज्ञानमिति ।

1—Svetāśvatara up., 4.5.

2—Mundaka up., 1.1.9.

3—Rgveda, 6.47.18.

जीवगतत्वेन बहुत्वव्यपदेशो ब्रह्मगतत्वेन चैकत्वव्यपदेश इत्यर्थः । तत्र केचित् वेदान्तिनोऽविद्याया जीवाश्रयत्वमेव प्रतिजानन्ते । तेषां मते जीवानां बहुत्वात्तदाश्रयाविद्या अपि बहुवः । जीवत्वस्याविद्याकृतत्वाज्जीवरय चाविद्याश्रयत्वादन्योऽन्याश्रयता तु न, बीजाङ्कुरदज्जीवभावस्यानादित्वोपपत्तेः । अन्येषां मते त्वविद्या न जीवा रया परन्तु चिन्मात्राश्रया । न चात्र ज्ञानस्वरूपस्य तस्याविद्याश्रयत्वेन व्याघात इति पूर्वमुपपादितम् । अस्मिन् मते शुद्धचैतन्याश्रयाविद्या जीवपक्षपातित्वाजीवभागे एव दोषमुत्पादयति, यथा दर्पणस्थं मलं दिश्वभागे विहाय प्रतिबिम्बभाग एव दोषमुत्पादयति । ग्रन्थकारास्तु मतद्वयं प्रमाणीकृत्य, अविद्यायाः समष्ट्यभिप्रायेणैकत्वं व्यष्ट्यभिप्रायेण च नानात्वं प्रतिपादयन्ति । ईश्वरं लक्षयति एतदुपहितं चैतन्यमिति । व्यष्ट्युपहितं चैतन्यं जीव इति कथयति—एतदुपहितं चैतन्यमल्पज्ञत्वेति । जीवब्रह्मणोः प्राज्ञावस्थेश्वरवस्थयोः साम्यं चात्र प्रतिपादितम् । ७]

Trans— This *ajñāna* is said to be one and many from the collective point of view and distributive point of view respectively. Thus, for instance, as trees viewed from the collective point of view are termed by the singular word 'forest' and drops of water collectively are termed by the word 'tank', So the *ajñānas*, appearing as many in the individual selves, are termed collectively as one, as it is stated in the *śruti*: 'Unborn, one' etc. This collective *ajñāna*, being the adjunct of the superior self (Brahman) is characterised by pure *sattva*. The consciousness conditioned by this is said to be the cause of the world, God, the inner being of all, unmanifest possessing omniscience, omnipotence and control over all, being the illuminator of all the *ajñānas*. Thus it is stated in the *śruti*: 'who is the knower of all, the knower of everything' etc. This collective adjunct of the *Īśvara* is said to be the causal body, as it is the cause of all ; the sheath of bliss, as it abounds in joy and covers like a sheath, and as *susupti* (deep sleep), everything being

subsided there, so it is also said to be the place of dissolution of the gross and subtle worlds. As the forest is designated distributively as 'trees', as the water reservoir is said to be many as 'drops of water', so also the *ajñāna* is said to be many distributively. it being described in the *Śruti*: 'Indra goes in various forms through his *Māyās*' Here the designation of *vyaṣṭi* and *samaṣṭi* etc. is due to their pervasion of one and many respectively. This *vyaṣṭi* (individual *ajñāna*), being the adjunct of the inferior is characterised by inferior *sattva*. The consciousness, conditioned by this, possesses limited knowledge and has no control over others (*anīśvaratva*); so it is termed as *prājña*, as it manifests only a single *ajñāna*. Its being *prājña* is due to the reason of having the obscuring adjunct and imperfect illumination. This individual adjunct is said to be the causal body, being the cause of egoism etc.; the sheath of bliss, being similar to a sheath and abounding in joy; the state of *susupti*, everything else being merged in this; and it is also said to be the place of dissolution of the gross and the subtle bodies (7).

Comm.—There is always a parity between the individual self and the cosmic self, which is expressed by the popular maxim '*yat piṇḍe tat brahmāṇḍe*', whatever is in the individual is in the cosmos 'Microcosm in the macrocosm and macrocosm in the microcosm' is the principle on which the philosophy of vedānta is based. The three stages of the individual consciousness viz-waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, correspond to the tree stages of the cosmic consciousness respectively.

Ajñāna viewed from the collective point of view is known as *Samaṣṭi* and from the distributive point of view is *Vyaṣṭi*. Consciousness, which is conditioned by this *Samaṣṭi* is *Īśvara* or God and consciousness that is conditioned by the *Vyaṣṭi* is known as *Jiva* or individual. These two kinds of *ajñānas* form the causal body of their associate consciousness. In the stage of deep sleep, when the individual remains in the causal body without any contact with the gross and the subtle bodies, the form of *ajñāna* becomes manifest conspicuously. This stage of the individual consciousness corresponds to the stage of the cosmic consciousness, in which the latter is called *Īśvara* or God; the difference is only that the concealing aspect of *ajñāna* is inert in *Īśvara*, for which he is never deluded. (7)

मूलम्—समष्टिव्यञ्ज्योरीश्वरप्राज्ञयोरभेदत्वञ्च तदानीमेतावीश्वरप्राज्ञौ चैतन्यप्रदीप्ताभिरतिसूक्ष्माभिरज्ञानवृत्तिभिरानन्दमनुभवत 'आनन्दमुक् चेतोमुखः प्राज्ञः' इति श्रुतेः¹, 'सुखमहमस्वाप्तं न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्' इत्युत्थितस्य परामर्शोपपत्तेश्च। अनयोः समष्टिव्यञ्ज्योर्वनवृक्षयोरिव जलाशयजलयोरिव वाऽभेदः। एतदुपहितयोरीश्वरप्राज्ञयोरपि वनवृक्षावच्छिन्नाकाशयोरिव जलाशयजलगतप्रतिबिम्बाकाशयोरिव वाऽभेदः 'एष सर्वेश्वर' इत्यादिश्रुतेः² [८]

ठट्टाठट्टा—सुषुप्तौ सुखानुभवस्वीकारेऽन्तःकरणवृत्तेर्नावश्यकता विद्यते, तद्वृत्त्यभावेऽपि चैतन्यप्रदीप्तानामज्ञानवृत्तीनां सद्भावादानन्दानुभवस्योपपत्त्वात्। न चाज्ञानस्य जडत्वादानन्दानुभवे तद्वृत्तीनामनुपयोग इति वाच्यम्, यथा जडस्याप्यन्तःकरणस्य चैतन्यदीप्तस्य प्रभाजनने सामर्थ्यं यथात्रापि। अज्ञानवृत्तिं प्रमाणं यति—तदानीमिति। तत्समर्थयितुं श्रुतिभक्त्यारयति—आनन्दमुगिति। तदानीं स्वरूपानन्द एवाभिव्यज्यते मायाकल्पितस्य संसारस्योपसंहृतत्वात्, 'सता सोम्य

1—Māṇḍūkya up, 5.

2—Māṇḍūkya up, 6.

तदा संपन्नो भवति' इत्यादिश्रुतेः^१ । न चात्रात्मस्वरूपस्याभिव्यक्तत्वात्नोक्षप्रसङ्ग-
इति वान्धवम्, अज्ञानस्यापि विद्यमानत्वात् । आनन्दशब्दोऽत्राविद्यावृत्तिसंवलित-
चैतन्यस्वरूपपरः । उत्तरकालीनसुखानुभवपरामर्शमपि दर्शयति—सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्
इत्यादि । समज्ज्यज्ञानतद्व्यज्जज्ञानयोरभेदं तदवच्छिन्नचैतन्ययोश्चाभेदं प्रतिपादयति
—अनयोरिति । [८]

Trans.—The non-difference between the *Samāṣṭi* and *vayṣṭi* as well as *Īśvara* and *Prājña* consists in the fact that there these two viz-*Īśvara* and *Prājña* experience joy through the subtle modifications of *ajñāna*, illuminated by consciousness, as it is stated in the *śruti* : '*Prājña* with the internal vision is the enjoyer of bliss', also as it is evident from waking experience : 'I slept quietly and knew nothing'. There is no distinction between these two as between a forest and the trees or between a reservoir and the water drops. There is no distinction between *Īśvara* and *Prājña*, conditioned by these two (*ajñānas*), as there is no difference between the spaces, limited by forest and trees or the spaces, reflected in the reservoir and the water drops, as it is stated in the *Śruti* : 'He is the lord of all' etc. (8)

Comm.—At the time of deep sleep, when the individual (also the *Īśvara*) is in contact with the causal body, he enjoys extreme happiness, for which this is known as *ānandamaya kośa*. Though there is the absence of the internal organ and its modifications at that stage, which are necessary for the perception of such things, still there is no difficulty in enjoying happiness, as it is enjoyed through the help of the modifications of *ajñāna*, illuminated by consciousness. (8)

1—Chāndogya up, 5, 8, 1.

मूलम्—वनवृक्षतदवच्छिन्नाकाशयोर्जलाशयजलतद्गतप्रतिबिम्बाकाश-
योर्वाऽऽधारभूतानुपहिताकाशवदनयोरज्ञानतदुपहितचैतन्ययोराधारभूतं यदनुपहितं
चैतन्यं तत्तुरीयमित्युच्यते 'शिवमद्वैतं चतुर्थं मन्यन्ते' इत्यादिश्रुतेः¹ । इदमेव
तुरीयं शुद्धचैतन्यमज्ञानादितदुपहितचैतन्याभ्यां तस्मादपि षडवदविविक्तं सम्महा-
वाक्यस्य वाच्यं विविक्तं सलक्ष्यमिति बोध्यते ॥९॥

व्याख्या—अज्ञानयोस्तदवच्छिन्नचैतन्ययोराधारभूतं यदनुपहितं
तुरीयचैतन्यं तल्लक्षयति—वनवृक्षेत्यादि । प्राज्ञेश्वरयोश्चोपाधिकृतत्वात्तुरीयशुद्ध-
चैतन्याद् यथार्थतोऽभेदः, तस्मिन्नेव सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां तात्पर्यावगमात् ।
उपाधिभेदाज्जीवानां जीवेश्वरयोश्च भिन्नत्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वेऽपि वस्तुतो भेदाभावात् ।
तथा चाभियुक्तोक्तिः—²

‘आत्मा ह्याकाशवजीवैर्घटाकाशैरिवोदितः ।

घटादिभिश्च संघातैर्जातावेतन्निदर्शनम् ॥’

न चास्मिन् पक्षे कस्यचिदपि दुःखित्वे सुखित्वे वा अपरस्यापि तथात्वप्रसङ्गः, उपाधि-
भेदादपि प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थोपपत्तेः । तथा चोक्तं वेदान्तसंप्रदायविद्भिराचार्यैः—³

‘यथेकस्मिन् घटाकाशे रजोघूमादिभिर्युते ।

न सर्वे संप्रयुज्यन्ते तद्वज्जीवाः सुखादिभिः’ ॥

इति ! अस्यैव ब्रह्मरूपस्य शुद्धतुरीयचैतन्यस्य महावाक्येन लक्ष्यत्वं वाच्यत्वं च
प्रतिपादयति—इदमेवेति ॥ [९]

Trans.—The unconditioned consciousness, which forms the ground of both the *ajñāna* and the consciousness, conditioned by it, just like the unconditioned space, which forms the ground of the reservoir, water and the space reflected in them, as well as of the forest, trees and the space limited by them, is said to be the Fourth, as it is stated in the *Śruti* : ‘They think it as auspicious, non-dual and the Fourth’. This very Fourth, the pure consciousness, not distinguished from *ajñāna* etc. and the consciousness, conditioned by them,

1—Māṇḍūkya up, 7.

2—Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, 3, 3.

3—Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, 3, 5.

like a lump of blazing iron, is said to be expressed (*vācya*) by the great saying (*Mahāvākya*) and when distinguished is said to be indicated (*lakṣya*) by it. (9)

The consciousness, which forms the ground of both of them is known as *Turiya* or the Fourth. This is the *Nirguṇa Brahman* or the unqualified Brahman of *Advaita vedānta*, which is of the essence of Pure consciousness. When it is taken together with *Īśvara* and *Jīva* it becomes the direct meaning of the great saying. 'That thou art', and when taken as distinct from them becomes the indicated meaning of it. (9)

मूलम्—अस्याज्ञानस्यावरणविक्षेकनामकमस्ति शक्तिद्वयत् । आवरण-
शक्तिस्तावेदल्पोऽपि मेघोऽनेकयोजनायतनमादित्यमण्डलमवलोकयितुनयनपथपिघा-
यकतया यथाच्छादयनीव तथाज्ञानं परिच्छिन्नमप्यत्मानमपरिच्छिन्नमसंसारिण-
मवलोकयितुबुद्धिपिघायकतयाच्छादयतीव तादृशं सामर्थ्यम् तदुक्तम्—¹

‘घनच्छन्नदृष्टिर्घनच्छन्नमर्कं यथा मन्यते निष्प्रभं चातिमूढः ।

तथा बद्धवद्भाति यो मूढदृष्टेः स नित्योपलब्धिस्वरूपोऽहमात्मा’ इति ॥

अतयेवावरणशक्त्यावच्छिन्नस्यात्मनः कर्तृत्वमोक्तत्वे सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतुच्छससार-
भावनापि सम्भाव्यते यथा स्वाज्ञानावृतायां रज्ज्वां संपत्त्वसम्भावना ।

विक्षेपशक्तिस्तु यथा रज्ज्वज्ञानं स्वावृतरज्जो स्वशक्त्या सर्पादिकमुद्भाव-
यत्येवमज्ञानमपि स्वावृतात्मनि विक्षेपशक्त्याकाशादिप्रपञ्चादिमुद्भावयति तादृशं
सामर्थ्यम् तदुक्तम्—²

‘विक्षेपशक्तिर्लिङ्गादिव्रह्माण्डान्तं जगत्सृजेत्’ इति । १०]

व्याख्या—अद्वैतवेदान्तप्रतिपादितं विवर्तवादं समर्थयितुं विवर्त-
कारणस्याज्ञानस्य शक्तिद्वयमत्त्वं प्रतिष्ठापयति—अस्याज्ञानस्येति । यच्छक्तिसा-
वित्येनाज्ञानमात्मनः सच्चिदानन्दानन्ताद्वयस्वरूपमावृणोति सावरणशक्तिः । यद्यपि
सावयवस्य परिच्छिन्नस्याज्ञानस्य निरवयवापरिच्छिन्नात्मस्वरूपावरणे सामर्थ्यं

1—Hastāmalaka Stotra, 10.

2—Vākyasudhā, 13.

नास्ति, तथापि प्रतीयमानत्वेन तदपि स्वोक्रियते, यथार्थतस्तु नावरणसङ्गतिरिति प्रतिपादयति—अवलोकयितुं बुद्धिपिधायकतया इति । आवरणशक्तिरेव वस्तुनः स्वरूपमावृणोति । विश्लेषशक्तिस्तत्रानिर्वचनीयमर्थान्तरमुद्भावयति । आवरणशक्त्यनवच्छिन्नस्यात्मनः कर्तृत्वादिविश्लेषा न सम्भवन्ति इति प्रतिपादयति—अनयैवावरणशक्त्येति । [१०]

Trans—This *ajñāna* has two powers named *āvaraṇa* (concealing) and *vikṣepa* (projecting). Regarding the concealing power (it is said), as the small cloud, obscuring the sight of the observer, seems to conceal the face of the sun, extending various *yojanas*, so also this *ajñāna*, though itself limited, obscuring the intellect of the observers, seems to conceal the self, which is unlimited and not subject to the *saṃsāra* (world). Thus is its power. So it is said : 'As a fool, whose sight is obstructed by the cloud, thinks that the sun, concealed by the cloud is lightless, so this self appears as if imprisoned to an ignorant, where as, that very self is of the nature of eternal experience, signified the cognition 'I am'.

The false feeling of the empirical world, characterised by agency, enjoyment, pleasure, pain and delusion is possible in the self, which is conditioned by this concealing power, as serpent-hood is possible in the rope, concealed by its *ajñāna*. Thus is projecting power :—As the *ajñāna* pertaining to the rope gives rise to the serpent in the rope, concealed by it, so also *ajñāna* by its projecting power gives rise to the world, beginning with *ākāśa*, in the self, concealed by it. Such is its power. It is said : 'The projecting power creates the world, beginning with the subtle body to the universe.' (10)

Comm.—In this passage the writer describes the two aspects of ajñāna viz āvaraṇa and vikṣepa. (10)

मूलम्—शक्तिद्वयवदज्ञानोपहितं चैतन्यं स्वप्रधानतया निमित्तं स्वोपाधिप्रधानतयोपादानं च भवति । यथा लूता तन्तृकार्यं प्रति स्वप्रधानतया निमित्तं स्वशरीरप्रधानतयोपादानं च भवति । ११।

व्याख्या—वेदान्तेषु विवर्तवादस्य स्वीकृतत्वात्तद्वादे च जगतो ब्रह्मविवर्तत्वाच्चैतन्यस्योपादानतां निमित्ततां च प्रतिपादयति—शक्तिद्वयवदज्ञानोपहितमित्यादि । स्वतो नित्यशुद्धस्य निर्गुणस्य कारणत्वानुपपत्तेराह—शक्तिद्वयवदिति । उपादानत्वे तत्कार्यस्य जडत्वात् कार्यकारणयोश्चान्निवृत्त्याद्ब्रह्मणोऽपि जडत्वापत्तिः स्यादिति कथयति—स्वोपाधिप्रधानतयोपादानमिति । ब्रह्मोपाधेरविद्याया उपादानत्वे ब्रह्मपुपादानत्वमुपचर्यते । दृष्टान्तमाह—यथा लूतेति । अन्येषु प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यत्वस्वीकारात्, मिथ्यात्वस्वीकारेऽपि शून्यकारणकत्वस्वीकारात्, अथवा विज्ञानकारणकत्वस्वीकारात्- तेभ्योऽयं मतवादो भिद्यते । तथा चोक्तमभियुक्तैः—¹

‘आरम्भवादः कणमक्षपक्षः संघातवादस्तु भदन्तपक्षः ।

सांख्यादिवादः परिणामवादो वेदान्तवादस्तु दिवर्तवादः ॥

ननु प्रधानपरमाष्वादिभिः सृष्टिप्रक्रियायाः सिद्धत्वाद् विवर्तवादस्वीकारे कल्पनागौरवं स्यादिति चेत् । उच्यते—प्रधानादिसमर्थकमतानां दुर्युक्ति-त्वाद् वेदविमुद्धत्वाच्च प्रत्याख्यातत्वेन न तान्यादरणीयानि । तथा हि प्रधानं न जगत्कारणं तस्याचेतनत्वेन रचनानुपपत्तेः । न च क्षोरवच्चेष्टितमिति वाच्यम्, चेतनाधिष्ठितत्वेन वस्तुद्वयार्थं क्षीरे चेष्टाया उपपन्नत्वे नाचेतने प्रधाने तद् युज्यते । नापि पुरुषाधिष्ठानात् प्रधाने चेष्टोपपद्यत इति वाच्यम्, पुरुषस्योदासीनत्वात् प्रधानस्याचेतनत्वाच्च परस्परवार्त्तानभिज्ञयोरिव न तयोः सम्बन्धः प्रवर्त्तकप्रवर्त्तमानलक्षणः प्रसज्यते । तस्मात् प्रधानवादेन न सृष्टिप्रक्रियाया गतार्थता ।

नाप्यणुवादे सृष्टिप्रक्रियायाः सिद्धत्वमिति वाच्यम् । परमाणूनां परस्परसंयोगानुपपत्तेः द्व्यणुकत्र्यणुकादिक्रमेण सर्वस्य जगतः सृष्टिर्न संभवति । तथा हि द्वयोः परमाण्वो मध्ये यः संयोगः स किं व्याप्यवृत्तिरथवाव्याप्यवृत्तिरिति प्रष्टव्यः । संयोगस्याव्याप्यवृत्तित्वे परमाणूनां सावयवत्वं स्यात् । सावयवत्वे च नित्यत्वं न संभवेत् । संयोगस्य व्याप्यवृत्तित्वे सावयवत्वाभावात् निरवयवस्यैकस्य परमाणोरपरस्मिन् परमाणौ निरवयवे संयुक्तत्वादुपचयानुपपत्तेरनुमात्रत्वप्रसङ्गः । तस्मात् त्र्यणुकादिक्रमेण जगत् सृष्टिरपि न संभवति ।

1—Samkṣepa Śārīraka, 2, 63.

सौगतसम्मतसंघातवादेनापि सृष्टेर्गतार्थता न । समुदायिनां पृथिव्यादि-
परमाणूनां रूपवेदनाविज्ञानसंज्ञासंस्कारसंज्ञकानां स्कन्धानां चाचेतनत्वात्
समुदायानुपपत्तिः । चित्ताभिव्यक्तेः समुदायाधीनत्वात्, कस्यचित् चेतनस्याऽयस्य
भोक्तुः प्रशासितुर्वा स्थिरस्य संहन्तुरभावात् समुदायसिद्धिः । आलयविज्ञान-
सहितानामेतेषां सर्वेषां क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमे संघातपूर्वक्षणे विद्यमानत्वेऽपि
संघातोत्पत्तिक्षणे विनष्टत्वात् संघातोत्पत्तिः संभवति । एवं सर्वथाप्यनादर-
णीयोऽयं सौगतः समय इत्यलं प्रपञ्चितेन ।

‘इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते’¹ ‘तस्माद् वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः
संभूतः’² इत्यादयः श्रुतयोऽपि ब्रह्मविवर्तवादे प्रमाणम् । नाप्यत्र ब्रह्मपरिणाम-
वादः प्रतिपाद्यत इति वाच्यम्, परिणामित्वे तस्यानित्यता स्यात् । मायाशब्द-
श्रवणाच्च विवर्तवादस्यैव प्रामाणिकत्वमिति सर्वमुपपन्नम् । [११]

Trans.—The consciousness, with these two powers, conditioned by *ajñāna* is the efficient cause in itself, and in reference mainly to its adjunct, is the material cause, as the spider becomes the efficient cause of the effect web, in reference mainly to itself and the material cause, in reference mainly to its body. (11)

Comm.—Here the writer refers to the vedantic doctrine of causality. According to Advaita vedānta Brahman is both the efficient and material cause of the word. The doctrine of causation, accepted by Advaita vedānta, is known as *vivarta vāda* or the doctrine of apparent transformation, according to which the Brahman appears as the phenomenal world through *avidyā*, as the rope appears like the serpent. The Brahman, in association with *Māyā* or cosmic *ajñāna*, creates the world, for which it is the efficient cause or *nimitta kāraṇa*. It being the substratum of the appearance

1—R̥gveda, 6, 47, 18.

2—Taittirīya up, 2, 1, 1.

is also the material cause, but it is never affected by the effect as the transformation is only apparent.

Sadānanda, following *vivaraṇa*, refutes the charge that if the material cause of the world is consciousness then its effect will also be conscious. He says that Brahman is said to be the material cause of the world in reference to its adjunct *avidyā*, but in itself it is the efficient cause only. This is explained in the text with the lucid example of the spider, which is both the efficient and the material cause of its net. The world of manifold phenomena is the modification of *avidyā* (*avidyāpariṇāma*) and the appearance of consciousness (*caitanyavivarta*). Vedānta Paribhāṣā defines *Pariṇāma* as that in which the effect has the same grade of existence as that of the cause and *vivarta* is that in which the grades of existence of the two are dissimilar. ¹ (11)

मूलम्—तमःप्रधानविक्षेपशक्तिमदज्ञानोपहितचैतन्यादाकाश आकाशाद् वायुर्वायोरग्निरग्नेरापोऽद्भ्यः पृथिवी चोत्पद्यते 'तस्माद् वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूत' इत्यादिश्रुतेः ।² तेषु जाड्याधिक्य—दर्शनात्तमःप्राधान्यं तत्कारणस्य । तदातीं सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि कारणगुणप्रक्रमेण तेष्वआकाशादिपूतपद्यन्ते । एतान्येव सूक्ष्मभूतानि तन्मात्राण्यपञ्चीकृतानि चोच्यन्ते । एतेभ्यः सूक्ष्मशरीराणि स्थूलभूतानि चोत्पद्यन्ते ॥ [११]

व्याख्यानम्—सृष्टिक्रमं प्रदर्शयन् प्रथमतस्तन्मात्रपञ्चकस्योत्पत्तिं दर्शयति—तमःप्रधानेति । आकाशादीनां जडत्वात्तमोगुणप्रधानाज्ञानावच्छिन्नचैतन्यात्तेषामुत्पत्तिः । एतेषामेव तन्मात्राणां स्थूलसूक्ष्मशरीरकारणत्वेनाखिलस्थूलसूक्ष्मप्रपञ्चोत्पत्तौ प्राथम्यात् प्रथमत एव तेषां निर्देशः । केवलस्य ब्रह्मणो निर्लिप्तत्वात् न तस्य कारणत्वम् । 'मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सृजते सचराचरम् इति स्मृतेश्च ।³ [१२]

1—Vedānta Paribhāṣā, P. 31.

2—Taittiriya up, 2, 1, 1.

3—Bhagavadgītā, 9, 10.

Trans.—From the consciousness, conditioned by *ajñāna* with the projecting power, in which *tamas* predominates comes into existence *ākāśa*; from *ākāśa* air, from air fire; from fire water; from water earth, as it is stated in the *śruti*. 'From this self *ākāśa* came into existence' etc. The excess of inertness being seen in them in their cause *tamas* predominates. Then, *saṁtva*, *rajas* and *tamas* appear in these *ākāśa* and the rest according to the qualities of their causes. These are the subtle elements, termed as non-quintuplicated *tanmātras*. From these spring into existence the subtle bodies and the gross elements. (12)

Comm.—Here the writer describes the creation of the subtle elements known as the *tanmātras*. He follows the Taittirīya Upaniṣad in this respect and says that from the consciousness, which is conditioned by *ajñāna*, comes into existence *ākāśa*. Then the other four elements follow the previous ones in due order of succession. These subtle elements when exist separately are known as non-quintuplicated elements. Here it is to be noted that these created elements are only the *vivarta* of consciousness, but these are the modification of *avidyā*. These five non-quintuplicated elements are the material causes of the subtle bodies and the subtle universe. The *mahābhūtas* or the gross elements are the effects of the subtle elements, which come into being through the process of quintuplication or *Pañcikaraṇa*. The only difference is that the subtle elements in contrast to the gross elements are not perceptible by the senses. (12)

मूलम्—सूक्ष्मशरीराणि सप्तादशावयवतानि लिङ्गशरीराणि । अवयवास्तु ज्ञानेन्द्रियपञ्चकं बुद्धिमनसो, कर्मेन्द्रियपञ्चकं, वायुपञ्चकञ्चेति । ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षुर्जिह्वाघ्राणाद्यानि । एतान्याकाशादीनां सात्त्विकांशेभ्यो व्यस्तेभ्यः पृथक् पृथक् क्रमेणोत्पद्यन्ते । बुद्धिर्नाम निश्चयात्मिकान्तःकरणवृत्तिः । मनो नाम सङ्कल्पविकल्पात्मिकान्तःकरणवृत्तिः । अनयोरेव चित्ताहङ्कारयोरन्तर्भावः । एते पुनराकाशादिगतसात्त्विकांशेभ्यो मिलितेभ्य उत्पद्यन्ते । एतेषां प्रकाशात्मकत्वात्सात्त्विकांशकार्यत्वम् । इयं बुद्धिर्ज्ञानेन्द्रियैः सहितं विज्ञानमयकोशो भवति । अयं कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वसुखित्वदुःखित्वाद्यभिसामन्तत्वेनेहलोकपरलोकगामी व्यावहारिको जीव इत्युच्यते । मनस्तु ज्ञानेन्द्रियैः सहितं सन्मनोमयकोशो भवति । कर्मेन्द्रियाणि वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाद्यानि । एतानि पुनराकाशादीनां रजोऽंशेभ्यो व्यस्तेभ्यः पृथक् पृथक् क्रमेणोत्पद्यन्ते । वायवः प्राणापानव्यानोदानसमानाः । प्राणो नाम प्राग्गमनवाशाशाग्रस्थानवर्ती । अपानो नामावागमनवान् पाय्वादिस्थानवर्ती । व्यानो नाम विष्वग्गमनवान्-हिलशरीरवर्ती । उदानो नाम कण्ठस्थानीय ऊर्ध्वगमनवानुत्क्रमणवायुः । समानो नाम शरीरमध्यगताशितपीतान्नादिसमीकरणकरः । केचित्तु नागकुर्मकृकलदेवदधनञ्जयाख्याः पञ्चान्ये वायवः सन्तीति वदन्ति । तत्र नाग उद्गीरणकरः । कूर्म उन्मीलनकरः । कृकलः क्षुत्करः । देवदत्तो जृम्भणकरः । धनञ्जयः पोषणकरः । एतेषां प्राणादिष्वन्तर्भावात् प्राणादयः पञ्चैवेति केचित् । एतत्प्राणादिपञ्चकमाकाशादिगत रजोऽंशेभ्यो मिलितेभ्य उत्पद्यन्ते । इदं प्राणादिपञ्चकं कर्मेन्द्रियैः सहितं सत् प्राणमयकोशो भवति । अस्य क्रियात्मकत्वेन रजोऽंशकार्यत्वम् । एतेषु कोशेषु मध्ये विज्ञानमयो ज्ञानशक्तिमान् । कर्तृरूपः । मनोमय इच्छाशक्तिमान् करणरूपः । प्राणमयः क्रियाशक्तिमान् कार्यरूपः । योग्यत्वादेव-मेतेषां विभाग इति वर्णयन्ति । एतत्कोशत्रयं मिलितं सत् सूक्ष्मशरीरमित्युच्यते । [१३]

व्याख्या—सूक्ष्मशरीरोत्पत्तिं दर्शयन् तस्य सप्तादशावयवत्वमाह सूक्ष्मशरीराणीति । अवयवानिर्दिशति—अवयवास्त्विति । ज्ञानेन्द्रियेषु कस्य कस्मात् कारणादुत्पत्तिरिति कथयति—एतान्याकाशादीनामिति । आकाशस्य सात्त्विकांशाच्छ्रोत्रम्, वायोः सात्त्विकांशात् त्वक्, तेजसः सात्त्विकांशाच्चक्षुः । जलस्य सात्त्विकांशाद्रसना, पृथिव्याः सात्त्विकांशाद् घ्राणम् इति क्रमेण तेषामुत्पत्तिरिति भावः । अन्तःकरणवृत्तीनां कार्यभेदाद्भिन्नसंज्ञकत्वं वक्तुं तेषां लक्षणानि कथयति—बुद्धिर्नामेति । निश्चयात्मिकान्तःकरणवृत्तिर्बुद्धिः, सङ्कल्पात्मिका वृत्तिर्मनः, स्मरणात्मिका वृत्तिश्चित्तम्, गर्वात्मिका वृत्तिरहङ्कार इति कार्य-

भेदादेकस्यैवान्तःकरणस्य भिन्नत्वोपपत्तिः । 'कामः संकल्पो विचिकित्सा
 श्रद्धाश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीर्धीर्भीरिति ये तत्सर्वं मन एव' इत्यादि¹ बृहदारण्यकश्रुति-
 रपि तस्मिन् प्रमाणम् । अन्तःकरणस्य सात्त्विकांशेभ्यो भूतेभ्य उत्पत्तिं दर्शयति
 —एतेषामिति । एतेषामिति बुद्ध्यादीनामन्तःकरणवृत्तीनामित्यर्थः । एतेन
 बुद्ध्यादीनां भौतिकत्वं प्रख्यापितम्, सांख्यादिपक्षतो वेदान्तस्य भेदः प्रदर्शितश्च ।
 ज्ञानेन्द्रियसहिता बुद्धिर्दिज्ञानमयकोश इति व्यपदिश्यते । अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्न-
 चैतन्यस्य जीवत्वं दर्शयति—अयमिति । वस्तुतश्चैतन्यं कर्तृत्वादिरहितमपि
 बुद्ध्याद्यवच्छिन्नं सत् स्वर्गादिलोकान्तरगामी जीव इति लोकव्यवहारमाग-
 भवति । ज्ञानेन्द्रियसहितस्य मनसो मनोमयकोशत्वमुच्यते—मनस्त्विति । कर्मे-
 न्द्रियाणि तेषामुत्पत्तिं च निर्दिशति—कर्मेन्द्रियाणीति । एतेषां क्रियात्मकत्वाद्
 भूतेभ्यः रजोऽंशप्रधानेभ्य उत्पत्तिः । इन्द्रियाणीति शब्देन सूक्ष्मानिन्द्रियाण्युच्यन्ते
 न तु स्थूलरूपाणि, तेषां सूक्ष्मभूतकार्यत्वात् सूक्ष्मशरीरप्रतिष्ठत्वाच्च । अन्यथा
 चोत्क्रान्तिसमये सूक्ष्मशरीरेण सह तेषां गमनानुपपत्तेः । यथाकथञ्चिद्गमनोपपत्ता-
 वप्युत्क्रान्तिसमये प्रत्ययेण तेषामुपलब्धिः प्रसज्येत । वायुपञ्चकं निरूपयति वायव
 इति । नागकूर्मादीनां प्राणादिष्वन्तर्भाव इति दर्शयितुं प्रसङ्गतस्तान् विवृणोति
 —केचिस्त्विति । एतद्वायुपञ्चकस्याकाशादिगतरजोऽंशकार्यत्वं दर्शयति—
 एतत्प्राणादीति । आकाशादिपञ्चभूतकार्यत्वात्तेषां न केवलं वायुरूपत्वमिति
 भावः । तेषां सूक्ष्मत्वं चेन्द्रियादीनामिव बोध्यम् । प्राणादिपञ्चकं कर्मेन्द्रिययुक्तं
 सत् प्राणमयकोश इति व्यपदिश्यते । पञ्चकोशेषु विज्ञानमयमनोमयप्राणमयानां
 यथाक्रमं ज्ञानेच्छाक्रियाशक्तिमत्त्वेन कर्तृकरणक्रियारूपत्वं प्रदर्शयति—
 एतेष्विति । एतत्कोशत्रयस्य सूक्ष्मशरीरत्वं प्रतिपादयति—एतदिति । [१३]

Trans—The subtle bodies, having seventeen components are known as *līṅga śarīras*. The components are the five sense organs, *budhi*, *manas* the five organs of action and the five vital airs. The sense organs are ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose. These come out of the *sattva* aspects of *ākāśa* etc. separately in due order. *Budhi* is the determining mode of the internal organ; *manas* is the mode of the internal organ, characterised by volition and doubt; *citta* and *ahaṅkāra* are

1—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up, 1, 5, 3.

included in them (*citta* is the bundle of impressions, which acts in the form of memory and *ahaṅkāra* is the feeling of egoism). These come into existence out of the *satva* aspects of the elements like *ākāśa* etc, mingled together. They are the effects of the *satva* aspects, as they are of the nature of illumination. This *budhi*, taken together with the sense organs makes 'sheath of *viñāṇa*' (the rendering of this by Hiriyanna as self-consciousness is doubtful) or '*viñāṇamaya kośa*'. This is termed as the empirical self or *jīva*, which migrates from this world to the other world as it is with the egoism of agent, enjoyer, happy and miserable. The *manas* with the sense organs forms the mental sheath or '*manomaya kośa*' (Hiriyanna's rendering as the sheath of consciousness is doubtful). The organs of action are the organ of speech, hand, foot, the anus and the generating organ. These are created respectively and differently out of the *rajas* aspects of the elements like *ākāśa* etc. taken individually. The vital airs are *Prāṇa*, *apāṇa*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*. *Prāṇa* is that which goes forward, residing in the tip of the nose. *Apāṇa* is that which goes downward, residing in the places like anus etc. *Vyāna* is that which goes in all the directions and pervades the whole body. *Udāna* is the departing breath, which goes upwards residing in the throat. *Samāna* is that which resides in the body and assimilates what is eaten or drunk. Some others say that other vital airs are there named *nāga*, *kūrma*, *kṛkālā*, *devadatta* and *dhanañjaya*. Amongst these, *nāga* causes eructation ;

kūrma causes the opening of the eyes ; *kṛkāla* causes yawning ; and *dhanañjaya* nurtures. Some are of opinion that these being included in *prāṇa* etc, there are only five vital airs like *prāṇa* and others. This group of five airs, consisting *prāṇa* etc. comes into existence out of *rajas* aspects of *ākāśa* and others, mixed together. This group of five, led by *prāṇa*, with the organs of action is termed as the 'vital sheath' or the '*prāṇamayakośa*'. This being characterised by action, is the effect of the *rajas* aspect. Amongst these sheaths, the *viñānamaya*, endowed with the cognitive power is like the agent, the *manomaya*, endowed with the volitional power is like the instrument and the *prāṇamaya*, endowed with the power of activity is like the action (contrast with Hiriyanna's rendering as self-consciousness and energy). They say that this division is due to their capability. These three sheaths, [combined together are termed as the subtle body. (13)

Comm.—The subtle body consists of seventeen limbs. These are the five senses, intellect (*budhi*) mind (*manas*), the five organs of action and the five vital airs. It is to be borne in mind that, in contrast to *sāṅkhya* system of philosophy, the vedantins maintain that the ten senses as well as the internal organ are the effects of the material elements, which is more akin to the doctrine of the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika*. But in the *sāṅkhya* system of philosophy their origin is traced back to the *ahaṅkāra* or egoism.

Here the writer differentiates intellect and mind by saying that the former is the determining

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

function of the *antahkaraṇa*, where as the latter is the function, characterised by volition and doubt. But unlike the conceptions of the other systems of thought, in Advaita vedānta they are traced to one internal organ. The senses and the internal organ are derived from the *sattva* portions of the elements as their nature is illumination (*prakāśa*). The *buddhi*, which is discurvise by nature, accompanied with the senses, is termed as the 'intellectual sheath' or '*viñānamaya kośa*'. The consciousness, qualified with this *buddhi* or intellect is known as *jīva* or the individual. The mind forms the mental sheath with the five senses. The five organs of action, which only here signify their subtle forms, are products of the *rajas* portions of the elements, as there activity prevails.

The five vital forces like *Prāṇa*, *apāna* etc. are the products of the *rajas* portions of the five subtle elements. Here the word *vāyu* is not to be understood as 'air'. They are only named as 'the five airs' (*pañcavāyavaḥ*) in the secondary sense, but they are not really the products of air, as their origin is traced back to all the five elements. So they are nothing more than the different functions of the one vital force '*Prāṇa*'. The organs of action, with the five 'vital forces' or 'vital airs' form the *Prāṇamaya kośa* or the vital sheath. These three sheaths viz-*viñānamaya*, *manomaya* and *prāṇamaya* form the subtle body. This manifests in the dreaming state. The consciousness, conditioned by the individual subtle body is named as *taijasa* and the consciousness, conditioned by the totality of of the subtle universe

is known as *Hiranyagarbha*, which are really one and the same consciousness, though manifesting through two kinds of limiting adjuncts. (13-14)

सूचम्—अत्राप्यखिलसूक्ष्मशरीरमेकबुद्धिविषयतया वनवज्जलाशयवद्-
वा समष्टिरनेकबुद्धिविषयतया वृक्षवज्जलवद् वा व्यष्टिरपि भवति । एतत् समष्ट्यु-
पहितं चैतन्यं सूत्रात्मा, हिरण्यगर्भः, प्राग्देत्युच्यते सर्वत्रानुस्यूतत्वाज्ज्ञानेच्छा-
क्रियाशक्तिमदुपहितत्वाच्च । अस्यास्य समष्टिः स्थूलप्रपञ्चापेक्षया सूक्ष्मत्वात्
सूक्ष्मशरीरं, विज्ञानमयादिकोशत्रयं, जाग्रद्वासनामयत्वात् स्वप्नोऽत एव स्थूल-
प्रपञ्चलक्ष्यस्थानमिति चोच्यते । एतद्व्यपष्ट्युपहितं चैतन्यं तैजसो भवति
तेजोमयान्तःकरणोपहितत्वात् । अस्यापीयं व्यष्टिः स्थूलशरीरापेक्षया सूक्ष्मत्वादिति
हेतोरेव सूक्ष्मशरीरं विज्ञानमयादिकोशत्रयं जाग्रद्वासनामयत्वात् स्वप्नोऽत एव
स्थूलशरीरलक्ष्यस्थानमिति चोच्यते । एतौ सूत्रात्मतैजसौ तदानीं मनोवृत्तिभिः
सूक्ष्मविषयाननुभवतः 'प्रविविक्तमुक् तैजस इत्यादिश्रुतेः¹ । अत्रापि समष्टिव्य-
पष्ट्योस्तदुपहितसूत्रात्मतैजसयोर्वनवृक्षवत्तदवच्छिन्नाकाशवच्च जलाशयजलवत्तद्वत्-
प्रतिबिम्बाकाशवच्चाभेदः । एवं सूक्ष्मशरीरोत्पत्तिः ॥ १४ ॥

व्याख्या—सूत्रात्मतैजसयोर्लक्षणं स्फुटीकर्तुं तयोरुपाध्योः समष्टि-
व्यष्टिरूपयोः सूक्ष्मशरीरयोर्लक्षणं तावदाह—अत्रापि । सर्वप्राणिनां यावन्ति
सूक्ष्मशरीराणि तेषां समष्टित्वं व्यष्टित्वं चैकबुद्धिगम्यत्वादानेकबुद्धिगम्यत्वाच्च
भवति । यथा सर्वेषां वृक्षाणामेकबुद्धिगम्यत्वात् वनमिति व्यपदेशः, अनेकबुद्धि-
गम्यत्वाच्च वृक्षा इति व्यपदेशस्तथात्रापि । समष्ट्युपहितचैतन्यस्य सूत्रात्मादि-
संज्ञकत्वमाह—एतत्समष्ट्युपहितमिति । हेतुमवतारयति—सर्वत्रानुस्यूत-
त्वादिति । इयं समष्टिरेतदुपाध्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य सूक्ष्मशरीरमुच्यते । विराड्रू-
पावच्छेदकस्थूलप्रपञ्चापेक्षया सूक्ष्मत्वात् स्थूलप्रपञ्चलक्ष्यस्थानमिति चोच्यते ।
व्यपष्ट्युपहितजीवचैतन्यस्य तैजसत्वं प्रतिपादयति एतद्व्यपष्ट्युपहितमिति ।
सूत्रात्मतैजसयोरन्तःकरणवृत्तिभिः स्वप्नकालप्राप्तसूक्ष्मविषयानुभवं दर्शयति—
एताविति । माण्डूक्यश्रुतिं प्रमाणयति—प्रविविक्तमुगिति । समष्टिव्यपष्ट्यो-
स्तदुपहितसूत्रात्मतैजसयोश्चैकत्वं प्रतिपादयति—अत्रापिति । एकबुद्धयनेकबुद्धि-
विषयतया समष्टिव्यपष्ट्युपाध्योर्भेदेऽपि न यथा तयोः पारमार्थिकभेदोऽस्ति तथा
तदुपहितचैतन्ययोर्न यथार्थतो भेद इति भावः । सूक्ष्मशरीरोत्पत्तिमुपसंहरति—
एवमिति । [१४]

Trans — Here also all the subtle bodies, as the objects of one cognition like a forest or a reservoir are designated as *samaṣṭi* and being the objects of many cognitions distributively like the tree or water drops are termed as *vyasṭi*. The consciousness, conditioned by this aggregate is termed as *sūtrātman*, *hiranyagarbha* and *Prāṇa*, being immanent in all and being conditioned by those, which possess the cognitive, volitional and active (vital) powers. This *samaṣṭi*, belonging to it, is termed as subtle body, being subtler than the gross universe, which is the combination of the three sheaths and also as the dreaming state, being replete with the *vāsanās* (impressions) of the waking state; so it is said to be the place of dissolution of the gross universe. The consciousness conditioned by this *vyasṭi* (individual) is termed as *Taijasa*, it being conditioned by the internal organ, in which *tejas* (fire) predominates. This *vyasṭi*, belonging to it is termed as the subtle body, being subtler than the gross body, which is the combination of the three sheaths like *viññānamaya* etc. and also dreaming state, being pervaded by the impressions of waking state. So it is said to be the place of dissolution of the gross body. These *Sūtrātman* and *Taijasa*, at that stage, enjoy the subtle objects with the help of the modifications of *manas*, as it is stated in the *Śruti*: '*Taijasa* is the enjoyer of the subtle' etc. Here also there is no distinction between the *samaṣṭi* and *vyasṭi* and between the *sūtrātman* and *Taijasa*, conditioned by them, as in the case of forest and the tree and the *ākāśa* reflected in them. Thus is the creation of subtle body. (14)

मूलम्—स्थूलभूतानि तु पञ्चीकृतानि । पञ्चीकरणं त्वाकाशादिपञ्च-
स्वेकैकं द्विधा समं विभज्य तेषु दशसु भागेषु प्राथमिकान् पञ्चभागान् प्रत्येकं
चतुर्धा समं विभज्य तेषां चतुर्णां भागानां स्वस्वद्वितीयार्धभागपरित्यागेन
भागान्तरेषु संयोजनम् । तदुक्तम्—¹

‘द्विधा विधाय चैकैकं चतुर्धा प्रथमं पुनः ।

स्वस्वेतरद्वितीयांशैर्योजनात् पञ्च पञ्च ते’ ॥ इति ॥

अस्याप्रामाण्यं नाशङ्कनीयं त्रिवृत्करणश्रुतेः पञ्चीकरणस्याप्युपलक्षणत्वात् ।
पञ्चानां पञ्चात्मकत्वे समानेऽपि तेषु च ‘वैशेष्यात्तु तद्वादस्तद्वादः’ इति ²
न्यायेनाकाशादिव्यपदेशः सम्भवति । तदानीमाकाशे शब्दोऽभिव्यज्यते वायौ
शब्दस्पर्शविग्रौ शब्दस्पर्शरूपाण्यप्सु शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसाः पृथिव्यां शब्दस्पर्शरूपरस-
गन्धाश्च । [१५]

व्याख्या—सूक्ष्मप्रपञ्चं निरूप्य तत्कार्यं स्थूलप्रपञ्चं निरूपयि-
तुमुपक्रम्य प्राथम्यात् पञ्चीकरणप्रक्रियां तावदाह स्थूलभूतानीति । पञ्चीकरणं
विवृणोति पञ्चीकरणमिति । आकाशाद्यपञ्चीकृतभूतानि यदा द्विधा विभज्यन्ते
तदा दशभागा भवन्ति । तेषु दशसु भागेषु सत्सु प्राथमिकान् पञ्चभागान्
पुनश्चतुर्धा विभज्य स्वसमानार्धपरित्यागेन चतुर्णां प्रत्येकं भागान्तरेषु संयोजनेन
पञ्चीकृतानि स्थूलभूतानि भवन्ति । तथा चात्राकाशेऽर्धांशः अपञ्चीकृताकाशो
विद्यते, अयमेव पञ्चीकृतस्थूलाकाश इति कथ्यते । एवं वाय्वादिषु । अस्मिन्नर्थे
सांप्रदायिकानामुक्तिं प्रमाणयति द्विधा विधायेति । ननु पञ्चीकरणमिदमप्रामाणिकं
श्रुत्यन्तरविरोधादिति चेत् । उच्यते—त्रिवृत्करणश्रुतेः पञ्चीकरणस्याप्यु-
पलक्षणत्वात् । अन्यथाकाशपवनयोः श्रुतिसंमतयोरग्रहणात् श्रुत्यन्तरव्याकोपः
स्यात् । छान्दोग्ये तेजःप्रभृतीनां त्रयाणां सृष्टिः ‘तत्तेजोऽसृजत’ ³ इत्याद्या
यथा ‘आत्मान आकाशः आकाशाद्वायुः’ ⁴ इति पञ्चभूतसृष्ट्या शास्त्रान्तरप्रति-
पादितया सह न विरोध्यते तथा चात्र त्रिवृत्करणपञ्चीकरणयोर्विरोधाभावः ।
वस्तुतस्तु ब्रह्मैकमात्रमद्वितीयं प्रमाणयन्त्याः श्रुत्या न सृष्टिप्रक्रियादिष्वनन्तर-
विषयेष्ववादरातिशयः । अद्वितीयं ब्रह्मात्रं ‘नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन’ इति ⁵

1—Pañcadaśī, 1, 27.

2—Brahmasūtra, 2, 4, 22.

3—Chāndogya up, 6, 10, 3.

4—Taittirīya up, 2, 1, 1.

5—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up, 4, 4, 19, Kāṭha up, 2, 1, 10.

प्रतिपादयितुम्, 'वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयम्' इति ¹ तत्कार्यस्य प्रपञ्चस्य च मिथ्यात्वं ज्ञापयितुं सृष्टिप्रक्रियाद्यवन्तरविक्रयानामवतारणात् सृष्टिप्रतिपादकानां श्रुतिवाक्यानां गौणत्वमुपपन्नम् । तथा च पारमार्थिकं तत्त्वं प्रतिपादयद्भिः संप्रदायविद्भिराचार्यैस्तु—²

‘न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।

न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥’

ननु पञ्चानामाकाशादीनां पञ्चात्मकत्वे समाने कथमाकाशादिव्यपदेशः । परिहरति—‘वैशेष्यात् तद्वादस्तद्वादः’ । इदं च सूत्रकारवचनम् । यद्भागस्य प्राधान्यं वर्तते तन्नाम्ना हि व्यवहारो भवतीत्यर्थः । कस्मिन् के गुणा अभिध्यज्यन्त इति कथयति तदानीमीति । एवं पञ्चीकरणम् । [१५]

Trans.—But the gross elements are quintuplicated. Quintuplication is dividing each of the five, beginning with *ākāśa* into two equal parts; then dividing each of the first five halves of the ten halves into four parts equally and then admixing the fourth parts with the remaining halves with the exclusion of their own kind. So it is said : ‘Dividing each into two, then dividing the first into four and then admixing with the second halves of those, which are different from it, they become the five-fold five’. It should not be thought to be invalid, as the *Śruti*, advocating triplication is an indication of quintuplication also. Though each of the five consists of all the five elements alike, yet by the logic, ‘such designation is due to pre-dominance’, the designation of them as *ākāśa* etc. is possible. At that time, sound manifests in *ākāśa*; sound and touch in air; sound, touch and colour in fire; sound, touch, colour taste and odour in earth. (15)

1—Chāndogya up, 6, 1, 4.

2—Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, 2, 32.

मूलम्—एतेभ्यः पञ्चीकृतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यो भूमिवःस्वर्नहर्जनस्तपःसत्य-
नित्येतन्नामकानामुपर्युपरि विश्रमानानामतलवितलमुतलरसातलतलातलमहातल-
पातालनामकानामधोऽधोदिद्यमानानां लोकानां ब्रह्माण्डस्य तदन्तर्बर्त्तिचतुर्विध-
स्थूलशरीराणां तदुचितानामन्नपानादीनाञ्चोत्पत्तिर्भवति । चतुर्विधशरीराणि तु
जरायुजाण्डजोद्भिज्जस्वेदजाख्यानि । जरायुजानि जरायुभ्यो जातानि मनुष्य-
पश्वदीनि । अण्डजान्यण्डेभ्यो जातानि पक्षिपन्नगादीनि । उद्भिज्जानि
भूमिमुद्भिद्य जातानि कक्षवृक्षादीनि । स्वेदजानि स्वेदेभ्यो जातानि
मूकामशकादीनि । [१६]

व्याख्या—पञ्चीकृतैर्भूतेः स्थूलप्रतञ्चोत्पत्तिं दर्शयति एतेभ्य इति ।
स्थूलप्रतञ्चान्तर्बर्त्तिचतुर्विधस्थूलशरीराणामुत्पत्तिं निर्दिशन् सोदाहरणं तानि
लक्षयति जरायुजानीति । यद् वैशेषिका अप्रत्यक्षाभ्यां वाय्वाकाशाभ्यां सह
पृथिव्यादिभि रारम्भमाणस्य शरीरस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वं स्यादिति वदन्ति, तन्न,
प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षावयववृत्तीनामवयविनामप्यप्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात् सिद्धं
पञ्चभौतिकत्वं देहस्य । [१६]

Trans.—From these quintuplicated elements come into existence the worlds known as *bhūh*, *bhuvah*, *svah*, *mahah*, *jannah*, *tapoh* and *satya*, which are set up above in succession ; the worlds that are set up downwards in succession as *atala*, *vitale*, *sutale*, *rasatala*, *talatala*, *mahatala* and *patala* and the cosmos, including the four gross bodies, and food, drink etc, suitable to them. The four kinds of bodies are *jarāyuja*, *andja*, *udbhijja* and *svedaja*. The *jarāyujas* are men and beasts born of womb. The *andjas* are like birds and reptiles, born of eggs. The *udbhijjas* are grass and trees that are created piercing the earth. The *svedajas* are lice and mosquitoes born of sweat. (16)

मूलम्—अत्रापि चतुर्विधसकलस्थूलशरीरमेकानेकबुद्धिविषयतया
वनवज्जलाशयवत् समष्टिर्बुध्वज्जलवद् वा व्यष्टिरपि भवति । एतत्समष्ट्युपहितं चैतन्यं
वैश्वानरो विराडित्युच्यते सर्वनराभिमानित्वाद् विविधं राजमानत्वाच्च । अस्या
समष्टिः स्थूलशरीरमन्नविकारत्वा दन्नमयकोशः स्थूलभोगायतनत्वाच्च स्थूलशरीरं

जाग्रदिति च व्यपदिश्यते । एतद्व्यद्युपहितं चैतन्यं विश्व इत्युच्यते सूक्ष्म-
शरीराभिमानमपरित्यज्य स्थूलशरीरादिप्रविष्टत्वात् । अस्याप्येषा व्यष्टिः
स्थूलशरीरमज्ञाकारत्वादेव हेतोरन्नमयकोशो जाग्रदिति चोच्यते । तदानीमेतौ
विश्ववैश्वानरौ दिग्वातार्कवरुणाश्विभिः क्रमाश्रित्यन्त्रितेन श्रोत्रादीन्द्रियपञ्चकेन
क्रमाच्छब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धानग्नीन्द्रोपेन्द्रयमप्रजापतिभिः क्रमाश्रित्यन्त्रितेन वागादी-
न्द्रियपञ्चकेन क्रमाद्वचनादानगन्तविसर्गानन्दांश्चन्द्रचतुर्मुखशङ्कराच्युतैः क्रमाश्रित्य-
न्त्रितेन मनोबुद्धयहङ्कारचित्ताख्येनान्तरिन्द्रियचतुस्केन क्रमात्सङ्कल्पनिश्चयाहङ्कार्य-
चैतांश्च सर्वमितान् स्थूलविषयाननुभवतो 'जागरितस्थानो बहिष्प्रजः'
इत्यादिश्रुतेः ।¹ अत्राप्यनयोः स्थूलव्यष्टिसमष्टयोस्तदुपहितविश्ववैश्वानरयोश्च
ननुवृक्षवत्तदवच्छिन्नाकाशवच्च जलाशयजलवत्तदुपहितविम्बाकाशवच्च पूर्ववदभेदः ।
एवं पञ्चीकृतसूतेभ्यः स्थूलप्रपञ्चोत्पत्तिः । [१७]

व्याख्या—पूर्ववदत्रापि स्थूलप्रपञ्चस्य एकानेकबुद्धिविषयतया
समष्टिव्यष्टिव्यवस्थां दर्शयति अत्रापि । एतत् सकलस्थूलशरीरसमष्ट्युपहितचैतन्यस्य
वैश्वानरसंज्ञां दर्शयति एतदिति । हेतुमवतारयति सर्वनराभिमानित्वादिति ।
व्यद्युपहितचैतन्यस्य विश्वसंज्ञां प्रतिपादयति एतद्व्यद्युपहितमिति । अन्यत् सर्वं
पूर्ववद् बोध्यम् । एवं स्थूलप्रपञ्चोत्पत्तिः । [१७]

Trans.—Here also all the gross bodies of the four kinds, as objects of one cognition and objects of many cognitions are termed as *samaṣṭi* like a forest or a reservoir and *vyasṭi* like tree or water drop. The consciousness, conditioned by this *samaṣṭi* is termed as *vaiśvānara* and *virāt* because of its egoistic feeling in all the persons and because of appearing differently. This *samaṣṭi* belonging to it, is its gross body, which is termed as 'annamaya kośa' or material sheath, being the transformation of food (matter); gross body, being the place of gross enjoyment and also waking state. The consciousness, conditioned by this *vyasṭi* is termed as *viśva* as it has entered the gross body etc., without giving up the egoism in subtle

1—Māṇḍūkya up, 3.

body This *vyāṣṭi*, belonging to it, being the transformation of matter (food) is termed as material sheath and also waking state. At that time both this *viśva* and *vaiśvānara* enjoy the gross objects like sound, touch, colour, taste, and odour respectively by the five (sense) organs, controlled by Dik, Wind, Sun, Varuna, and Asvins ; speaking, taking, going, excreting and enjoying through the five organs of action, beginning with the organ of speech, controlled by Agni, Indra, Upendra, Yama and Prajapati ; desiring, determining, feeling egoism and recollecting through the five internal senses, known as *manas*, *budhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *citta*, controlled by candra, Brahmā, Śāṅkara, and Viṣṇu, as it is stated in the *Śruti* : 'persisting in the waking state, conscious of the external' etc. Here also there is absence of difference between these two viz-the gross *vyāṣṭi* and the *samṣṭi* and also between the *viśva* and *vaiśvānara*, conditioned by them, as there is no difference between the forest and the tree, as well as *ākāśa*, limited by them, and between the reservoir and water, as well as the *ākāśa*, reflected in them, alike the former. Thus is the creation of the gross universe from the quintuplicated five gross elements. (17)

मूलम्—एतेषां स्थूलसूक्ष्मकारणप्रपञ्चानामपि समष्टिरेको महान् प्रपञ्चो भवति, यथावान्तरवनानां समष्टिरेकं महद्वनं भवति, यथावान्तरजलाशयानां समष्टिरेको महान् जलाशयः । एतदुपहितं वैश्वानरादीश्वरपर्यन्तं चैतन्यमप्यवान्तरवनावज्जिज्ञाकाशवदवान्तरजलाशयगतप्रतिबिम्बाकाशवच्चैवमेव । आभ्यां महाप्रपञ्चतदुपहितचैतन्याभ्यां तसायःपिण्डवदविविक्तं सदनुपहितं चैतन्यं 'सर्वं खलु इदं ब्रह्म' ¹ इति वाक्यस्य वाच्यं भवति विविक्तं सल्लक्ष्यमपि भवति । एवं वस्तुन्यवस्वारोपोऽध्यारोपः सामान्येन प्रदर्शितः । [१८]

1—Chāndogya up, 3, 14, 1.

व्याख्या—महाप्रपञ्चस्य स्वरूपं निर्विशति एतेषामिति । पूर्वोक्त-
स्थूलसूक्ष्मकारणप्रपञ्चानां समष्टिरेव महाप्रपञ्च इत्यर्थः । स्थूलप्रपञ्चः सर्वेषां
स्थूलशरीराणां समष्टिर्जाग्रदवस्थाविषयः । सूक्ष्मप्रपञ्चः सर्वेषां सूक्ष्मशरीराणां
समष्टिः स्वप्नावस्थाविषयः । कारणप्रपञ्चश्चाज्ञानलक्षणोऽज्ञानसमष्टिः सुषुप्तिविषयः ।
दृष्टान्तेन प्रद्वयति यथावान्तरवनानामिति । एकमेवचैतन्यमेतत्सर्ववच्छिन्नं सत्
प्रतिभासत इति कथयति एतदुपहितमिति । विश्वतैजसप्रज्ञानां वैश्वानरहिरण्यगर्भ-
ेश्वरादिसंज्ञकानां चोपाधिकृतभेदसत्त्वेऽपि परमार्थतो भेदाभावादेकत्वम् । 'नेति
नेती'त्यादिश्रुतिवाक्यस्य 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' इति श्रुतिवाक्येन सह
विरोधमाशङ्क्य विरोधं परिहर्तुं 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मे'ति श्रुतिवाक्यं
व्याख्याति आभ्यामिति । 'शान्तं शिवमद्वैतं चतुर्थं मन्यन्ते स आत्मा स विज्ञेयः'
इति ² श्रुत्या प्रतिपादितं यत्तुरीयं ब्रह्मचैतन्यं तन्महाप्रपञ्चतदुपहितचैतन्याभ्यां
सह संयुक्तं सत् सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मे'ति वाक्यस्य वाच्यं भवति । विविक्तं सद्
वाक्यस्यास्य लक्ष्यं भवति । तस्माल्लक्षणया सर्वप्रपञ्चनिर्मुक्तं निर्विकारे
तुरीयचैतन्ये प्रतिपादिते 'नेति नेती'ति वाक्येन न कश्चिद्विरोधलेशोऽपि वर्तत
इति सर्वमुपपन्नम् । एवं ब्रह्मणि प्रपञ्चाध्यारोपः प्रदर्शितः । [१८]

Trans.—The aggregate of these gross, subtle and causal universes is one great universe, as the aggregate of the minor forests forms a great forest and the aggregate of minor reservoirs forms a great reservoir. The consciousness, conditioned by this, beginning with *vaiśvānara* and ending with *Īśvara* is one, as the *akāśa*, limited by minor forests or the *akāśa*, reflected in the minor reservoirs. The unconditioned consciousness, being not distinguished from the great universe and the consciousness, conditioned by it, as the glowing iron lump, becomes the object of the direct expression of the statement. 'All this is Brahman', and when distinguished becomes the object of indication also. Thus, the superimposition of that which is not real on the real is shown in a general manner. (18)

1—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up., 4. 4. 19.

2—Māṇḍūkya up. 7

Comm.—Here the process of quintuplication is described through which the gross elements are created, which are necessary for the creation of the gross bodies and the gross universe. Thus the gross elements are the admixture of all the elements, but an element, is named according to the predominance of a specific element in it. In the process of creation the latter is the effect of the former, so the quality of the former also remains in seed form in the latter. Thus *ākāśa* is endowed only with sound, where as its effect air has both sound and touch. But these qualities remain unmanifest in the subtle elements, but after quintuplication they manifest. Though in the upaniṣad the process of triplication is described still then it is not against the validity of quintuplication, as the description of triplication is only an indication of the quintuplication. Quintuplication is implied by triplication, which only can do justice to the five elements described in the vedas. The five elements of Advaita Vedānta, unlike that of the vaiśeṣika, are not distinct realities, neither do they remain separate from each other. From these quintuplicated elements or gross elements the gross bodies and the gross universe are created.

The gross body is known as *annamaya kośa*, or material sheath. The consciousness, conditioned by the totality of gross universe is known as *virāṭ* and that which is conditioned by the individual gross body is known as *viśva*. The domain of gross universe is the waking state. The pure consciousness, which forms the ground of these

gross, subtle universes and the cosmic nescience is the *nirguṇa Brahman*, which is indicated by the great saying : 'All these are the Brahman.' (15-18)

मूलम्—इदानीं प्रत्यगात्मनीदमिदमयमारोपयतीति विशेषत उच्यते । अतिप्राकृतस्तु 'आत्मा वै जायते पुत्रः' इत्यादिश्रुतेः¹ स्वस्मिन्निव स्वपुत्रेऽपि प्रेमदर्शनात् पुत्रे पुत्रे नष्टे चाहमेव पुष्टो नष्टश्चेत्याद्यनुभावाच्च पुत्र आत्मेति वदति ।

चार्वाकस्तु 'स वा एष पुरुषोऽक्षरसमयः' इत्यादिश्रुतेः² प्रवीसगृहात्स्वपुत्रं परित्यज्यापि स्वस्य निर्गमदर्शनात् स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहमित्याद्यनुभावाच्च स्थूलशरीरमात्मेति वदति ।

अपरश्चार्वाकः 'ते ह प्राणाः प्रजापतिं पितरमेत्य ब्रूयुः'³ इत्यादिश्रुतेरिन्द्रियाणामभावे शरीरचलनाभावात् काणोऽहं बधिरोऽहमित्याद्यनुभावाच्चेन्द्रियाण्यात्मेति वदति ।

अपरश्चार्वाकः 'अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा प्राणमयः' इत्यादिश्रुतेः⁴ प्राणाभाव इन्द्रियादिचलनायोगादहमशनायावानहं पिपासावान् इत्याद्यनुभावाच्च प्राणा आत्मेति वदति ।

अन्यस्तु चार्वाकः 'अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोमयः'⁵ इत्यादिश्रुतेर्मनसि सुप्ते प्राणादेरभावादहं सङ्कल्पवानहं विकल्पवानित्याद्यनुभावाच्च मन आत्मेति वदति ।

वौदस्तु 'अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः' इत्यादिश्रुतेः⁶ कर्तृभावं करणस्य शक्त्यभावादहं कर्ताहं भोक्तेत्याद्यनुभावाच्च बुद्धिरात्मेति वदति ।

प्राभाकरतार्किकौ तु 'अन्योऽन्तर आत्माऽनन्दमयः' । इत्यादिश्रुतेर्बुद्ध्यादीनामज्ञाने लयदर्शनादहमज्ञोऽहं ज्ञानीत्याद्यनुभावाच्चाज्ञानमात्मेति वदतः ।⁷

1—Kauśītaki up, 2, 11. modified 'ātmā vai Putranāmāsi'.

2—Taittirīya up, 2, 1, 1.

3—Chāndogya up, 5, 1, 7.

4—Taittirīya up, 2, 2, 1.

5—Taittirīya up, 2, 2, 1.

6—Taittirīya up, 2, 4, 1.

7—Taittirīya up, 2, 5, 1.

भाट्टस्तु 'प्रज्ञानघन एवानन्दमयः' इत्यादिश्रुतेः ¹ सुषुप्तौ प्रकाशाप्रकाश-
सद्भावान्मामहं न जानामीत्याद्यनुभवाच्चाज्ञानोपहितं चैतन्यमात्मेति वदति ।

अपरो बौद्धः 'असदेवेदमग्र आसीत् इत्यादिश्रुतेः ² सुषुप्तौ सर्वाभावाद्ब्रह्मं
सुषुप्तौ नासमित्युत्थितस्य स्वाभावपरामर्शविषयानुभवाच्च शून्यमात्मेति
वदति । [१९]

व्याख्या — तत्पदार्थे प्रपञ्चाधारोपप्रकारं प्रपञ्चेदानीं प्रसङ्गप्राप्तं
त्वम्पदार्थविषयमधारोपं दर्शयति इदानीमिति । आत्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासस्य
दुःखात्मकसंसारहेतुत्वेन निरसनीयत्वात् स ब्रह्मादिमतोपन्यासेन विशेषतो वक्तव्य
इत्यर्थः । अतिसूक्ष्मे मत्तं तावदाह अतिप्राकृतस्त्विति । श्रुत्युक्तचतुर्भवाभासादीन्
प्रमाणयति आत्मेत्यादि । अहमिदं ममेदमिति द्विविधत्वेऽप्यध्यासस्य, ममकारा-
ध्यासस्य पुत्रादिस्थलेषु वक्तुमुचितत्वेऽप्यहंकाराध्यासोक्तिस्तस्य बलवत्त्वं
प्रतिपादयितुमुपन्यस्तेति भावः ।

देहात्मवादिनां चार्वाकैकदेशिनां मतमुत्थापयति चार्वाकस्त्विति ।
गृहदाहादिसमये पुत्रं परित्यज्य स्वस्य निर्गमनदर्शनात् पुत्रादपि स्वदेहेऽधिकतरा
प्रीतिर्दृष्टा । सूक्ष्मेऽहं कृशोऽहमित्याद्यहंप्रत्ययस्य च देहात्मत्वेन दृष्टत्वात्
सूक्ष्मशरीरमेवात्मेत्यभिप्रायः ।

इन्द्रियात्मवादिनां मतमुत्थापयति अपरश्चार्वाक इति । साक्षाच्छ्रुतेर-
भावेऽपि श्रुतार्थापत्तिं प्रमाणयितुमाह ते ह प्राणा इति । प्राणादिनामचेतनत्वे
तेषां गुरुपसत्तिप्रक्षरणादिव्यापारा न संभवन्ति, ततस्तेषां चैतन्यमुपपन्नमिति
श्रुतार्थापत्तिः । युक्तिमवतारयति इन्द्रियाणामात्मत्वं युक्तमिति भावः ।
अनुभवं प्रमाणयति काणोऽहमित्यादि । देहादाद्यहंप्रत्ययस्य बाधितत्वात्तस्य
गौणत्वमित्यर्थः ।

मुख्यप्राणात्मवादिनां मतमुत्थापयति अपरश्चार्वाक इति । श्रुतिं
प्रमाणयति अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा प्राणमय इति । युक्तिमवतारयति प्राणाभाव इति ।
अन्नाद्यलाभेन प्राणस्य दुर्बलत्वे संजाते स्वस्वविषयेष्विन्द्रियाणां प्रवृत्त्यदर्शनात्
प्राण एवात्मेति भावः । शरीरेऽहंप्रत्ययस्य बाधितत्वेन गौणत्वात्, इन्द्रियाणां च
करणत्वेन ज्ञानान्वयव्यतिरेकोपपत्तादध्यात्मत्वमनुपपन्नम् । किंच शरीरेऽस्मिन्नि-

1—Māndūkya up, 5.

2—Chāndogya up, 6, 2, 1.

न्द्रियाणां सम्भूय भोक्तृत्वं प्रत्येकं वा । प्रथमपक्षे कस्यचिद्विषयस्य ग्रहणकाले सर्वेषामेवेन्द्रियाणामावश्यकत्वाद्व्यापादिविषयग्रहणकाले जिह्वादिनामपि व्यापारापत्तेः । प्रत्येकं च भोक्तृत्वे योऽहं दृष्टवान् सोऽहमनुभवामीति प्रत्यभिज्ञा न स्यात् । तस्मादिन्द्रियाणां करणत्वमेव न तु भोक्तृत्वं संभवति । इन्द्रियव्यापाराणां कारणत्वादिन्द्रियाणां चाश्रयत्वाच्च प्राण एवात्मेति सिद्धमित्यभिप्रायः । अनुभवं प्रमाणयति अहमशनायावानित्यादि । अशनायापिपासयोश्च प्राणधर्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धत्वादहंप्रत्ययविषयः प्राण एवात्मेत्यभिप्रायः ।

मन आत्मवादमतं दर्शयति अन्यस्त्विति । श्रुतिं प्रमाणयतिअन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोनय इति । युक्तिमाहमनसि सुप्त इति । प्राणादेरिति प्राणेन्द्रियादिसमुद्ध्येत्यर्थः । सुषुप्तौ मनसोऽसद्भावान् प्राणवृत्तीनामशनायादीनामिन्द्रियवृत्तीनां च दर्शनादीनामभावः । किंच स्वप्नकाले केवलेनैव मनसा दर्शनादिसंभवान्मन एवात्मेति भावः । अनुभवं प्रमाणयति अहं सङ्कल्पवानहं विकल्पवानिति । मनसश्च सङ्कल्पादिधर्मवत्त्वं प्रसिद्धम् ।

योगाचारमतं दर्शयति बौद्धस्त्विति । श्रुतिं प्रमाणयति अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमय इति । योगाचारमते क्षणिकविज्ञानमेवात्मा । बुद्धिरेव क्षणिकविज्ञानमित्यभिधीयते कालान्तरास्थायित्वाद् विषयग्रहणे कर्तृत्वाच्च । युक्तिमवतारयति कर्तृरभाव इति । मनसः करणत्वात् करणस्य च कर्त्रधीनव्यापारत्वाद् विज्ञानस्य कर्तृरूपस्यावश्यकता वर्तते । न च मनसः कर्तृत्वमस्तु किं विज्ञानेनेति वाच्यम् । मनसः कर्तृत्वे करणाभावात् कर्तुर्मनसश्चाधिष्ठातृत्वेन नियामकान्तराभावाच्च सर्वैरिन्द्रियैः सह युगपत् संबन्धाद् युगपत्सर्वविषयावभासप्रसङ्गः । तस्माद्बुद्धिरेव कर्तृत्वं न मनसः । अनुभवं प्रमाणयति अहं कर्ताहं भोक्तेत्याद्यनुभवाच्चेति । वस्तुतस्तु क्षणिकविज्ञानस्यात्मत्वं न संभवति ज्ञानेच्छाप्रयत्नसंस्कारादीनां क्रमिकत्वात् क्षणिकविज्ञानाश्रयानुपपत्तेः । विज्ञानस्य क्षणिकत्वे च 'सोऽयं देवदत्त' इति प्रत्यभिज्ञापि न स्यात्, स इति पूर्वानुभवस्यायमिति परानुभवस्य च सामानाधिकरण्यानुपपत्तेः । क्षणिकत्वे च बन्धभोक्षयोरपि वैयधिकरण्यात् कस्यचिन्मोक्षेच्छापि न स्यात् । यथार्थतस्तु विज्ञानस्य विषयान्तरवत् साक्षिभास्यत्वेन जडत्वाद् विज्ञानवादोऽयमत्यन्तमनादरणीयः ।

प्राभाकरतार्किकयोर्नतं दर्शयति प्राभाकरतार्किकाविति । श्रुतिमवतारयति अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमय इति । अज्ञानमिति ज्ञानमिन्नं तदधिकरणं द्रव्यरूपमात्मतत्त्वम् । युक्तिमवतारयति बुद्ध्यादीनामिति । सुषुप्तौ सर्वज्ञानाभावस्य संप्रतिपन्नत्वेन सुषुप्तिजागरितयोश्चैकात्म्यप्रत्यभिज्ञानुरोधाच्च ज्ञानमिन्न आत्मेति

भावः । अनुभवेन द्रढयति अहमज्ञ इति । अहमज्ञो ज्ञानहीनोऽहम्, अहं ज्ञानी ज्ञानवानहमित्याद्यनुभवाच्च ज्ञानस्य धर्मत्वे सिद्धे धर्मिण आत्मनो द्रव्यत्व-सिद्धम् धर्मधर्मिणोर्भेदान्न ज्ञानमात्मेति भावः । वस्तुतस्तु सुषुप्तौ विषयाग्रहणस्या-ज्ञानसद्भावात् सिद्धेः, अज्ञानस्य च साक्षिमास्यत्वेन सुषुप्तावपि ज्ञानसद्भावो न केनचिदपि दूरीकर्तुं शक्यते । अनुभवेन ज्ञानमेव केवलमात्मेति प्रतीयते, न तु तस्य द्रव्यत्वमप्यनुभवसिद्धम् । द्रव्यत्वादिपरिभाषाया निष्प्रमाणकत्वेनासिद्धेर्नात्मनो द्रव्यत्वसिद्धः । तस्मादात्मनो द्रव्यत्वं प्राभाकरतार्किकयोर्मनोरथमात्रम् ।

मादृमतमुत्थापयति मादृस्त्विति । अज्ञानोपहितं चैतन्यमात्मेति मादृमतम् । अज्ञानोपहितत्वमज्ञानयुक्तत्वं ज्ञानाज्ञानरूपत्वं प्रमातृप्रमेयरूपत्वं द्रव्यबोधरूपत्वं वा । मादृानां मते एकस्यैवात्मनो द्वावंशौ विद्येते द्रव्यांशो बोधांशश्चेति । तत्र द्रव्यांशस्य ज्ञेयत्वेन कर्मत्वम्, बोधांशस्य च ज्ञातृत्वेन कर्तृत्वम्, न च कर्मकर्तृभावविरोधः, द्रव्यांशस्य प्रमेयत्वे बोधांशस्य च प्रमातृत्वे न कश्चिद्विरोधशङ्कावकाशोपपद्यते । श्रुतिं प्रमाणयति प्रज्ञानघन इति । प्रज्ञानघन शब्देन कर्तृत्वद्रव्यपदेशः, आनन्दमयशब्देन च कर्मत्वनिर्देशः । प्राचूर्यार्थं मयट् । युक्तिमवतारयति सुषुप्ताविति । 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सं न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्' इति सुप्तोत्थितस्य परामर्शोपपत्तेस्तत्र ज्ञानाज्ञानयोरुभयोरपि सद्भावोऽस्ति । तत्र 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इति बोधांशोऽनुसूयते, 'न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्' इति च द्रव्यांशः प्रकाशते । सुषुप्तिपरामर्शं तदर्थप्रतिपादकानुभवान्तरेण द्रढयति मामहमिति । अनुभवेऽस्मिन् कर्तृरि भासमानेऽपि तस्यैवानुपसंहृतविशेषस्य कर्मत्वमपि भासते । तस्मात् कर्तृकर्मोभयरूपो द्रव्यबोधोभयरूपोऽयमात्मेति भावः । वस्तुतस्तु एकस्यैवात्मनो द्रव्यबोधोभयरूपत्वस्वीकारे अंशांशित्वापत्तेरनित्यत्वं स्यात् । द्रव्यांशस्यापि जडत्वादात्मत्वायोगात् । सुषुप्तिपरामर्शस्य भावरूपज्ञानोपहित-सुखस्वरूपात्मनः सद्भावादेव सिद्धेर्न तेन द्रव्यबोधरूपत्वमात्मनः सिध्यति इति सिद्धान्तः ।

माध्यमिकमतं दर्शयति अपरो बौद्ध इति । श्रुतिं प्रमाणयति असदेवेदमिति । युक्तिमवतारयति सुषुप्ताविति । सुषुप्तौ न कस्यचिदपि पदार्थस्य सद्भावोऽनुसूयते । तस्मात् असदेवात्मतत्त्वमिति शून्यवादिनां मतम् । सुषुप्तावात्मनोऽभावं परामर्शेन द्रढयति अहं सुषुप्ताविति । अतः शून्यमात्मेति भावः । वस्तुतस्तु शून्यस्य निष्प्रमाणकत्वेऽसिद्धत्वात् सप्रमाणकत्वे च ज्ञानसद्भावापत्तेः सर्वाभावः कदाचिदपि न प्रतिष्ठापयितुं शक्यते । तस्मान्माध्यमिकानां मतं दुर्युक्तिकत्वादनादरणीयमिति सिद्धान्तः । [१९]

Trans.—Now it is explained in detail that such and such persons superimpose on the internal self such and such objects. The most ordinary man says that the son is the self, as it is stated in the *Śruti* : 'The self is indeed born as the son', because there is love for the son as one's ownself, it being experienced that when the son is prosperous one feels himself to be prosperous and when suffers one feels as if he is suffering. But the *cārvāka* says that the gross body is the self, as it is stated in the *śruti* : This man is made of food and drink, it being seen that one comes out of a burnt house even giving up his son, and because of the experience 'I am fat', 'I am thin' etc. Another *cārvāka* says that the senses are the self, as it is stated in the *Śruti* : 'Those senses approached father *prajāpati* and said' etc., because no motion is possible of the body in the absence of the senses and as there is such experience 'I am blind' 'I am deaf' etc. Another *cārvāka* says that the vital force is the self, as it is stated in the *śruti* : 'Another and inner self is the sheath of vital force' ; because no motion of the senses is possible in the absence of the vital force; as there is such experience 'I am hungry' 'I am thirsty' etc. Another *cārvāka* says that the *manas* is the self, as it is stated in the *śruti* : 'Another and inner self is the mental sheath; because there is the absence of the functioning of the senses etc. when the *manas* is asleep and as there is such experience 'I am with desires' 'I am with doubts' etc. The Buddhist says that *budhi* is the self, as it is stated in the *Śruti* : 'Another and inner self is the 'sheath

of *viñāna* ; because in the absence of the agent there is no power of functioning in the instrument; and as there is such experience 'I am agent', 'I am enjoyer' etc. The upholder of the *prābhākara* school of *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Naiyāika* says that the self is non-sentient, as it is stated in the *Śruti* : 'Another and inner self is the 'sheath of bliss' ; because *buddhi* and others are seen to lose their being in the non-sentient ; and as there is such experience 'I am unaware', 'I am ignorant' etc. The *Bhāṭṭa* says that the consciousness endowed with nescience is the self, as it is stated in the *Śruti* : 'This essence of consciousness is verily the *ānandamaya*', because in the state of deep sleep there is the existence of both illumination and non-illumination ; and as there is such experience 'I know not myself etc. Another Buddhist says that void is the self, as it is stated in the *śruti* : 'The non-being existed at first' etc, because in the state of deep sleep there is the absence of all ; and as there is such experience of the awoken regarding the after knowledge 'I was not existing in deep sleep' etc. (19)

Comm.— Before going to state the meaning of the great saying 'that thou art', the writer is showing the meaning of the word 'thou', which stands to signify the individual self. Successively he states the views of the different schools, which begin with the experience of the most ordinary man and end in the assertion of the nihilists. This sort of *adhyāropa* or superimposition of the not-selves on the self is based on the general criterion of superimposition. 'V' says that the

writer adopts here '*arundhatī nyāya*' (the manner of showing the star arundhatī) to show the self clearly. For various theories he gives different arguments, based on our experience and also quotes the authoritative statements from the veda to support them, but subsequently rejects them by the help of stronger arguments and stronger vedic testimonies.

At first he shows the conception of the layman, who superimposes himself on the son. Here the word 'son' stands for other external relations like wife etc, with whom people identify themselves and feel miserable when they are in miseries and become happy when they are happy. But this feeling of happiness and pain in others' feelings cannot prove the identity of the self with other external persons or this feeling is only conditional, which is refuted by other instances of difference. Some materialists think that the body is the self, as there is such experience 'I am fat' 'I am thin' etc, which establishes the identity of the self and the body. But this is not tenable, as the body cannot act without the senses. So other materialists believe that the senses are the self. According to them, the experience 'I am blind' etc. confirms their thesis; but this is not tenable, as without the vital force the senses cannot work. 'V' argues that if the senses are the self then either each of them is the self or they are the self combinedly. Each of them cannot be the self, as, if it were the fact then there would be no unity of knowledge. If each of

them were the self then there would be no harmony, they being independent of each other, which would give rise to discordance. On the other hand they cannot be the self combinedly, as all of them are not required for the accomplishment of a particular action, their objects being specifically determined for each. But they are only the instruments (karaṇa) in the enjoyment of a particular object (viṣaya). So they cannot be the self, which is the enjoyer. A different group of materialists believe that the vital force (prāṇa) is the self, as without it the senses cannot operate. There is also the experience 'I am hungry', 'I am thirsty' etc. which confirms this view, as hunger and thirst are the requirements of the vital force. Another materialist says that the mind (manas) is the self, as in the absence of the mind no perception of hunger and thirst is possible, nor the senses can operate without mind. Mind is the faculty of desires and doubts, in contrast to intellect, which is the faculty of determination. It is also said to be the faculty of attention as various objects of the different senses being present at one time, there can be only one perception, which is due to the fact that unless the mind is attached to the sense no perception can take place. But this mind, which is the instrument of knowledge, cannot be the agent of the process of knowing. If it were the agent then all the kinds of sense knowledge would simultaneously manifest at one time, there being no regulating factor between the senses and the agent. So 'V' argues that the mind is only the instrument but not the self, as the self is the agent and the enjoyer.

Upto this the writer states the views upheld by different groups of *cārvākas*. This word is loosely translated as 'materialists'. But in this context this word has got no singular meaning, in-as-much as many *cārvākas* are there, as we have seen in this book, who think that the mind is the self. So the previous group of *cārvākas*, who identify the body with the self are to be termed as 'gross materialists.' The position of this last school, which identifies, the mind with the self, differs from that of the Buddhist school of idealism in this that according to the latter, *viññāna* or *budhi* is not the product of matters, where as the materialists do not believe in this.

The *yogācāra* school of Buddhism, which holds the doctrine of *viññānavāda* or idealism, thinks that *viññāna* is the self. This *viññāna* is identical with *budhi*, which the *viññānavādins* identify with the self and consciousness. According to them it is always changeful or momentary as it changes from moment to moment, there being no changeless self. Cognitions, volitions and emotions change from time to time, which are nothing but the modifications of *buddhi*. This *buddhi* is translated as mind or intellect. The various discursive and emotive functions are assigned to one *viññāna*. This is the agent or *kartṛ*. But the momentary *viññāna* cannot be the self, as if it is accepted, then *pratyabhijñā* or recognition will be impossible; that *viññāna*, which cognises something, being momentary, it cannot recognise the same thing in a different time. This doctrine also violates the law of unity of knowledge and memory. This is an undeniable fact that one who knows only

can recall something. But if momentary *viññāna* is the self, then the *viññāna* which knows being different from that which remembers, there will be utter chaos and confusion. So this momentary *viññāna* cannot be the self. The Buddhist idealists, owing to ignorance, confuse this with the changeless self, which underlies the surface of the process of knowing.

The *Prābhākara* school of *Mīmāṃsā* and *Nyāya* say that the self is the substance, which is different from knowledge. In this context, this word '*ajñāna*' does not mean here ignorance, but it only means different from knowledge *jñānabhinna*, as it is interpreted by 'V'. The *prābhākaras* say that the self is the locus of knowledge, which manifests through its attribute (dharma) knowledge. Knowledge is selfluminous according to this view, but the self is not so, which only manifests through knowledge as its locus (*āśraya*). The *Naiyāyikas* say that knowledge is the attribute which inheres in the substance self (*ātman*). According to them the self is known through mental perception. Both the schools opine that the self is different from knowledge and is the substratum of it. The proof in this is the experience of deep sleep, in which there is no existence of knowledge, as at that time the *buddhi* merges in the self, which is different from knowledge (*ajñāne layadarśanāt*). But this view is not tenable, as the experience 'I am ignorant' does not repudiate the existence of knowledge, but it only proves the existence of ignorance, which is known through knowledge.

The *Bhāṭṭa* school of *Mīmāṃsā* holds that the self is the consciousness, associated with ignorance (*ajñānopaḥitam caitanyam*), as in deep sleep both knowledge and ignorance exist. The word 'ajñānopaḥitam' is interpreted by 'S' as limited by ignorance or *ajñānāvachchinnam*. 'V' finds its meaning in the *Bhāṭṭa* doctrine that the self is of two parts one is unconscious and the other is conscious. It is unconscious in the part of substance (*dravya*), and conscious in the part of knowledge (*bodha*). According to the school of the *Bhāṭṭas* this experience 'I do not know myself' is the proof in this. According to them self is both the knower and the knowable. But this view is untenable as the same thing cannot be of two nature. On the other hand, the knowledge of deep sleep only proves the existence of both ignorance and its revealer knowledge, which is required for the perception of the former, but it cannot prove their unity in one self.

The *Mādhyamika* school of Buddhism upholds the doctrine of non-existence of the self. The writer intends to mean this when he says that according to the nihilistic school of Buddhism void is the self. The *sūnyavādins* say that there is no existence of knowledge at the time of deep sleep, which is refuted previously. Utter nihilism cannot be possible. At least we have to accept the existence of the substratum, on which error takes place. (19)

मूलम्—एतेषां पुत्रादीनामनात्मत्वमुच्यते । एतैरतिप्राकृतादि-
वादिभिस्तुक्तेषु श्रुतियुक्तयनुमवाभासेषु, पूर्वपूर्वोक्तश्रुतियुक्तयनुमवाभासानामुत्तरो-
त्तरश्रुतियुक्तयनुमवाभासैरात्मत्वबाधदर्शनात् पुत्रादीनामनात्मत्वं स्पष्टमेव ।

किञ्च, प्रत्यगस्थूलोऽक्षुरप्राणोऽमना अकर्ता चैतन्यं चिन्मात्रं सदित्यादिप्रबल-
श्रुतिविरोधादस्य पुत्रादिशून्यपर्यन्तस्य जडस्य चैतन्यभास्यत्वेन घटादिवदनि-
त्यत्वाद् अहं ब्रह्मेति विद्वदनुभवप्राबल्याच्च तत्तच्छ्रुतियुक्तं यनुमवाभासानां बाधित-
त्वादपि पुत्रादिशून्यपर्यन्तमखिलमनात्मैव । अतस्तद्भासकं नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्त-
सत्यस्वभावं प्रत्यक्षैतन्यमेवात्मवस्तु इति वेदान्तविद्वदनुभवः । एवमध्यारोपः । २० ।

उच्यते—एवमात्मनि पूर्वपक्षिणां विप्रतिपत्तोः प्रतिपाद्य-
सिद्धान्तपक्षं प्रतिपादयितुं पूर्वोक्तानि मतानि दूषयन्नाह—एतेषामिति । हेतु-
मवतारयति—एतैरिति । पूर्वोक्तश्रुतियुक्तं यनुमवाभासादीनामुत्तरोत्तरश्रुति-
युक्तं यनुमवाभासैर्बाधितत्वाद् दृष्टवत्त्वजडत्वसावयवत्वादीनां हेतूनां सत्त्वाच्च
पुत्रादीनामनात्मत्वं स्पष्टमेवोपपन्नम् । बलवच्छ्रुतिवाक्यैरन्वेषां श्रुतिवाक्यानां
बाधितत्वं दर्शयति—किंचेति । ‘कश्चिद्धीरः प्रत्यात्मानमेक्षतः^१’, ‘अस्थूलमन्य-
ह्रस्वम्^२’, ‘परित्यक्तक्षुः सः^३’, ‘सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म’^४ इत्यादिश्रुतिवाक्यै-
रात्मनो याथार्थ्ये प्रतिपादिते पुत्रादीनामनात्मत्वं स्पष्टमेव । ननु केषांचिद्
वेदवाक्यानामप्रामाणिकत्वे परस्परविरुद्धत्वे च कथं वेदानां प्रामाण्यं सिध्यतीति
चेत् ? अत्रोच्यते, न श्रुतिवाक्यानां परस्परविरुद्धत्वमरुन्धतीदर्शनन्यायेन पूर्व-
प्रतिपादितविषयनिराकरणेनात्मतत्त्वस्यातिसूक्ष्मस्य प्रदर्शनीयत्वात् । युक्तिं दर्शयति
—अस्य पुत्रादिशून्यपर्यन्तस्येति । पुत्रादिशून्यपर्यन्तं सकलमनात्मैव जडत्वा-
च्चैतन्यभास्यत्वाच्च घटादिवत् । विद्वदनुभवप्राबल्यं दर्शयति—अहं ब्रह्मेति ।
‘तदात्मानमेवावेत् । अहं ब्रह्मास्मीति । तस्मात्तत्सर्वमभवत्तद्व्यो यो देवानां
प्रत्यबुध्यत स एव तदभवत्तथर्षीणां तथा मनुज्याणां तद्वै तत्पश्यन् षिर्वामदेवः
प्रतिपेदेहं मनुमवसूर्यश्चेति^५ इति ब्रह्मात्मैक्यानुभूतेः प्राबल्यमेव दर्शयति भगवतो
श्रुतिः । विद्वदनुभवमुपसंहरति—अत इति । एवमध्यारोपः प्रदर्शितः । [२०]

Trans.—Now it is to be shown that these beginning with son are not the self. Amongst these misleading scriptural testimonies, fallacious arguments and false experiences, maintained by these debators like the most ordinary and the rest,

1—Kāṭha up., 2. 1. 1.

2—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up., 3. 8. 8.

3—Śvetāsvatra up., 3. 19.

4—Taittirīya up., 2. 1. 1.

5—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up., 1. 4. 10.

the earlier false testimonies, arguments and experiences being sublated by the later testimonies, arguments and experiences, it is conspicuous that the son and others are not the self, as there is opposition of the powerful 'śruti, 'internal, not gross, not the eye, not the vital force, not the *manas*, not the agent, consciousness, consciousness only, the Being' etc.; because of the evanescent character of the insentient, beginning with the son to the end of the void, as the pot, they being illuminated by consciousness; as there is such experience of the knower that I am Brahman; and as they sublate respectively the false testimonies, fallacious arguments and false experiences. So, it is the experience of the knower of *vedānta* that the inner consciousness, which is their revealer and which is eternally pure, intelligent, free and intransient by nature, is the self. Thus is the superimposition. (20)

Comm.—Here the writer says that the prior testimonies, arguments and the experiences, which are given as proofs for the truth of the previous theories, cannot be accepted as final, as they are intended to make the ignorant understand the truth successively. The arguments are fallacious being based on erroneous experiences. In this passage he refers to the stronger vedic statements (vide Br-up. 3, 8, 8; Kāṭha 4. 1; Muṇḍ. up, 1, 11, 6 etc.) to prove his own thesis. The whole universe beginning from the son upto ignorance cannot be the self-luminous self, as they are only illuminated by consciousness, but cannot

manifest by themselves. Finally the experience of the seer is given as a proof in the vedantic truth. Upto this passage the writer has described the process of superimposition. In contradistinction to them, which are superimposed, the *ātman* (self) is eternal, pure, luminous and invariable inner consciousness, which reveals them all. Both the knowledge of the not-self as the self and the knowledge of the false as real are erroneous. It is remarkable in this context that though in one case the whole universe is imposed on the Brahman or the Reality and in the other case some are imposed on the individual self, still then these two sorts of *adhyāsa* are not different in kind, as the same nescience is the cause of them both and the very *ātman* (self) is the Brahman. (20)

मूलम्—अपवादो नाम रज्जुविवर्तस्य सपश्य रज्जुमात्रत्ववद्वस्तु-
विवर्तस्यावस्तुनोऽज्ञानादेः प्रपञ्चस्य वस्तुमात्रत्वम् । तदुक्तम्¹—

‘सत्त्वतोऽन्यथाप्रथा विकार इत्युदीरितः ।

अतत्त्वतोऽन्यथाप्रथा विवर्त इत्युदीरितः ॥’ इति ॥

तथा—एतद्भोगायतनं चतुर्विधसकलस्थूलशरीरजातं भोग्यरूपान्नपानादिकमेत-
दायतनभूतादिचतुर्दशभुवनान्येतदायतनभूतं ब्रह्माण्डं चैतत्सर्वमेतेषां कारणरूपं
पञ्चीकृतभूतमात्रं भवति । एतानि शब्दादिविषयसहितानि पञ्चीकृताति भूताति
सूक्ष्मशरीरजातं चैतत्सर्वमेतेषां कारणरूपापञ्चीकृतभूतमात्रं भवति । एतानि
सत्त्वादिगुणसहितान्यपञ्चीकृतान्युत्पत्तिव्युत्क्रमेण तत्कारणभूताज्ञानोपहितचैतन्य-
मात्रं भवति । एतदज्ञानमज्ञानोपहितं चैतन्यञ्चेश्वरादिकमेतदाधारभूतानुपहित-
चैतन्यरूपं तुरीयं ब्रह्ममात्रं भवति । [२१]

व्याख्या—आत्मनि प्रपञ्चाध्यारोपप्रकारं सप्रपञ्चं निरूप्येदानीं
तदपवादं निरूपयिष्यन्नादौ तल्लक्षणमाह—अपवादो नामेति । चिद्वस्तुमात्रस्य
ब्रह्मणो विवर्तस्यास्य संसारस्य चिन्मात्रब्रह्मत्वेनावस्थानं नामापवादः । नामरूपै-
र्विभिन्नत्वेन प्रतीतस्य संसारस्य नामरूपाणि विहायाधिष्ठानवस्तुमात्रत्व-

1—Cannot be traced.

प्राप्तिः । यथा कटककुण्डलादिनामरूपाणि विहाय सुवर्णस्य सुवर्णमात्रत्वप्राप्तिः । जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां विक्रियमाणत्वे श्रुतिः 'तद्धेदं तर्ह्यध्याकृतमासीत्तन्नामरूपाभ्यां व्याक्रियत । असौनामायमिदं रूपं'¹ इति । 'विवर्तपरिणामयोर्भेदं दर्शयति—सतत्त्वत इति । सतत्त्वतो यथार्थत्वेनान्यथाप्रथनमन्यभावेन परिणामो विकारः । स्वरूपं परित्यज्यान्यस्वरूपावासिरित्यर्थः । अतत्त्वतोऽप्यथायत्नत्वेन स्वरूपमपरित्यज्यान्यस्वरूपावाहिर्विवर्तः । दुग्धस्य दधिस्वरूपावासिः परिणामः, रज्ज्वाश्च सर्पाकारेण प्रतीतिविवर्तः । अपवादक्रमं दर्शयति—तथाहीति । नामरूपनिर्मुक्तमिदं सूक्ष्मप्रपञ्चरूपं ब्रह्माण्डं पञ्चीकृतभूतसमुहमात्रं भवति । पञ्चीकृतभूतसहितोऽयं सूक्ष्मप्रपञ्चोऽपञ्चीकृतभूतमात्रं भवति । अपञ्चीकृतभूतानि सत्त्वादिगुणसहितानि लयक्रमेणाप्यज्ञानोपहितं चैतन्यमात्रं भवन्ति । एवमधिष्ठानावशेषः सर्वेषां वस्तूनां विनाशोऽभ्युपगम्यते, अधिष्ठानस्य च नामरूपादिविकाररहितत्वेन विकारित्वाभावात्ताशानुपपत्तेः । आत्मैव संसारगतेः पर्यवसानम् तथा च श्रुतिः—'पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः' इति² । [२१]

Trans.—*Apavāda* is the assertion that the universe, beginning with ignorance, which is the appearance of the Reality and not real by nature is nothing but the Reality, as the serpent, which is the appearance of the rope is nothing but the rope, So it is said : 'The actual transformation is *vikāra* and the apparent transformation is *vivarta*.' Thus this seat of enjoyment, consisting of the four categories of the gross bodies, the enjoyment like food and drink etc., their location the fourteen worlds beginning with *bhūh* and their support, the cosmos—all these are nothing but the non-quintuplicated elements, which are their causes. These non-quintuplicated elements, with the three *gunas* like *sattva* etc., in the reverse order of their creation, are nothing other than the consciousness,

1—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up, 1. 4. 7.

2—Kāṭha up., 1. 3. 11.

conditioned by the *ajñāna*, which is their cause. This *ajñāna* and consciousness, conditioned by *ajñāna*, *Īśvara* etc. are nothing but the Fourth, Brahman, the unconditioned consciousness. (21)

Comm.—In this passage the writer describes the process of negation of superimposition, known as *apavāda*. It is the re-assertion of the Reality, in which the whole universe, which is the appearance (*vivarta*) of the former, subsides. The writer quotes a verse from some ancient text to substantiate his view that *vivarta* is the apparent transformation of something, where as *vikāra* (*pariṇāma*) is the real modification. So negation is a process by which the effect, which is nothing more than a mere appearance, sustained by mere names and forms, re-assumes its previous causal shape. Thus, the whole gross universe, with the manifold objects are, in reality, nothing more than the five quintuplicated elements (gross elements). The subtle universe with the five quintuplicated elements, are, in reality, the five non-quintuplicated elements. In this regressive way they become nothing but the nescience. At last the nescience and the consciousness, conditioned by it, become the unconditioned consciousness, the Brahman. This is the Fourth or *Turiya*, which not only forms the ground of the individual bodies viz-the causal body, the subtle body and the gross body, but also of the gross, subtle and causal universes. From the individual standpoint it is called the self or *ātman* and from the side of the universe it is named as the Brahman. But, in fact, it is one and the same

consciousness. It is remarkable in this context that the upaniṣads use these two words as synonymous.

It is noteworthy to remember that this doctrine of Advaita vedānta cannot be regarded as solipsism, in-as-much as, the self of vedānta is not the individualised self of the solipsists. Nor can it be termed as idealism, as, unlike the subjectivists Advaita vedānta does not regard the objects of the world to be the conglomerations of mere ideas. Such a view we find with a group of Buddhists, known as *vijñānavādins*, which is severely criticised by Śaṅkara. We cannot also find out similarity between the Absolute idealism of Hegel and the non-dualism of vedānta. The dynamic progress of the abstract idea through the dialectic process of development, which is the basic principle in the Hegelian philosophy, has nothing similar to the static changeless consciousness of Advaita vedānta. The vedantic Brahman is ever-perfect, which does not require, unlike the Hegelian idea, any process of development for its concretisation. On the other hand, unlike that of Hegel the Brahman of Advaita is not an logical principle or an intellectual idea merely. Nor can it be compared with the Sentient Experience of Bradley, which is according to him the absolute Reality. The Bradleyan Experience is nothing more than a system or a conglomeration of the fragments of experiences, which can hardly be compared with the partless Brahman of Advaita vedānta. On the other hand, the Bradleyan conception is more sensationalistic in contrast to that of Hegel, while the vedantic conception is

neither sensationalistic nor rationalistic. In fact, it is not at all a speculative idea. Brahman, which is of the essence of consciousness, is beyond sensation, reason, thought imagination, the knowledge of which can only be obtained through unbroken contemplation and absorption. (2.)

मूलम्—आभ्यामध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां तत्त्वपदार्थशोधनमपि सिद्धं भवति । तथा हि—अज्ञानादिसमष्टिरेतदुपहितं सर्वज्ञत्वादिविशिष्टं चैतन्यमेतदनुपहितं चैतत्त्रयं तसायःपिण्डवदेकत्वेनावभासमानं तत्त्वपदवाच्यार्थो भवति । एतदुपाध्युपहिताधारभूतमनुपहितं चैतन्यं तत्त्वपदलक्ष्यार्थो भवति । अज्ञानादिव्यष्टिरेतदुपहिताल्पज्ञत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यमेतदनुपहितं चैतत्त्रयं तसायःपिण्डवदेकत्वेनावभासमानं त्वम्पदवाच्यार्थो भवति । एतदुपाध्युपहिताधारभूतमनुपहितं प्रत्यगानन्दं तुरीयं चैतन्यं त्वम्पदलक्ष्यार्थो भवति । (२२)

व्याख्या—अध्यारोपापवादयोः प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वप्रदर्शनपरत्वेऽपि तत्त्वपदार्थशोधनं तयोरेवान्तरफलमिति सूचयितुं कथयति आभ्यामिति । तत्त्वपदयोः प्रत्येकं द्विविधोऽर्थो लक्ष्यार्थो वाच्यार्थश्चेति । तदुभयं विवृणोति—तथाहीति । अज्ञानं तदवच्छिन्नेश्वरचैतन्यं तयोराधारभूतमनुपहितं चैतन्यं चैतत्त्रयं तसायःपिण्डवदविविक्तं सत्त्वपदवाच्यार्थो भवति । तत्त्वपदलक्ष्यार्थमाह—एतदिति । तयोराधारभूतमनुपहितं चैतन्यमेव लक्ष्यार्थ इति भावः । व्यष्टिभूतमज्ञानं तदवच्छिन्नजीवचैतन्यं तयोराधारभूतमनुपहितं चैतन्यं चैतत्त्रयमविविक्तं सत्त्वपदवाच्यार्थो भवति । तयोराधारभूतमनुपहितं चैतन्यं त्वपदलक्ष्यार्थो भवति । तत्त्वपदगोचरयोः पदार्थयोरेकत्वज्ञापनाथमध्यारोपापवादयोः रप्युपयोगिता वर्त्तत इत्यर्थः । (२२)

Trans.—Through these superimposition and negation the clarification of the meaning of the words *Tat* (that) and *Tvam* (thou) is achieved. These three viz. the aggregate of *ajñāna* etc. and the consciousness, endowed with such as omniscience etc., conditioned by this and the unconditioned, taken together, appearing as one like the glowing lump of iron, become the direct meaning of the word *Tat* (that). The

unconditioned consciousness, which is the substratum of these condition and the conditioned, is the indicative meaning of the word *Tai*. These three viz. the individual *ajñāna* etc, the consciousness, conditioned by this, endowed with limited knowledge and the unconditioned taken together, appearing as one like the glowing lump of iron become the direct meaning of the word *Tvam* (thou). The unconditioned consciousness, the substratum of these condition and the conditioned, which is the internal bliss and the Fourth is the indicative meaning of the word *Tvam* (thou). (22)

Comm.—The identity of the individual and the cosmic spirit is the import of the great saying, ‘That thou art’. This sense is ascertained through the process of superimposition and negation. When the imposed difference is discarded through negation, the oneness of them is easily ascertained. Though the direct meanings of the words ‘that’ and ‘thou’ are not compatible, yet, when we take their indicative meanings (*lakṣyārtha*) there is no discrepancy between them as the same pure consciousness is indicated by both the words. (22)

मूलम्—अथ महावाक्यार्थो वर्ण्यते । इदं तत्त्वमसीति वाक्यं सम्बन्धत्रयेणाल्लण्डार्थबोधकं भवति । सम्बन्धत्रयं नाम पदयोः सामानाधिकरण्यं पदार्थयोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावः प्रत्यगात्मलक्षणयोर्लक्ष्यलक्षणभावश्चेति । तदुक्तम्¹—

‘सामानाधिकरण्यं च विशेषणविशेष्यता ।

लक्ष्यलक्षणसम्बन्धः पदार्थप्रत्यगात्मनाम् ॥ इति ॥

सामानाधिकरण्यसम्बन्धस्तावद्यथा ‘सोऽयं देवदत्त’ इत्यस्मिन् वाक्ये तत्काल-विशिष्टदेवदत्तवाचकसशब्दस्यैतत्कालविशिष्टदेवदत्तवाचकायं शब्दस्य चैकस्मिन् पिण्डे तात्पर्यसम्बन्धः । तथा च तत्त्वमसीति वाक्येऽपि परोक्षत्वादिविशिष्ट-चैतन्यवाचकतत्पदस्यापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यवाचकत्वम्पदस्य चैकस्मिन्चैतन्ये तात्पर्यसम्बन्धः ।

1—Naiskarmyasiddhi, ५. 3.

विशेषणविशेष्यभावसम्बन्धस्तु यथा तत्रैव वाक्ये सशब्दार्थतत्कालविशिष्ट-
देवदत्तस्यायं शब्दार्थतत्कालविशिष्टदेवदत्तस्य चान्योऽन्यभेदव्यावर्तकतया विशेषण-
विशेष्यभावः । तथात्रापि वाक्ये तत्पदार्थपरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यस्य त्वम्प-
दार्थापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यस्य चान्योऽन्यभेदव्यावर्तकतया विशेषणविशेष्य-
भावः ।

लक्ष्यलक्षणसम्बन्धस्तु यथा तत्रैव वाक्ये सशब्दायं शब्दयोस्तदर्थयोर्वा
विरुद्धतत्कालैतत्कालविशिष्टपरित्यागेनाविरुद्धदेवदत्तेन सह लक्ष्यलक्षणभावः ।
तथात्रापि वाक्ये तत्त्वम्पदयोस्तदर्थयोर्वा विरुद्धपरोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्ट-
परित्यागेनाविरुद्धचैतन्येन सह लक्ष्यलक्षणभावः । इयमेव भागलक्षणेत्युच्यते । (२३)

७८११८११—पदार्थनिर्णयपूर्वकत्वाद्वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तेरादौ पदार्थ
परिशोध्य वाक्यार्थं निर्णेतुमारभते—अथेति । तत्त्वमसीति श्रुतिप्रतिपादित-
महावाक्यस्याखण्डार्थबोधकत्वं सम्बन्धत्रयेण सिद्धं भवतीति कथयति—
इदमिति । अखण्डार्थेति भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानां शब्दानामेकस्मिन्नेवार्थे पर्य-
वसानम् । तदेवापर्यायशब्दानां संसर्गागोचरप्रमितिजनकत्वं नाम । तथा चोक्तं
संप्रदायविद्भिराचार्यैः—¹

‘संसर्गसिद्धिसम्यग्धीहेतुता या गिरामियम् ।

उक्ताखण्डार्थता यद्वा तत्प्रातिपदिकार्थता’ ॥ इति ॥

नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धिचनमुपन्यस्यति—सामानाधिकरण्यं चेति ।

सामानाधिकरण्यसम्बन्धं विवृणोति—सामानाधिकरण्यसम्बन्धस्ताव-
दिति । भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तयोः शब्दयोरेकस्मिन्नेवार्थे तात्पर्यं सामानाधि-
करण्यम् । यथा ‘सोऽयं देवदत्त’ इति वाक्ये स इति तत्कालविशिष्टार्थस्य
शब्दस्यायमित्येतत्कालविशिष्टार्थस्य शब्दस्य चैकस्मिन् देवदत्तपिण्ड एव
तात्पर्यम् । दृष्टान्तं दार्ष्टान्तिके योजयति—तथा चेति । तत्त्वंपदयोरप्येकस्मि-
न्नेवार्थे तात्पर्यमिति भावः ।

विशेषणविशेष्यभावं विवृणोति—विशेषणविशेष्यभावसम्बन्धस्त्विति ।
व्यावर्तकं विशेषणं, व्यावर्त्य तु विशेष्यम् । ‘सोऽयं देवदत्त’ इति वाक्ये,
अयं शब्दवाच्यो देवदत्तः सशब्दवाच्याद्देवदत्तान्न मिद्यत इति यदा प्रतीयते तदा
सशब्दस्यायं शब्दविशेषणत्वं तन्निष्ठभेदव्यावर्तकत्वात् । यदा तु सशब्दवाच्यो
देवदत्तोऽयं शब्दवाच्याद् देवदत्तान्न मिद्यत इति प्रतीयते तदायं शब्दस्य सशब्द-
विशेषणत्वं तन्निष्ठभेदव्यावर्तकत्वात् । एवं तयोः परस्परं विशेषणविशेष्यभावः

1—Tattva Pradipikā, I, 19.

इत्यर्थः । दार्ष्टान्तिके योजयति—तथात्रापीति । अनेन जीवब्रह्मणो-
रेकत्वं गम्यत इत्यर्थः ।

लक्ष्यलक्षणसम्बन्धं विवृणोति—लक्ष्यलक्षणसम्बन्धस्त्विति । ‘सोऽयं
देवदत्त’ इति वाक्ये पदद्वयोस्तदर्थयोर्वा विरुद्धांशपरित्यागेनाविरुद्धदेवदत्तपिण्डेन
सह लक्ष्यलक्षणभावः । अत्र देवदत्तस्य लक्ष्यत्वं पदयोस्तदर्थयोर्वा लक्षणत्वमिति
बोध्यम्, दार्ष्टान्तिके योजयति—तथात्रापीति । तत्त्वं पदयोस्तदर्थयोर्वा पूर्ववद्
विरुद्धपरोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टत्वपरित्यागेनाविरुद्धेन चैतन्येन सह लक्ष्यलक्षण-
सम्बन्ध इति भावः । अत्य लक्ष्यलक्षणभावस्य संज्ञान्तरं कथयति—इयमेवेति ।
भागलक्षणेति संप्रदायप्रसिद्धिः । (२३)

Trans—Now the import of the great saying is being explained. This statement ‘that thou art’ signifies the undivided meaning through three different relations. The three relations are the apposition of the two terms (Jacob’s rendering ‘community of reference’, Hiriyanna’s rendering ‘apposition’), the position of qualifier and qualified (Hiriyanna’s rendering ‘substance and attribute’, Jacob’s rendering ‘predicate and subject’) between the meanings of these two terms and the relation of indicated and indicator between the internal self and its indicator (the purport of the terms). The relation of apposition is, as in the sentence ‘That is this Devadatta’ the term ‘that’ signifying Devadatta of the past time and the term ‘this’, signifying Devadatta of the present time refer to one person, so also in the sentence ‘That thou art’ the term ‘that’, signifying the consciousness, endowed with indirectness and the term ‘thou’ signifying the consciousness, endowed with directness refer to one consciousness.

The relation of qualifier and qualified is such, as in that sentence Devadatta of the past, signified by the term ‘that’ and Devadatta of the present,

signified by the term 'this', eliminating their mutual distinction become mutually predicate and subject, so also in this sentence there is the relation of predicate and subject between the consciousness, endowed with indirectness, signified by the term 'that' and the consciousness, endowed with directness, signified by the term 'thou' as they eliminate their mutual distinction.

The relation of indicated and indicator is, as it is the case in that sentence, where either the terms, 'that' and 'this' or their meanings are related with the non-contradictory element of Devadatta, eliminating their discrepant portions of belonging to the present and the past times, so also in this statement, either the terms 'that' and 'thou' or their meanings are related with the non-contradictory consciousness as indicator and indicated, eliminating their discrepant portions of having indirectness and directness. This is known as partial indication (23).

Comm.—After explaining the terms 'that' and 'thou' in the previous passage, now the writer explains the import of the great saying that thou are'. He says that in three different ways the meaning of the great saying is ascertained. They are *Sāṃānādhikarāṇya*, *viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyatā* and *lakṣyalakṣaṇabhāva*.

सामानाधिकरण्यम्—This word is rendered as 'apposition' by Hiriyana and 'community of reference' by Jacob. In any way this signifies the applicability of two words to a certain person or thing without any consideration whether they are related as noun and adjective or not. The subtle difference between this and the second relation viz. the relation of

qualified and the qualifier is that in the second the qualifier differentiates the qualified from others, where as in this case the two terms only signify one and the same person 'with the same force. So, in this present relation the two terms retain their independence, but in the second case, one is subjected to the other. In the statement 'that is this Devadatta' the term 'that' stands for Devadatta of the past time and the term 'this' stands for Devadatta of the present time. But both of them signify the same person. In this manner, the term 'that' representing the Brahman and the term 'thou' representing the individual signify the same eternal consciousness.

विशेषणविरोध्यता—This is translated as the relation of substance and attribute by Hiriyanna. Jacob renders these two words as predicate and subject. Here, these are rendered as qualifier and qualified. However, it is better to retain the original sanskrit terms, as no other suitable terms are there in English language to replace them. *Viśeṣya* (qualified) is that, which is differentiated and that which differentiates is *viśeṣaṇa*. So it is said : '*bhedyam viśeṣyam ityāhurbhedakam tu viśeṣaṇam*'. In the statement 'That is this Devadatta' Devadatta of the past time, becomes the qualifier or *viśeṣaṇa* of the meaning of the term 'this', Devadatta of the present time, as it differentiates this particular person from others and vice versa. Thus, both the terms 'that' and 'this' mutually differentiate one another from the other things and persons and become each a *viśeṣya* and also a *viśeṣaṇa*. In this manner, the consciousness, which

is conspicuously known (ātman) and the consciousness, which is not conspicuously known (the Brahman) become the qualifiers of each other excluding their differences. This is a manner of interpreting the great saying 'that thou art'.

लक्ष्यलक्षणमात्रः—This is the third way of ascertaining the meaning of the great saying. This is the relation between that which is indicated and the indicator, which indicates. In the statement 'that is this Devadatta,' both these terms or their meanings indicate the same person Devadatta. Here the sense of past and present time is lost. So also in the statement 'that thou art' the two terms, giving up their discrepant portions indicate the pure consciousness. This is known as *bhāga-lakṣaṇā* or partial indication. Here the direct meaning (vācyārtha) is suppressed and the indicative meaning (lakṣyārtha) is taken into consideration. (23)

मूलम्—अस्मिन् वाक्ये नीलमुत्पलमिति वाक्यवद्वाक्यार्थो न सङ्गच्छते । तत्र तु नीलपदार्थनीलगुणस्योत्पलपदार्थोत्पलद्रव्यस्य च शौक्यपटादिभेदव्यावर्तकतयाऽन्योन्यविशेषणविशेष्यभावसंसर्गस्यान्यतरविशिष्टस्यान्यतरस्य तदैक्यस्य वा वाक्यार्थत्वाङ्गीकारे प्रमाणान्तरविरोधाभावात्तद्वाक्यार्थः सङ्गच्छते । अत्र तु तदर्थपरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यस्य त्वमर्थपरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यस्य चान्योन्यभेदव्यावर्तकतया विशेषणविशेष्यभावसंसर्गस्यान्यतरविशिष्टस्यान्यतरस्य तदैक्यस्य च वाक्यार्थत्वाङ्गीकारे प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविरोधाद्वाक्यार्थो न सङ्गच्छते । तदुक्तम्—¹

‘संसर्गो वा विशिष्टो वा वाक्यार्थो नात्र सम्मतः ।

अलण्डैकरसत्वेन वाक्यार्थो विदुषां मतः’ ॥ इति ॥ (२४)

व्याख्या—तनूक्तसम्बन्धत्रयं विनापि नीलमुत्पलमिति वाक्यवद्वाक्यार्थस्य सङ्गतत्वात् किमेतन् सम्बन्धत्रयेणेत्याशङ्क्याह—अस्मिन् वाक्ये इति ।

महावाक्यस्याखण्डार्थताप्रतिपादकत्वात् सांसर्गिकत्वं न, संसर्गस्य वैशिष्ट्यस्य वा भेदनिबन्धनतया नाखण्डार्थता स्यादिति भावः । एतदर्थं विवृणोति—तत्र त्विति । नीलमुत्पलमिति वाक्ये शुक्लादिगुणान्तरव्यावर्तकनीलगुणस्य पटादिद्रव्यान्तरव्यावर्तकोत्पलद्रव्यस्य गुणगुणिभावस्य सत्त्वे संसर्गस्य वैशिष्ट्यस्य वा वाक्यार्थत्वाङ्गीकारे प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधाभावात् सङ्गतिः । तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्ये तु परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्ययोर्द्यदि विशेषणविशेष्यभावसंसर्गो वैशिष्ट्यं वा स्वीक्रियते तदा प्रमाणान्तरविरोधाद् वाक्यार्थो न सङ्गच्छते । तस्माद् वाक्यार्थशोधनेनैव सम्बन्धत्रयेण तस्याखण्डार्थप्रतिपादकत्वमित्यर्थः । वस्तुतस्तु ब्रह्मणो जात्यादिभेदरहितत्वेन संसर्गसङ्गिसम्यग्बोधगम्यतया सांसर्गिकवाक्यार्थत्वं न युज्यत इति भावः । भेदविशिष्टस्येव सांसर्गिकबोधगम्यत्वस्वीकारे सांसर्गिकवाक्यगम्यत्वोपपत्तेः । पञ्चदशीवाक्येन प्रतिज्ञातमर्थं ब्रूयति—संसर्गो वेति । (२४)

Trans.—The meaning of this sentence is not similar to that of the sentence 'The lotus is blue'. There the (ordinary) meaning is valid whether we take it to signify the relation of qualified and qualifier between the quality signified by the term 'blue' and the substance signified by the term 'lotus' distinguishing each other from the qualities like whiteness and substances like cloth ; or the state of one being qualified by the other ; or their identity, because there is no contradiction with other *pramāṇa*. But here (in the case of 'that thou art'), such meaning of the sentence is not appropriate, as there is contradiction with other *pramāṇas* like *Pratyakṣa* etc , whether we take the meaning to signify the relation of qualified and qualifier between the consciousness endowed with the characteristic indirectness, which is the import of the term 'that' and the consciousness, endowed with the characteristic directness, which is the import of the term 'thou' excluding each others difference ; or the state of one being qualified by

the other ; or their identity. Thus, it is stated : 'the import of this sentence, as it is accepted, is neither a relation nor a qualified one, but according to the wise men it is the partless (impartite) one. (24)

Comm.—In this passage the author tries to prove the non-relational character of the great saying. He quotes a verse from pañcadasi (vide, vii, 75) which says that neither a relation nor a qualified one (viśiṣṭa) is the import of the great saying, as any of these two mutilates the impartite character of the *Mahāvākya*. Now it is to be borne in mind that the Brahman, signified by the great saying, being partless by nature cannot be expressed by a relational statement, as the relational statement is fraught with internal difference. Relation, which pre-supposes difference, cannot be applicable to that which is free from all the differences. This is based on the logic of the parity of knowledge and reality. A relational way of thought cannot express the Reality as it is upheld by Bradley. But it differs from the Bradleyan position in this that, according to vedānta, a thing, which is fraught with internal differences, can only be expressed by a relational way of thought, but the Brahman cannot be expressed by relational way of knowledge, as it is free from differences. So, according to Advaita vedānta, the relational mode of thinking is adequate if it is applied only to the world of differences, but it cannot be applied to that which is free from all the differences. The doctrine of appearance of

Advaita vedānta is more realistic in character, which does not say that our relational thought falsifies Reality, but only opines that it cannot be applied to Reality, as Reality transcends all the relations. It is note-worthy to remember that *avidyā*, which is the cause of the world of differences, is not a subjective category according to Advaita vedānta. Unlike the categories of Kant, *avidyā* is not a subjective category, which obscures the reality, but it has also objective validity, which is vouchsafed by the vedantic doctrine of error viz. *anirvacanīya khyāti*. So the comparison of the vedantic doctrine of appearance with the kantian phenomenalism is far from being tenable.¹

The author says that the import of the great saying cannot be ascertained in the manner we assert the meaning of the relational statements, say 'the lotus is blue'. He says that each of the two terms 'lotus' and 'blue' becomes the qualifier of the other, as their relation is not contradicted by any other *Prāmāṇa*. For this reason we can take this relation or the qualified whole consisting both the relation and the two relata, to be the meaning of this statement. But in the great saying the meaning of the terms 'that' and 'thou' being contradictory no relation can be taken as the import of this statement. This is the explanation, given by the writer as to why relation should not be taken as the meaning of this statement. But in

1—See Paul Deussen's comparison of Advaita with Kantian Philosophy vide, His 'The system of vedānta'.

fact, Brahman being free from all the differences cannot be expressed in a relational way.

Rāmatirtha, the writer of the commentary 'V' gives a better argument to defend the impartite character of this statement. He says that between the meaning of these two terms, the relations of substance and attribute, cause and effect, part and whole, action and its agent, and the relation of universal and particular are not possible, as the Brahman, signified by them is free from all the attributes. It is remarkable to remember the saying of citsukha that 'akhaṇḍār-thatā' (having impartite meaning) of a statement means 'being capable of producing non-relational knowledge.' ¹ (24)

मूलम्—अत्र गङ्गायां घोषः प्रतिवसतीति वाक्यवज्जहलक्षणापि न सङ्गच्छते । तत्र तु गङ्गाघोषयोराधाराधेयभावलक्षणस्य वाक्यार्थस्याशेषतो विरुद्धत्वाद्वाक्यार्थमशेषतः परित्यज्य तत्सम्बन्धितीरलक्षणाया युक्तत्वाज्जहलक्षणा सङ्गच्छते । अत्र तु परोक्षापरोक्षचैतन्यैकत्वलक्षणस्य वाक्यार्थस्य भागभात्रे विरोधाद्भागान्तरमपि परित्यज्यान्यलक्षणाया अयुक्तत्वाज्जहलक्षणा न सङ्गच्छते । न च गङ्गापदं स्वार्थपरित्यागेन तीरपदार्थं यथा लक्षयति तथा तत्पदं त्वम्पदं वा स्वार्थपरित्यागेन त्वम्पदार्थं तत्पदार्थं वा लक्षयत्वतः कुतो जहलक्षणा न सङ्गच्छत इति वाच्यम् । तत्र तीरपदाश्रवणेन तदर्थप्रतीतौ लक्षणया तत्प्रतीत्यपेक्षायामपि तत्त्वपदयोः क्षूयमाणत्वेन तदर्थप्रतीतौ लक्षणया पुनरन्यतरपदेनान्यतरपदार्थप्रतीत्यपेक्षाभावात् । (२५)

व्याख्या—भागलक्षणां प्रतिष्ठापयितुं लक्षणान्तरं निरस्यति—अत्रेति । गङ्गायां घोष इति वाक्ये वाक्यार्थस्याशेषतो विरुद्धत्वाद्भवयानुपपत्तेर्जहत्स्वार्थया वृत्त्या तत्सम्बन्धितीरे लक्षणा । प्रकृते वाक्ये तु वाक्यार्थस्य भागान्तरे विरोधाज्जहलक्षणा न सङ्गच्छते । आशङ्कते—न चेति । यथा गङ्गापदं स्वार्थं परित्यज्य तीरं लक्षयति तथा त्वं पदं स्वार्थपरित्यागेन तत्पदार्थं लक्षयतु तत्पदं च तथैव त्वं पदार्थं लक्षयतु जहत्स्वार्थया वृत्त्येति शङ्कार्थः । परिहरति—

1—Citsukhī, 1, 19.

तीरपदस्याश्रूयमाणत्वेन तदर्थबोधाह्लक्षणाया आवश्यकत्वेऽपि तत्त्वपदयोः
श्रूयमाणत्वेन तदर्थबोधे सति जहृत्स्वार्थया स्वार्थपरित्यागेनान्यपदार्थप्रतीत्यपेक्षा
नास्तीति तयोर्वैषम्यम् । (२५)

Trans.—Here ‘jahallakṣaṇā’ or the indication by total abandonment, as it is in the case ‘the hamlet of herdsmen is in the Ganges’ is not appropriate. There the relation of location and located between Ganges and the hamlet of herdsmen being totally discrepant, the indication by total abandonment, in which ‘bank’ is indicated by giving up its total meaning, is tenable. But here, the meaning of identity between direct consciousness and indirect consciousness being partially discrepant, the indication by total abandonment, giving up the other portion of the meaning is not tenable. It is not even sound to say, as the word ‘Ganges’, giving up its own meaning indicates the bank, so also the word ‘that’ or ‘thou’ giving up their own meaning should indicate the things, signified by the words ‘thou’ and ‘that’ respectively, so where is the untenability of the indication by total abandonment? In that case there is the necessity of knowing by indication (indication by total abandonment) as the word ‘bank’ is not heard there for which its meaning is not understood, but in this case the words ‘that’ and ‘thou’ being heard (expressed) and their meaning being understood there is no necessity of understanding one by the other through indication. (25)

मूलम्—अत्र शोणो धावतीति वाक्यशब्दजह्लक्षणापि न सम्भवति ।
तत्र शोणगुणगमनलक्षणस्य वाक्यार्थस्य विरुद्धत्वात्तदपरित्यागेन तदाश्रयाश्वादि-
लक्षणाया तद्विरोधपरिहारसम्भवादजह्लक्षणा सम्भवति । अत्र तु परोक्षवादि-

विशिष्टचैतन्यैकत्वस्य वाक्यार्थस्य विरुद्धत्वात्तदपरित्यागेन तत्सम्बन्धिनो यस्य कस्यचिदर्थस्य लक्षितत्वेऽपि तद्विरोधपरिहारासम्भवादजहल्लक्षणा न सम्भवत्येव । न च तत्पदं त्वम्पदं वा स्वार्थविरुद्धांशपरित्यागेनांशान्तरसहितं त्वम्पदार्थं तत्पदार्थं वा लक्षयत्वतः कथं प्रकारेण भागलक्षणाङ्गीकरणमिति वाच्यम् । एकेन पदेन स्वार्थांशपदार्थान्तरोभयलक्षणाया असम्भवात्पदान्तरेण तदर्थप्रतीतौ लक्षणाया पुनस्तत् प्रतीत्यपेक्षाभावाच्च । (२६)

व्याख्या—अजहत्स्वार्थं व्युदस्यति—अत्र शोण इति । अत्र शोणगुणस्य धावनासंभवात्तदर्थपरित्यागेन तदाश्रयेऽश्वादौ लक्षणा । प्रकृते वाक्ये तु परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वयोर्विरोधात्तयोरेकत्र संहतत्वं नास्तीति हेतोरजहत्स्वार्थापि न संभवति । प्रकारान्तरेणाजहत्स्वार्थं निराकरोति—न चेति । सकृदुच्चरितस्यैव पदस्य युगपत् स्वार्थांशपदार्थान्तरोभयलक्षणाया असंभवाद् भागलक्षणाया आवश्यकता वर्तत इत्यर्थः । [२६]

Trans.—Here, indication without abandonment, as it is in the case 'The red is running', is not also appropriate. There, indication without abandonment is possible, as the meaning of the sentence regarding the running of the quality redness is impossible, for which, without giving up its meaning and by taking something like horse, which is the substratum of such qualities, this contradiction can be eliminated. But here, the meaning of the sentence, the identity of the direct consciousness and indirect consciousness being self-discrepant and as the discrepancy cannot be eliminated even though we accept something related to them without abandoning their meaning, the indication without abandonment is not possible. Nor is it sound to say that the word 'that' or the word 'thou', discarding some parts of their meaning which is discrepant and with the other parts should indicate the import of the word 'thou' or 'that' respectively. So what is the necessity in accepting the partial indication? The same word

cannot indicate both the portions of its meaning and that of other. Moreover, if the meaning of a certain word is signified by a different word there is no necessity of understanding the same by indication (26)

मूलम्—तस्माद्यथा 'सोऽयं देवदत्त' इति वाक्यं तदर्थो वा तत्कालैतत्काललक्षणस्य वाक्यार्थस्यांशे विरोधाद्विरुद्धतत्कालैतत्कालविशिष्टत्वांशं परित्यज्याद्विरुद्धं देवदत्तांशमात्रं लक्षयति तथा 'तत्त्वमसी'ति वाक्यं तदर्थो वा परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यैकत्वलक्षणस्य वाक्यार्थस्यांशे विरोधाद्विरुद्धपरोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टत्वांशं परित्यज्याद्विरुद्धमखण्डचैतन्यमात्रं लक्षयतीति । (२७)

व्याख्या—भागलक्षणाङ्गीकरणेनोपसंहरति—तस्माद्यथेति । सोऽयं देवदत्त इति वाक्यं विरुद्धतत्कालैतत्कालांशद्वयं परित्यज्याद्विरुद्धदेवदत्तपिण्डमात्रं लक्षयति । यद्यपि पदधर्मो लक्षणा तथापि पदार्थद्वारा वाक्ये तदर्थे वा लक्षणोपचारात् । प्रकृते योजयति—तथा तत्त्वमसीत्यादि । विरुद्धांशपरित्यागेनाविरुद्धचैतन्यमात्रबोधनादखण्डार्थताप्रतिपादनार्थं भागलक्षणाङ्गीकरणमिति भावः । (२७)

Trans—Therefore, as the sentence 'that is this Devadatta' or its meaning, giving up its discrepant portions of being related to the past and the present, because there is only partial discrepancy in the meaning of the sentence, viz. Devedatta as related to the past and present, indicates only Devadatta, which is the indisputable portion ; so also the sentence 'that thou art' or its meaning, giving up its discrepant portions, directness and indirectness, as there is only partial discrepancy in the meaning of the sentence, that is the identity of the direct consciousness and the indirect consciousness, indicates the indisputable partless consciousness. (27)

Comm.—Here the author describes the various indications with a view to showing the applicability of 'partial indication' to the present case.

जहल्लक्षणा—*Jahallakṣaṇā* is a sort of indication in which the primary meaning of the sentence being discrepant is totally abandoned. So, this is known as the indication with total abandonment. In the sentence 'the village of the herds men is on the Ganges' the primary meaning of the sentence being discrepant, it indicates the bank. Here the sense of the word 'Ganges' is totally abandoned.

अजहल्लक्षणा—This is a kind of indication where the primary sense being discrepant by itself, some other word is added to it without eliminating its primary meaning. In the sentence 'the *śoṇa* (redness) is running', the primary sense being discrepant it signifies some animal like horse, whose quality is redness. It is noteworthy that the word '*śoṇa*' in Sanskrit is both a noun and an adjective. As a noun it means the quality 'redness' and as an adjective it signifies something which is 'red'. Primarily it signifies the quality and secondarily with the indicative meaning (*Lakṣyārtha*) it only signifies something which is red.

भागलक्षणा—This indication operates where the primary meaning is partly abandoned and partly retained. In the case of the great saying 'that thou art' *jahallakṣaṇā* cannot operate as here no sense is completely eliminated, but only partly abandoned. So also *ajahallakṣaṇā* is not applicable, as in this, some other word is added to give a tenable meaning without abandoning its primary sense. But here no word, being added, can give an

appropriate meaning. So *bhāgalakṣaṇā* is accepted here, as it is in the case of the sentence 'that is this Devadatta'. In the case of this great saying, the discrepant portions, directness and indirectness, of the meaning of these two terms are eliminated and the indisputable portion viz. the sense of the pure consciousness is retained. Some vedāntins do not accept at all indication, as according to them, this meaning can also be expressed in the primary sense according to them, as the writer of vedānta paribhāṣā says, the acceptance of indication is only a tentative one. ¹ (25, 26, 27)

मूलम्—अथाधुनाहं ब्रह्मास्मी²त्यनुभववाक्यार्थो वर्धते । एवमाचार्येणाध्यारोपापवादपुरस्सरं तत्त्वंपदार्थौ शोधयित्वा वाक्येनाखण्डार्थेऽवबोधितेऽधिकारिणोऽहं नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तसत्यस्वभावपरमानन्दानन्ताद्वयं ब्रह्मास्मीत्यखण्डाकाराकारिता चित्तवृत्तिरुदेति । सा तु चित्प्रतिबिम्बसहिता सती प्रत्यगभिन्नमज्ञातं परं ब्रह्म विषयीकृत्य तद्गताज्ञानमेव बाधते । तदा पटकारणतन्तुदाहे पटदाहवदखिलकारणेऽज्ञाने बाधिते सति तत्कार्यस्याखिलस्य बाधितत्वात्तदन्तर्भूताखण्डाकाराकारिता चित्तवृत्तिरपि बाधिता भवति । तत्र प्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यमपि यथा दीपप्रभादित्प्रभावमासनासमर्थं सती तयाभिभूता भवति तथा स्वयंप्रकाशमानप्रत्यगभिन्नपरब्रह्मावभासनानर्हतया तेनाभिभूतं सत् स्वोपाधिभूताखण्डचित्तवृत्तेर्बाधितत्वाद्दर्पणाभावे मुखप्रतिबिम्बस्य मुखमात्रत्ववत् प्रत्यगभिन्नपरब्रह्मात्रं भवति । (२८)

व्याख्या—उपदेशवाक्यमवलम्ब्य जीवब्रह्मणोरैक्यं निरूप्येदानीमनुभववाक्यमाश्रित्य तदर्थं प्रतिपादयति, तदर्थेऽनुभवस्य परमप्रमाणत्वादनुभावसानन्त्वाद् ब्रह्मविद्यायाः—अथेति । अहं ब्रह्मास्मीति श्रुतिवाक्येन ब्रह्मविदामनुभवः प्रदर्शितः । आचार्येण महावाक्यार्थेऽवबोधितेऽधिकारिण एव ब्रह्मात्मैक्यानुभूतिर्भवति नान्यस्येति कथयति—एवमिति । वृत्तेर्जडत्वात् कथं तस्याश्रिन्मात्रब्रह्मप्रकाशकत्वमिति कथयति—सा त्विति । चैतन्यप्रतिबिम्बसहितैव

1—Vedānta Paribhāṣā, Chap. 4. 'ācāryāṇām lakṣaṇoktiḥ abhyupagamavādena bodhyā'.

2 - Bṛhadāraṇyaka up, 1. 4. 10.

चित्तवृत्तिरज्ञानं निरेत्यति न केदलेत्यर्थः । शुद्धब्रह्मणो जडचित्तवृत्तिभास्यत्वाभावात् प्रत्यगभिन्नस्याज्ञानविशिष्टस्यैव ब्रह्मणस्तत्त्वमिति बोध्यम् । अन्तःकरणवृत्तिरज्ञानमेव बाधते न तु ब्रह्मापि प्रकाशयतीति प्रतिपादयन्नाह—तद्गताज्ञानमेवेति । ब्रह्मणः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वात् प्रकाशकान्तरानभ्युपगमात् । अज्ञाने बाधितेऽपि तद्बाधकचित्तवृत्तेरबाधान्नोद्वेऽपि चित्तवृत्तेः सत्त्वाद्वैतवादानुपपत्तिरिति शङ्काव्युदस्यति—पटकारणतन्तुदाह इति । वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यस्यापि चैतन्यमात्रत्वेनावस्थानं दर्शयति—तत्रेति । (२८)

Trans.—Now the meaning of the statement 'I am Brahman' which is the expression of experience is being explained. Thus, after clarifying the meaning of 'that' and 'thou' with the methods of superimposition and negation, when the impartite meaning is imparted by the preceptor with the help of the sentence (the vedic statement), there arises the mental modification in the qualified, taking the form of the partless one—'I am the Brahman,' which is by nature eternal, pure, intelligent, free, real and the supreme bliss; which is infinite and without a second.' That (mental modification, combined with the reflection of consciousness and having made the unknown supreme Brahman its object, which is not distinct from the inner self, destroys the ignorance, pertaining to it. At that time ignorance, which is the cause of all, being sublated with all, which are its effects, the mental modification, taking the shape of the partless one, which is included in them is also sublated, as the cloth is burnt when its cause the threads are burnt. The consciousness as reflected in it, unable to illuminate the self-luminous Brahman, which is not different from the inner self, but being overcome by it, becomes one with the Brahman, which is not

different from the inner self, as the flame of the lamp, being unable to illuminate, is overcome by the rays of the sun and as in the absence of mirror the reflection of the face becomes one with the face, because its conditioning adjunct, the mental modification taking the form of the partless one, is sublated. (28).

Comm The author here explains the meaning of the judgement, 'I am the Brahman', which is the expression of the realization of the identity between the individual consciousness and the cosmic consciousness. So it is known as *anubhava vākya*. The modification of the internal organ, taking the form of the partless one, making the Brahman, which is not different from the inner self, its object, destroys the nescience pertaining to it. It may be asked, how can the internal organ, which is itself material by nature, grasp the self-luminous consciousness? 'S' says that the modification of the internal organ only grasps the Brahman that is obscured by nescience and not different from the inner self (*pratyagabhinna*), but does not grasp the pure Brahman. This is suggested by the text when it says that this modification grasps the supreme 'Brahman that is unknown or obscured by nescience (*ajñātaṃ pa r m brahma*). After destroying the nescience obscuring the Brahman, the modification, which is the effect of the nescience, is also destroyed. If the modification is not destroyed then non-dualism cannot be established even after the destruction of nescience. Sadānanda says that the modification of the internal organ being an effect of the nescience cannot remain after the sublation of it.

Not only in the case of the *Mahāvākya* 'Tattvamasi', but also in ascertaining the meaning of this *anubhava vākya* indication (*lakṣaṇā*) is to be employed. In this statement 'I am the Brahman,' the term 'I' stands for the individual self, which is the combination of the witness (*śākṣin*) and the internal organ. Vidyāranya says that one portion of the individual (Jīva) that is the internal organ, forming the limiting adjunct (*upādhi*, is dropped through partial indication (*bhāgalakṣaṇā*) and the witness is only understood ¹ So this experiential statement, alike the great saying, signifies the identity between the individual self and the cosmic consciousness. (28)

मूलम्—एवं च सति 'मनसैवानुदृष्टव्यं'² 'यन्मनसा स मनुते'³ इत्यनयोः श्रुत्योरविरोधं वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वाङ्गीकारेण फलव्याप्यत्व प्रतिषेधप्रतिपादनात् । तदुक्तम्—⁴

'फलव्याप्यत्वमेवास्य शास्त्रकृद्भिर्निवारितम् ।

ब्रह्मण्यज्ञाननाशाय वृत्तिव्याप्तिरपेक्षिता ॥'

'स्वयं' प्रकाशमानत्वान्नाभास उपयुज्यते ॥ इति ॥

जडपदार्थाकाराकारितचित्तवृत्तेर्विशेषोऽस्ति । तथाहि—अयं घट इति घटाकाराकारितचित्तवृत्तिर्ज्ञातं घटं विषयीकृत्य तद्गताज्ञाननिरसनपुरस्सरं स्वगतचिदाभासेन जडं घटमपि भासयति । तदुक्तम्—⁵

'बुद्धितत्स्थचिदाभासौ द्वावेतौ व्याप्नुतो घटम् ।

तत्राज्ञानं धिया नश्येदाभासेन घटः स्फुरेत्' इति ॥

यथा दीपप्रभामण्डलमन्धकारगतं घटपटादिकं विषयीकृत्य तद्गतान्धकारनिरसनपुरस्सरं स्वप्रभया तदपि भासयतीति । (२९)

1—Pañcadaśī, 7, 88-89.

2—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up, 4, 4, 19.

3—Kena up, 1, 5.

4—Pañcadaśī, 7, 90-92.

5—Pañcadaśī, 7, 91.

०२११०२११—अखण्डार्थाकाराकारिता चित्तवृत्तिस्तद्गताज्ञानमेव बाधते न तु ब्रह्मापि प्रकाशयतीति विवृण्वन्, 'मनसैवानुद्वेद्यम्', 'यन्मनसा न मनुते' इति वेदवाक्ययोर्विरोधं परिहरति—एवं चेति । ब्रह्मणो बुद्धिवेद्यत्वं प्रतिपादयन्त्या श्रुत्या तस्य वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वमेवोच्यते, तस्या बुद्धिवेद्यत्वं प्रतिषेधयन्त्या श्रुत्या फलव्याप्यत्वमेव निषिध्यते । ततस्तयोर्न कोऽपि विरोध इति भावः । पञ्चदशीवाक्येन तदर्थं ब्रह्मयति—फलव्याप्यत्वमिति । फलव्याप्यत्वनिषेधे कारणमाह—स्वयंप्रकाशमानत्वादिति । प्रमाणबलाच्चित्तवृत्ते विषयव्याप्यत्वमेव वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वम् । विषयाकाराकारितान्तःकरणवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचिदशकृतप्राकट्याश्रयत्वमेव फलव्याप्यत्वमिति रामतीर्थाः । प्राकट्यं चात्र चिदाभासकृतविषयनिष्ठातिशयः । तत्रान्तःकरणवृत्त्या ब्रह्मविषयकाज्ञानं विनश्यति, ततस्तद्विषये वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वं स्वीक्रियते । अज्ञाने विनष्टे सति ब्रह्मणः स्वयंप्रकाशमानत्वात्तत्प्रकाशनाय चिदाभासस्यानुपयोगित्वात् फलव्याप्यत्वं तत्र न स्वीक्रियते । नृसिंहाश्रमास्तु फलचैतन्यमित्यावरणभङ्गानन्तरं स्वयंप्रकाशमानं चैतन्यमेवेति वदन्ति । तेषां मते तस्मिन् फलचैतन्ये चित्तवृत्तिर्न व्याप्नोत्यावरणभङ्गस्य प्रागेव जातत्वात् ।¹

फलव्याप्यत्ववृत्तिव्याप्यत्वद्वयं स्पष्टतया प्रदर्शयितुं जडाकाराकारितचित्तवृत्तिब्रह्माकाराकारितचित्तवृत्त्योश्च वैषम्यं प्रकटयन्माह—जडपदार्थाकाराकारितेति । अयमर्थः । घटादिज्ञानजननस्थले तावदन्तःकरणं घटाद्याकारेण परिणमति । सेयं घटाकारेण परिणतान्तःकरणवृत्तिर्घटगताज्ञानं निरस्य स्वगतचिदाभासेन घटं भासयति । तत्र घटादीनां चैतन्य एवाध्यस्ततया घटादिविषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्यसत्तैव घटादिसत्ता । एकस्यैव चैतन्यस्य सर्वगतत्वेन प्रमातृचैतन्यविषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्ययोश्चाभेदः । तत्रान्तःकरणवृत्त्या घटादिविषयकेज्ञाने विनष्टे सति, अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्यैव प्रमातृत्वात् घटादिसत्ताप्रमातृसत्तयोश्चैकत्वं जायते । तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षत्वमेव प्रमात्रभिन्नत्वं प्रमातृसत्तातिरिक्तसत्ताकत्वाभाव इत्युक्तम्² । घटादीनां जडत्वात्तेषां वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यभास्यत्वमभ्युपगम्यते, आत्मनस्तु स्वयंज्योतिष्टत्वात् प्रकाशकान्तराभ्युपगमेऽनवस्थापत्तेश्च न चिदाभासापेक्षास्ति । पञ्चदशीवाक्यं प्रमाणयति—बुद्धितत्स्थचिदाभासाविति । दृष्टान्तमाह—यथेति । ननु शब्दस्य कथमपरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वमिति चेत् । उच्यते, वस्तुनः परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वे सर्वथैव न करणनिबन्धने परन्तु तद्योग्यत्वनिबन्धन एव । ततो 'दशमस्त्वमसी'तिवत् सन्निकृष्टविषयस्थलेऽपरोक्षत्वस्वीकारे न काचिद्धानिरिति सुवचम् । (२९)

1—See the introduction, PP 23-26.

2—See Vedānta Paribhāṣā, Chap. 1.

Trans.—It being so, there is no contradiction between the two *śrutis* 'By the *manas* alone this is to be seen' and 'what cannot be thought by the *manas*', as the pervasion by *Vṛtti* (modifications) is admitted, where as the pervasion by *Phala* is denied. It is stated : 'Its pervasion by *Phala* is only denied by the exponents of the scriptures but the pervasion by *Vṛtti* (modification), in relation to the Brahman, is necessary for the destruction of ignorance. Also : 'It being self-luminous there is no necessity of the reflection' The mental modification, taking the shape of insentient objects has got some distinction. Thus, the mental modification, taking the shape of the pot, expressed as 'This is pot', making the pot its object, having destroyed ignorance pertaining to it, also illuminates the insentient pot with the help of the reflection of the consciousness in it. It is stated : 'Both the internal organ and the reflection of consciousness in it pervade the pot, where the ignorance is dispelled by the internal organ and the pot manifests through the reflection', as the rays of the lamp, grasping the pot, the cloth etc, concealed by darkness, dispelling darkness of them at first, illuminate them also by their light. (29)

Comm.—In this passage Sadānanda tries to explain the vedantic process of perception. According to the school of Nyāya, perception happens through a process of contacts. Firstly, there is contact between the object and the sense, then there is the contact of the sense with the mind by which knowledge of the respective object arises in

the self (ātman). This explanation of the process of perception is based on their 'realistic pluralism, according to which the different souls are altogether different from the various objects. To bring them into a relation various contacts are necessary. But, according to Advaita vedānta, the self, which is one with the Brahman and of the nature of consciousness, being all pervasive, forms the ground of the manifold phenomena. So, there is no ultimate difference between the objects and the self, which perceives them. The difference is only created by *avidyā*, which is destroyed when the proper knowledge is achieved. So, knowing in the vedantic sense only means destruction of the concealment of *avidyā*. Perception happens when *avidyā*, which differentiates the subject (pramātā) and the object (prameya) is suspended and the unity of them is achieved. For this vedānta Paribhāṣā says, 'The perceptuality of the objects like jar etc. consists in their not being different from the subject.'¹ The modification or psychosis of the internal organ is necessary, according to one school of vedānta, to bring them into a relation. According to another school, it is for the destruction of the concealment.² However, the aim of these two views is the same, though it is expressed in two different ways.

The writer shows the difference between *pratyakhyāpyatva* and *vṛttivyāpṛatva* and justifies the

1—Vedānta Paribhāṣā, P. 20.

2—Vedānta Paribhāṣā, PP. 140-144

Also see Advaita siddhi, Pratikarmavyavasthā Chap.

necessity of only the latter in the field of the knowledge regarding the self. He says that the two paradoxical vedic statements, of which one denies the capability of the mind in perceiving the self and the other asserts it, have no real discrepancy, as they signify two different meanings viz-*Phalavyāpyatva* and *Vṛttivyāpyatva*. The vedic statement, which denies the capability of mind, only denies *phalavyāpyatva* and that which asserts it only asserts *vṛttivyāpyatva*.

वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वम्—This word literally means 'Pervasion by the *vṛtti* or modification of the internal organ'. At the time of perception, firstly the internal organ assumes the shape of the object by which the concealment of *avidyā*, which obscures the object, is destroyed. For instance, when the pot is known, the internal organ assumes the shape of the pot, by which the concealment is destroyed. This is known as the modification of the internal organ. When the text says that the nescience pertaining to the pot (*tadgatājñāna*) is destroyed by the modification, it does not mean that *ajñāna*, which rests in the pot is destroyed. Strictly speaking *ajñāna* cannot rest in the pot, as it only rests in the consciousness. It is both the locus and the *viṣaya* of nescience. When the consciousness is concealed, the objects are termed to be concealed secondarily.

फलव्याप्यत्वम्—This word means 'pervasion by the *phala*. The word '*phala*' means, according to 'V' the consciousness that is limited by the modification of the internal organ, which has assumed

the shape of the external object. Thus *phalavyāpyatva*, according to this, means 'being the locus of the manifestness (*prākāṣya*), caused by the portion of consciousness that is limited by the modification of the internal organ'.¹ Pañcadasi uses the word 'reflection of the consciousness' (*cidābhāsa*) to signify this.² The pot being unconscious cannot manifest by itself even after the destruction of the concealment, for which the reflection of consciousness is necessary for its manifestation. This pervasion by the reflection of consciousness or the consciousness, limited by the modification or psychosis is known as 'pervasion by the *phala*', through which the object manifests. When the concealment of the pot is destroyed by the modification, it is revealed by the reflection of consciousness.

In the case of the material objects both of them is necessary, but in the case of the self, the second, pervasion by the reflection of the consciousness, is not necessary, as the self being itself self-luminous, there is no necessity of the reflection for its manifestation.

This sense is differently expressed by 'S' as it interprets the word '*phala*' in a different manner. 'S' says that *phala* means the self-luminous consciousness after the destruction of concealment.³ The modification of the internal organ does not pervade this *phalacaitanya* or the consciousness after the destruction of concealment, as previously

1—Vidvanmanorañjanī, P. 127.

2—Pañcadaśī, 7. 91.

3—Subodhinī, P. 41.

its concealment has been destroyed. However, the result is the same. Both the commentators admit that there is no necessity of other illumination for the manifestation of the self as it is self-luminous.

So, the vedic statement, which says that this *ātman* is to be seen through the mind, means that the modification of the internal organ is necessary to destroy the nescience, concealing the self. The other vedic statement, which says that the self cannot be known through the mind, only means that the reflection of consciousness on the internal organ or the consciousness limited by the modification of it, which is ordinarily needed for the revelation of other objects, cannot reveal the self as the self is revelation itself. The writer gives the example of the flame of the candle, overcome by the rays of the sun, in order to prove that the reflection of consciousness cannot reveal the self-luminous consciousness, but is overcome by it.

It is not also correct to say that nescience cannot rest in consciousness, it being the remover of it, and there is no necessity of the modification to remove it. There is no opposition between the pure consciousness, which is of the essence of knowledge and nescience, as it is indifferent to nescience, but the *vṛttijñāna* or the modification, inspired by consciousness or with the reflection of consciousness only destroys *avidyā*, as it is rightly upheld by the writer of *Vivaraṇa*. On the other hand, the witness, which is of the essence of consciousness proves the existence of *avidyā*. For this reason witness-perception (*sākṣi pratyakṣa*) is taken as a proof in the existence of *ajñāna*. (29)

मूलम्—एवंभूतस्वस्वरूपचेतन्यसाक्षात्कारपर्यन्तं श्रवणमनननिदिध्या-
सनसमाध्यनुष्ठानस्यापेक्षितत्वात्तेऽपि प्रदर्श्यन्ते । श्रवणं नाम षड्विधलिङ्गै रशेष-
वेदान्तानामद्वितीये वस्तुति तात्पर्याविधारणम् । लिङ्गानि तूपक्रमोपसंहारा-
भ्यासापूर्वताफलार्थवा दोषवत्स्यान्यानि । तत्र प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्यार्थस्य तदाद्यन्तयो-
रुपादानमुपक्रमोपसंहारौ । यथा छान्दोग्ये षष्ठाध्याये प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्याद्वितीय-
वस्तुन 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्'¹ इत्यादौ 'ऐतदाल्यमिदं सर्वम्'² इत्यन्ते च
प्रतिपादनम् । प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्य वस्तुनस्तन्मध्ये पौनःपुन्येन प्रतिपादनमभ्यासः ।
यथा तत्रैवाद्वितीयवस्तुनि मध्ये तत्त्वमसीति नवकृत्वः प्रतिपादनम् । प्रकरण-
प्रतिपाद्यस्याद्वितीयवस्तुनः प्रमाणान्तराविषयीकरणमपूर्वता । यथा तत्रैवाद्वितीय-
वस्तुनो भानान्तराविषयीकरणम् । फलं तु प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्यात्मज्ञानस्य तदनु-
ष्ठानस्य वा तत्र तत्र श्रूयमाणं प्रयोजनम् । यथा तत्र 'आचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेद तस्य
तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्येऽथ संपत्त्य'³ इत्यद्वितीयवस्तुज्ञानस्य तत्प्रसिः
प्रयोजनं श्रूयते । प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्य तत्र तत्र प्रशंसनमर्थवादः । यथा तत्रैव 'उत
तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यो येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम्'⁴ इत्यद्वितीय-
वस्तुप्रशंसनम् । प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यार्थसाधने तत्र तत्र श्रूयमाणा युक्तिरूपपत्तिः ।
तथा तत्र 'यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृण्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद् वाचारम्भणं
विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्'⁵ इत्यादावद्वितीयवस्तुसाधने विकारस्य
वाचारम्भणमात्रं वे युक्तिः श्रूयते । मननं तु श्रुतस्याद्वितीयवस्तुनो वेदान्तानुगुण-
युक्तिभिरनवरतन्नुचिन्तनम् । विज्ञातीयदेहादिप्रत्ययरहिताद्वितीयवस्तुसजातीय-
प्रत्यप्रवाहो निदिध्यासनम् । समाधिर्द्विविधः सविकल्पको निर्विकल्पकश्चेति ।
तत्र सविकल्पको नाम ज्ञातृज्ञानादिविकल्पलयानपेक्षयाद्वितीयवस्तुनि तदाकारा-
कारिकारितायाश्चित्तवृत्तेरवस्थानम् । तदा मृण्मयगजादिभानेऽपि मृद्भानवद्-
द्वैतभानेऽप्यद्वैतं वस्तु भासते । तदुक्तम् —⁶

‘दृशिस्वरूपं गगनोपमं परं
सकृद्विज्ञातं त्वजमेकमक्षरम् ।
अलेपकं सर्वगतं यदद्वयं
तदेव चाहं सततं विमुक्तमोम् ॥ इति ।

1—Chāndogya up, 6, 2, 1.

2—Chāndogya up, 6, 8, 7.

3—Chāndogya up, 6, 14, 2.

4—Chāndogya up, 6, 1, 3.

5—Chāndogya up, 6, 1, 4.

6—Upadeśasāhasrī, 10, 1.

निर्विकल्पकस्तु ज्ञातृज्ञानादिविकल्पलयापेक्षयाद्वितीयवस्तुनि तदाकाराकारिताया-
श्रितवृत्तेरतितरामेकीभावेनावस्थानम् । तदा तु जलाकाराकारितलवणानवभासेन
जलमात्रावभासवद्वितीयवस्त्वाकाराकारितचित्तवृत्त्यनवभासेनाद्वितीयवस्तुमात्रमव-
भ सते । ततश्चास्य सुषुप्तेऽश्रमेदशङ्का न भवति । उभयत्र वृत्त्यमाने समानेऽपि
तत्सद्भावासद्भावमात्रेणानयोर्भेदोपपत्तेः । [३०]

व्याख्या—एवमुक्तब्रह्मात्मैवयसाक्षात्कारपर्यन्तं साधनभूतश्रवणमन-
नादीनामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वात्तेषां लक्षणानि यथाक्रमं प्रदर्शयति—एवं भूतेति ।
श्रवणस्य लक्षणमाह—श्रवणं नामेति । उपक्रमोपसंहारादिषड्विधलिङ्गैरखिल-
वेदान्तानामद्वितीये परब्रह्मणि तात्पर्यनिश्चयः श्रवणम् । श्रवणादीनामावश्यकत्वे
श्रुतिः—‘आत्मा वारे द्रष्टव्यः’^१ । लिङ्गानि दर्शयति—लिङ्गानीति । तथा
चोक्तम्—^२

उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासोऽपूर्वता फलम् ।

अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिङ्गं तात्पर्यनिर्णयं ॥ इति

उपक्रमोपसंहारौ तावद्दर्शयति—तत्रेति । उदाहरति—यथेति । अभ्यासस्य
लक्षणमाह—प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्येति । यथा छान्दोग्ये ‘तत्सत्यं स आत्मा
तत्त्वमसि ज्वेतकेतो’^३ इति नववारं वचनम् । अपूर्वतालक्षणमाह—प्रकरणेति ।
‘तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छमि’^४ इत्यादिश्रुतिवाक्यैर्ब्रह्मण उपनिषन्मात्रगम्यत्व-
पूर्वकप्रमाणान्तरागोचरत्वप्रतिपादनमेवापूर्वता । फललक्षणमाह—फलं त्विति ।
‘श्रुतं ह्येव मे भगवद्दृशेभ्यः स्तरति शोकमात्मविदिति’^५ स वा एष एवं
पश्यन्नेवं मन्वान एवं विजानन्नात्मरतिरात्मक्रीड आत्ममिथुन आत्मानन्दः स
स्वराड् भवति तस्य सर्वेषु लोकेषु कामचारो भवति’^६ इत्यादिश्रुतिवाक्यैर्ब्रह्म-
प्राप्तिलक्षणं फलं निर्दिष्टम् । अर्थवादमाह—प्रशंसनमिति । उपपत्तिलक्षणमाह—
प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यार्थसाधने श्रूयमाणेति । उदाहरति—यथा सौम्येति । यथा
घटादिकार्यं नामरूपादिमत्त्वेन यथार्थतो मृदो न भिन्नम् एवं संसारस्यापि
वागारब्धविकारत्वं यथार्थतस्तु ब्रह्मणो न भिन्नत्वम् । मनलक्षणमाह—मननं
त्विति । निदिध्यासनलक्षणमाह—विजातीयेति । समाधिं विमजते—समाधि-

1—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up, 2, 4, 5.

2—Quoted in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha.

3—Chāndogya up, 6, 8, 7.

4—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up, 3, 9, 26.

5—Chāndogya up, 7, 1, 3.

6—Chāndogya up, 7, 25, 2.

रिति । निर्विकल्पकसर्विकल्पमेदात्समाधिर्द्विविधः । ज्ञातृज्ञानादित्रिपुटील्लयान-
पेक्षयाद्वितीये ब्रह्मणि चित्तवृत्तेरवस्थानम् । तदवस्थायां द्वैतभावेऽपि तस्य
नामरूपमात्रत्वप्रतीतेस्तस्याधिष्ठानत्वेनाद्वैतभावनमपि भवति । निर्विकल्पकावस्थायां
ज्ञातृज्ञानज्ञेयादित्रिपुटील्यपूर्वकमन्तःकरणवृत्तेरद्वितीये ब्रह्मण्यतितरामेकीभावेनाव-
स्थानं भवति । ननु चित्तवृत्तिर्भावे कथं भेदराहित्यप्रतीतिर्निर्विकल्पकदशायां-
चेत् कथयति—तदेति । चित्तवृत्तिसद्भावेऽपि तस्या भानं न भवतीत्यर्थः ।
सुषुप्तिसमाध्योर्भेदं प्रदर्शयति—ततश्चास्येति । सुषुप्तौ चित्तवृत्तेः सद्भावो नास्ति
परंतु समाधौ तदस्तीति तयोर्विशेषः । वस्तुतस्तु सुषुप्तौ लेशमात्रत्वेनाविद्यासद्-
भावोपपत्तेः समाधौ न तदभावात्तयोर्भेदः । मुक्तावप्यज्ञानसद्भावराहित्येन तस्या
भेद इति तत्र नातिव्याप्तिः । [३०]

Trans.—As the practice of *Śravaṇa* (study),
manana (reflection), *nididhyāsana* (contemplation)
and *samādhi* (absorption) is necessary upto the
realization of this consciousness, which is the
very self, they are being explained. *Śravaṇa* is the
ascertainment, with the help of the six indicators,
that the non-dual Brahman is the purport all the
vedāntas. The indicators are *upakrama* and
upasaṃhāra abhyāsa, *apūrvatā*, *phala*, *arthavāda* and
upapatti. *Upakrama* and *Upasaṃhāra* mean the
mention of the subject matter in the beginning
and the end respectively. As in the *chāndogya*
upaniṣad in the sixth chapter the non-dual one,
which is the purport of this subject, is mentioned
in the beginning 'One only without a second' and
in the end 'All this is the essence of that'. *Abhyāsa*
is the repeated statement of the subject matter in
the chapter. As there, statement regarding the
non-dual one is made, in course of the chapter;
for nine times. *Apūrvatā* means the inability of
other *pramāṇas* to grasp the non-dual one that is
the purport of the topic. Thus, there the non-dual

one is not made an object of other *pramāṇas*. *Phala*, which is heard there, is the necessity of the self knowledge, which is the subject matter, or of the practice of it. Thus it is stated there that the knowledge of this non-dual one is necessary for its attainment. 'A man having a preceptor only knows this ; so far as he is not free there is dealy, but there after he attains this'. *Ārīhāvada* is the frequent appreciation of the subject matter. Thus there the non-dual one is praised : 'Didst thou ask for that instruction by which the unheard becomes heard the unthought becomes thought and the unknown becomes known' *Upapatti* is reasoning, which is adduced to prove the subject of the topic in various places. As we hear there such arguments regarding the fact that transformations are only verbal in character, which is employed for the establishment of the non-dual one : 'O, gentle one, as by the means of a lump of earth all that are made of earth are known, all the transformations are only verbal ; the earth is only real'. *Manana* is the constant reflection upon the non-dual reality with the help of reasoning, subservient to the vedāntas. *Nidhyāsana* is the flow of knowledge which is in concordance with the non-dual reality and destitute of the discordant feelings of body and others. *Samādhi* is of two kinds viz-*nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*, of them, *savikalpaka* is the resting of the modification of the internal organ in the non-dual one; whose shape is determined by the shape of the latter, without the loss of distinction between knower, known etc. There the non-dual Reality

manifests, though there still persists the appearance of duality, as the knowledge of earth in the appearance of the earthen toy-elephant. It is stated : 'I am that non-dual Reality, (which is of the essence of awareness, like the space, supreme, always shining, unborn, one, imperishable, untouch- ed, omnipresent and ever free'. *Nirvikalpaka* is the resting of the modification of the internal organ intensely in the non-dual Reality, with the loss of distinction between knower, known etc. At that time the non-dual Reality alone manifests without the manifestation of the mental modification, as water alone appears without the appearance of salt, which has been dissolved in water. So, doubt regarding its oneness with deep sleep does not arise. Though the modification is not perceived alike in the two states, still there is distinction owing to its existence and non-existence. (30)

मूलम्—अस्याङ्गानि यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यान- समाधयः । तत्र 'अहिंसासत्यास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहा यमाः'¹ । 'शौचसन्तोषतपः- स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि नियमाः'² । करचरणादिसंस्थानविशेषलक्षणानि पद्म- स्वस्तिकादिन्यासनानि । रेचकपूरककुम्भकलक्षणाः प्राणनिग्रहोपायाः प्राणा- यामाः । इन्द्रियाणां स्वस्वविषयेभ्यः प्रत्याहारणं प्रत्याहारः । अद्वितीयवस्तुन्यन्त- रिन्द्रियधारणं धारणा । तत्राद्वितीयवस्तुति विच्छिद्य विच्छिद्यान्तरिन्द्रियवृत्ति- प्रवाहो ध्यानम् । समाधिस्तुक्तः सविकल्पक एव । (३१)

व्याख्या—निर्विकल्पकसमाध्युपकारकाण्यङ्गान्याह—अस्वेति । यमादीन्यङ्गानि . क्रमशो लक्षयति—तत्रेति । रेचकपूरककुम्भकमेवैः प्राणायामस्य त्रैविध्यम् । शनैः शनैः सव्यापसव्यक्रमेण नासापुटभ्यां प्राणवायोरेतन्तःप्रवेशनं, तस्य निरोधः पुनर्वहिर्निःसारणं क्रमेण पूरककुम्भकरेचकनामभिः प्रसिद्धानि । प्राणवायोश्चलनेन मनसोऽपि चलनान्मनोनिग्रहार्थं प्राणायामस्यावश्यकता वर्तते ।

1—Yogasūtra, 2. 30.

2—Yogasūtra, 2. 32.

ध्यानसमाधयोर्भेदं दर्शयितुमाह—तत्राद्वितीयवस्तुति विच्छिद्येति । सविकल्प-
कस्याङ्गत्वं निर्विकल्पकस्य चाङ्गित्वं दर्शयितुमाह—समाधिस्त्विति । (३१)

Trans.—Its ancillaries are *yama*, *niyama*, *prāṇāyāna*, *pratyāhāra*, *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi*. Of them *yama* (restraint) consists of non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, celibacy and non-receiving of gifts. The *niyamas* are cleanliness, contentment, penance, study and surrender to God. The *āsanas* are various postures of limbs like hands and legs such as *padma*, *svastika* etc. *Prāṇāyāmas* are the methods of restraining the *prāṇa* such as exhaling, inhaling and restraining (the breath). *Pratyāhāra* is the withdrawal of the senses from their respective objects. *Dhāraṇā* is the fixation of the internal organ or the non-dual Reality. *Dhyāna* is the flow of the modificatory act of the internal organ towards the non-dual Reality with the occasional interruptions. *Samādhi* is the above said *Savikalpaka* one. (31)

Comm.—In this passage the author is describing the intellectual disciplines, which are required to realise the Brahman. They are *Śravaṇa* (hearing the vedantic texts), *manana* (reasoning or reflection), *nididhyāsana* (contemplation) and *saṁādhi* (absorption). *Samādhi* is divided into two kinds viz- *Savikalpaka* (determinate) and *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate). Determinate absorption comes first, in which the difference between the knower, knowledge and knowable remains, though the mind is steadfastly fixed in the non-dual Brahman. But in the indeterminate absorption that difference subsides. It is necessary and significant to take

into account the difference between *samādhi* and *suṣupti*. He says that in *suṣupti* the mental modifications do not at all exist, while in *nirvikalpaka samādhi*, modification, which has taken the shape of the partless Brahman, exists, though it is completely absorbed in the consciousness. The fact is that *samādhi* is the state of enlightenment, where as the other is the state of concealment by *avidyā*. Other factors like *yama*, *niyama*, *āsana*, *prāṇayama* etc. are taken to be the limbs of the indeterminate absorption, which are conducive to the practice of the latter, These eight limbs of the indeterminate absorption are mentioned by Patañjali in his aphorisms as the eight constituents of *Rāja Yoga*.¹ (30, 31)

मूलम्—एवमस्याङ्गिनो निर्विकल्पकस्य लयविश्लेषकषायरसास्वाद-
लक्षणाश्रित्वारो विघ्नाः सम्भवन्ति । लयस्तावदखण्डवस्त्वनवलम्बनेन चित्तवृत्ते-
निद्रा । अखण्डवस्त्वनवलम्बनेन चित्तवृत्तेरन्यावलम्बनं विक्षेपः । लयविश्लेषा-
भावेऽपि चित्तवृत्ते रागादिवासनया स्तब्धीभावादखण्डवस्त्वनवलम्बनं कषायः ।
अखण्डवस्त्वनवलम्बनेनापि चित्तवृत्तेः सविकल्पकानन्दास्वादनं रसास्वादः ।
समाधारमभिसमये सविकल्पकानन्दास्वादनं वा । (३२)

व्याख्या—निर्विकल्पकसमाधिमुत्तिष्ठतो विघ्ननिराकरणसन्तरेण
तत्फलप्राप्तिर्न भवतीति चिन्तयन् तज्ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेण निराकरणस्याशक्यत्वाद्
विघ्नान् निर्दिशति—एवमिति । लयं लक्षयति—लय इति । चित्तवृत्तेर्बाह्य-
विषयेभ्यो निवृत्तत्वेऽप्यखण्डवस्तुः कालस्येत्यानवलम्बनेन निद्रावस्थाप्राप्तिर्लयः ।
विषयासक्तिपरतन्त्रतया चित्तवृत्तेरात्माभिमुखताभावेन विषयग्रहणे प्रवृत्तिर्विश्लेष
इति विश्लेषं लक्षयति—अखण्डेति । रागादिवासनानामक्षीणतया कथञ्चिच्छ्रवणा-
दिसाधनानुष्ठानेनान्तर्मुखमपि चित्तं वासनाप्रतिबद्धतया मध्य एव स्तब्धं भवति,
तत् कषाय इति कथयति—रागादीति । सविकल्पकसमाधौ चित्तस्यान्यावलम्बना-
भावेन यो ज्ञात्रादिभेदयुक्त आनन्दोऽनुभूयते तस्यापि रसानन्दलक्षणविघ्नतां
प्रतिपादयति—सविकल्पकानन्दास्वादनमिति । भेदसत्त्वात् तस्य नाद्वैततत्त्व-

1—Yoga sūtra, 2. 29.

प्रतिपादकत्वमिति भावः । निर्विकल्पकसमाधिरेव चैतन्यस्य यथार्थस्वरूपं तुरीयावस्थालक्षणमिति बोध्यम् । तथा चोक्तमद्वैततत्त्वदर्शिमिराचार्यैः—¹

‘अन्यथा गृह्णतः स्वप्नो निद्रा तत्त्वमजानतः

विपर्यासे तयोः क्षीणे तुरीयं पदमश्नुते ॥

अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते

अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमेद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ॥’ इति । (३२)

Trans.—Thus to this nirvikalpaka, having these ancillaries, there are four obstacles, viz-*laya*, *vikṣepa*, *kaṣāya* and *rasāsvāda*. Of them, *laya* (lapse) is the lapsing into sleep of the mental activity without resting on the non dual Reality. *Vikṣepa* (distraction) is the resting of the modification of the internal organ in something else than the partless Reality. *Kaṣāya* is the suspended state of the mental modification due to previous impressions of attachment etc. without resting on the partless Reality, though there is the absence of *laya* and *vikṣepa* there. *Rasāsvāda* (enjoyment of bliss) is the state of mental modification of enjoying the bliss of *savikalpaka* without resting in the partless Reality or it is the enjoyment of the bliss of *Savikalpaka* stage when starting the practice of *Samādhi*. (32)

मूलम्—अनेन विघ्नचतुष्टयेन विरहितं चित्तं निर्वातदीपवदचलं सदखण्डचैतन्यमात्रमवतिष्ठते यदा तदा निर्विकल्पकः समाधिरित्युच्यते । तदुक्तम्—²

लये सम्बोधयेच्चित्तं विक्षिप्तं शमयेत् पुनः ।

सकषायं विजानीयाच्छ्रमप्राप्तं न चालयेत् ॥

नास्वादयेद्रसं तत्र निःसङ्गः प्रज्ञया भवेत् ॥’ इति ।

‘यथा दीपो निवातस्थो नेङ्गते सोपमा स्मृता’³ इति च । (३३)

1—Mandūkya Kārikā, I, 15-16.

2—Mandūkya kārikā, ५, 44-45.

3—Bhagavadgītā, 6. 19.

व्याख्या—विघ्नचतुष्टयरहितं चित्तं कथं निर्विकल्पकसमाधावव-
तिष्ठत इति दृष्टान्तेन प्रतिपादयति—अनेनेति—विघ्ननाशोपायान् क्रमशः प्रदर्श-
यति—लघु इति । पूर्वोक्त लयाभिधाने निद्रालक्षणे विघ्ने सञ्जाते, तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं
चित्तं सम्बोधयेद्बुद्धबोधयेन्मान्द्यादिपरित्यागेन कार्यक्षमं कुर्यात् । विक्षेपलक्षणे
विघ्ने सञ्जाते सति विक्षिप्तं चित्तं शमयेत्—शान्तिं नयेत् । वैराग्याभ्यासाभ्यां
बाह्यविषयेभ्यो विनिवर्त्य सच्चिदानन्दानन्ताद्वये वस्तुनि नियोजयेदित्यर्थः ।
चित्तं यदा सहस्रायं भवति तदा पुनःपुनरभ्यासवशेन शमप्राप्तं चित्तं न चालयेत्
स्थिराकुर्गदित्यर्थः । यदा लघुविशेषकषायेभ्यो निवर्तितं प्रत्यक्प्रवणं चित्तं
समाधौ स्थिरतामुपैति तदा रसं सविकल्पकानन्दं तत्र नास्वादयेत् । सविकल्पका-
नन्दस्य भेदवत्त्वान्नानेनाद्वैततत्त्वसाक्षात्कारो भवतीति भावः । प्रज्ञया विवेकेन
स्वात्मानं तस्माद् विविच्य निःसङ्गो भवेद् विषयजनितसुखदुःखादिद्वन्द्वरहितो
भवेत् । एवं विघ्नचतुष्टयरहितं चित्तमेवाखण्ड्यवस्तुतत्त्वाधिगमे समथं भवति
नान्यदिति भावः । भगवद्वाक्यं प्रमाणयति—यथा दीप इति । भ्रिर्वीतदीपवत्
स्थितप्रज्ञस्य चित्तं निश्चलमवनिष्ठ इत्यर्थः । तथा चोक्तमाचार्यैः¹—

‘यदा न लीयते चित्तं न च विक्षिप्यते पुनः ।

अनिङ्गनमनाभासं निष्पन्नं ब्रह्म तत्त दा ॥’ इति ।

चित्तनिरोधोपाया विशेषतस्तन्त्रान्तरे द्रष्टव्याः ‘अभ्यास वैराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोधः’,
‘तत्प्रतिषेधार्थमेकतत्त्वाभ्यासः’, ‘मैत्रीकरुणामुदितोपेक्षाणां सुखदुःखपुण्यापुण्य-
विषयाणां भावनातश्चित्तप्रसादनम्’ ‘प्रच्छेदनविधारणाभ्यां वा प्राणस्य’ विषय-
वती वा प्रवृत्तिरूपान्ना मनसः स्थितिनिबन्धनी’ ‘विशोका वा ज्योतिष्मती’
इत्यादयः² । (३३)

Trans.—When the internal organ, destitute of this four-fold obstacle, motionless like the lamp in a windless place, remains as one with the partless consciousness, then it is termed as *nirvikalpaka samādhi*. So it is said : ‘In the condition of lapse the mind should be awakened, it should be calmed in distraction ; with *kaṣāya* it is to be known and when quiescence is achieved it should not be disturbed. One should not taste the

1—Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, 3, 46.

2—Yogasūtra, 1. Sūtras 12, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36.

pleasure there, but should be free with awareness'. Also: 'The lamp which does not flicker in a windless place is its illustration'. (33)

Comm —Following Gaudapāda, the writer explains here the four obstacles in the practice of indeterminate absorption. At the time of practising *samādhi* if the mind lapses into deep sleep, then it should be awakened. Sometimes the allurements of the worldly things may create distraction in it, which is an obstacle in the practice of indeterminate absorption. In such difficulty, efforts should be made to pacify it. When the mind is drawn back from the worldly things and is directed towards the Brahman, it may be stupefied instantly owing to the obstruction of previous attachments, which can be overcome by practising steadfastness in serenity. The last obstruction, which arises out of the attachment to the bliss of determinate absorption can be overcome, by a discriminate feeling of isolation. If the mind is attached to the bliss of determinate absorption, which comes through the suspension of the external senses, the aspirant cannot reach the stage of indeterminate absorption. So he should discriminate himself from this enjoyment. The mind, which is free from these four obstacles, is absorbed in the *nirvikalpaka samādhi*. To show the stillness of mind at that stage Sadānanda gives the example of the lamp in a windless place. The fact is that, in the mind, which is hankering after the worldly allurements and is unsteady for this, the spiritual truth cannot be reflected. As the bottom of the pond cannot be seen when its water

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

is not clean and still, so also *ātman*, which underlies the displays of phenomena, cannot be perceived through an impure mind. For this, yoga is defined as the subsidence of the mental modifications by Patañjali.¹ It is remarkable in this regard to consider Śaṅkara's saying: 'A man with strong detachment can get concentration; only a man who has got concentration can realize deeply; after realization a man can be free from the bondage; and he who is free, can get eternal happiness'.² (33)

मूलम्—अथ जीवन्मुक्तलक्षणमुच्यते । जीवन्मुक्तो नाम स्वस्वरूपा-
खण्डब्रह्मज्ञानेन तदज्ञानबाधनद्वारा स्वस्वरूपाखण्डब्रह्मणि साक्षात्कृतेऽज्ञानतत्कार्य-
सञ्चितकर्मसंशयविपर्ययादीनामपि बाधितत्वादखिलबन्धरहितो ब्रह्मनिष्ठः ।

‘मिथ्यते हृदयग्रन्थिशिख्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।

क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे’ ॥

इत्यादिश्रुतेः³ । (३४)

ट्यालर्या—एवमुक्तसमाध्यनुष्ठानात् परं ब्रह्मात्मैक्यज्ञाने लब्धे
सत्यविद्यातत्कार्याणां बाधितत्वाच्छरीरपाते सद्योमुक्तिः स्यात् । अन्यथा
मुक्तिविषये किं प्रमाणमस्तीति सन्देहमपाकर्तुं जीवन्मुक्तलक्षणमाह—अथेति ।
मुक्तिर्न केवलं देहपातानन्तरं संभवति । अस्मिन् देहे ज्ञानलाभानन्तरं जीव-
तोऽपि मुक्तिः संभवति । सा जीवन्मुक्तिरित्युच्यते । जीवन्मुक्तं लक्षयति—
जीवन्मुक्त इति । ब्रह्मात्मैक्यसाक्षात्कारे जाते, अज्ञानतत्कार्यसञ्चितकर्मवास-
नादीनां बाधनात् कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादिरहितो ब्रह्मणि प्रतिष्ठितो निखिलबन्ध-
रहित एव जीवन्मुक्त इत्युच्यते । प्रारब्धकर्मणो ज्ञानेन नाशासंभवात् केवलसञ्चित-
कर्मण उक्तिः—तत्कार्यसञ्चितकर्मैति । जीवन्मुक्तिविषये श्रुतिः—‘यदा सर्वे
प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा येऽस्य हृदि धिताः । अथ मर्त्योऽमृतो भवत्यत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुत’⁴
इति । अत्रेत्यस्मिन् देहे जीवन्नेवेत्यर्थः । जीवन्मुक्तस्य देहादावसंसक्तत्वेऽपि

1—Yogasūtra, 1. 2.

2—Viveka cūdāmaṇi, Sl. 376.

3—Mūṇḍaka up, 2. 2. 8.

4—Kāṭha up, 2. 3. 14.

Also Bṛhadāraṇyaka up, 4. 4. 7.

श्रुतिः—‘तद्यथाहिनिर्बयनी बल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयीतैवमेवेदं शरीरं’
 शेतेऽथापरमशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव¹ इति । ज्ञानेन कर्मक्षयो भवति-
 त्यस्मिन् विषये श्रुतिं प्रमाणयति—मिथत इति । हृदयग्रन्थिरित्यदिद्याप्रचयो
 बुद्ध्याश्रयः । परं चावरं च परावरम् । परमिति कारणात्मनावस्थितं परब्रह्म,
 अवरमिति कार्यात्मनावस्थितं हिरण्यगर्भलक्षणम् । परावरे सर्वात्मके ब्रह्मणि
 ज्ञाते कर्मादीनां क्षयात् विमुक्तिर्लभ्यत इत्यर्थः । (३४)

Trans.—Now the definition of a *jīvan-mukta* is being stated. A *jīvan-mukta* (liberated but still living) is one, who is free from all the bondages owing to the destruction of *ajñāna* and its effects like accumulated *karma*, doubt, illusion etc, after the realization of the partless Brahman, which is his own self, the *ajñāna*, pertaining to this being sublated by the knowledge of the partless Brahman. As it is stated in the *śruti*: ‘when this which is both the cause and the effect (Parābara,) is seen, the knot of the heart is dispersed; all the doubts are dispelled; and all his actions are destroyed’. (34)

Comm.—Liberation is of two kinds viz- *Jīvanmukti* and *videhamukti*. The first belongs to a man, who has realised the identity of individual and the Brahman, but is still living in this world. After the end of his bodily existence he attains complete emancipation, which is known as *videhamukti*.

Jīvanmukti means liberation in this very life. When ignorance is destroyed through right knowledge, its effect the accumulated actions or *sañcita karmas* are also destroyed. False knowledge, doubts and attachments caused by ignorance, are

1—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up, 4. 4. 7.

also completely discarded. The author quotes a verse from the Muṇḍaka upaniṣad' to support this. Here in the verse the word *karmāṇi* only means the accumulated and future actions, as *prārabdha* cannot be done away with even by the learned, as it is evidenced in the saying of Śaṅkara.¹. 34)

मूलम्—अयं तु व्युत्थानसमये मांसशोणितमूत्रपुरीषादिभाजनेन शरीरेणाभ्यमान्धापदुत्वादिभाजनेनेन्द्रियप्राप्तेः शान्तापिपासाशोकमोहादिभाजनेनान्तःकरणेन च पूर्वपूर्ववासनया क्रियमाणानि कर्माणि भुज्यमानानि ज्ञानाविरुद्धारब्धफलानि च पश्यन्नपि बाधितत्वात् परमार्थतो न पश्यति । यथेन्द्रजालमिति ज्ञानवांस्तदिन्द्रजालं पश्यन्नपि परमार्थमिदमिति न पश्यति । 'सचक्षुरवक्षुरिव सकर्णोऽकर्ण इव'² इत्यादिश्रुतेः । उक्तं च—³

सुषुप्तवज्राप्रति यो न पश्यति

द्वयं च पश्यन्नपि चाद्वयत्वतः ।

तथा च कुर्वन्नपि निष्क्रियश्च यः

स आत्मविज्ञान्य इतीह निश्चय' इति । (३५)

टिप्पणी—ज्ञानेनाविद्यातत्कार्याणां बाधितत्वेऽपि प्रारब्धलेशवशाज्जीवन्मुक्तः सन् पुनः संसरतीति प्रागुक्तम् । किं तत् प्रारब्धं कथं वा तद्वशाज्ज्जीवन्मुक्तोऽपि सन् देहेन्द्रियादिभिर्यवहरतीत्यत्र प्रतिपादयति—अयं त्विति । व्युत्थानसमये निर्विकल्पकसमावेष्टितः सन्नयं जीवन्मुक्तो योगी पूर्वपूर्ववासानाबलेन कर्माणि कुर्वन् प्रारब्धफलानि चास्वादयन् देहेन्द्रियान्तःकरणादिभिर्यवहरति । प्रारब्धस्य ज्ञानाबाधितत्वं दर्शयति—ज्ञानाविरुद्धारब्धफलानीति । सञ्चिततागामिकर्मणां ज्ञानविनाशयत्वेऽपि प्रारब्धस्य न तथात्वमारब्धफलकत्वाद् व्याघ्रबुद्ध्या परित्यक्तः शरो यथा गौरियमिति बुद्ध्या न पुनः प्रत्यावर्तते तद्वत् । सोऽयं विद्वान् निरस्तकर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादिभेदबुद्धिरहंमाभिमानरहितो ब्रह्मानन्दनिमग्नहृदयो लोकसंग्रहार्थं नित्यादिकर्माणि भिक्षाटनादिकं च कुर्वन् संसारमिममिन्द्रजलोपमं स्वप्नोपमं वा पश्यन् प्रारब्धफलक्षयं यावद् व्यवहरति । तथा चोक्तमाचार्यैः—⁴

1—Viveka cudāmaṇi, Sl. 455.

2—Cannot be traced.

3—Upadeśasāhasrī, 10, 13.

4—Viveka cudāmaṇi, Sl. 454.

‘प्रारब्धं बलवत्तरं खलु विदां भोगेन तस्य क्षयः ।

सम्यग्ज्ञानहुताशनेन विलयः प्राक्सञ्चितागामिनम्,

ब्रह्मात्मैक्यमवेक्ष्य तन्मयतया ये सर्वदा संस्थिता—

स्तेषां तत्तूत्यं नहि कचिदपि ब्रह्मैव ते निर्गुणम् ।’ इति

श्रुतिं प्रमाणयति—सचक्षुरिति। स सचक्षुरप्यचक्षुरिवाचरति सकर्णोऽप्यकर्ण इवाचरतोत्यादि । सर्वथापीन्द्रियादीनां कर्मभिर्न लिप्यत इत्यर्थः । पूर्वाचार्यो-
क्तिमुद्धरति—सुषुप्तवदिति । तथा चोक्तं भगवता—¹

‘योगयुक्तो विशुद्धात्मा बिजितात्मा जितेन्द्रियः

सर्वभूतात्मभूतात्मा कुर्वन्नपि न लिप्यते’ ॥ इति । (३५)

Trans.—Such a person, after arising from *samādhi*, witnessing the activities, performed by the body, the place of flesh, blood, urine and faeces etc; by the senses, which are the places of blindness, inactivity, inefficiency etc; by the internal organ, which is the seat of hunger, thirst, grief and delusion etc; which are only performed by the force of the previous impressions; and also experiencing their results, not incompatible with knowledge, does not see them in reality, as they are really sublated (for him). Just as a man, knowing that it is magic, though he sees it, does not take it to be real, so it is stated in the Sruti: ‘Though he has eyes, he is as if not having the eyes, though he has ears, he is as if not having the ears’ etc. Also it is said: ‘He is the knower of the self but none else—he who perceiving the diversity in the waking state does not really see it, as in the state of deep sleep, because there is only non-duality—who, though performing the actions, is free from the actions. (35)

Comm.—Untill the exhaustion of *prārabdha*, which is the action that has already started to give

1—Bhagavadgita, 5. 7.

its results, he maintains his bodily existence. But there his actions are marked with a remarkable indifference, as the egoism, which causes indulgence, is lost. To such a man the world ceases to present itself as real, but only seems to be an appearance. This state of living for the exhaustion of *Prarabdha* can, otherwise, be described as living in divine consciousness, as, at that state, every action, every thought and every feeling flows from the divine will. This is the state of complete surrender of the devotees. Whatever may be the way of delineation, the essence is the same stage of transcendental existence, which is unanimously proclaimed by all the mystics of the world. Such a state of living is marked with inward bliss, untouched by the sorrows of the mundane world. This is what the *Bhagavadgītā* describes :¹ 'By getting which nothing more is desired to be obtained and in which state one is not disturbed even by the greatest pain'. This above conception confirms the view that vedantic emancipation is not a mere speculative idea. Religion or spiritualism is not a matter of belief, but it is a way of life—to live in tune with reality—which is a matter of practice and cultivation. But it is not some thing which is newly acquired, as it is the very essence of the being of the individual, which only remains concealed through ignorance. (35)

मूलम्—अस्य ज्ञानात्पूर्वं विद्यमानानामेवाहारविहारादीनामनुवृत्ति-
वच्छुभवासनानामेवानुवृत्तिर्भवति शुभाशुभयोरोदासीन्यं वा । तदुक्तम्—²

1—*Bhagavadgītā*, 6, 22.

2—*Naiskarmyasiddhi*, 4, 62.

‘बुद्धाद्वैतसत्त्वस्य यथेष्टाचरणं यदि ।

शुनां तत्त्वदृशां चैव को भेदोऽशुचिमक्षण’ इति ॥

‘ब्रह्मवित्त्वं तथा मुक्त्वा स आत्मज्ञो न चेतः’¹ इति । (३६)

व्याख्या—नन्वहंममाभिमानरहितत्वास्य जीवःमुक्तः शुभाशुभ-
कर्मभिर्बन्धनानुपपत्तेः, ‘हत्वापि स इमाँल्लोकान् हन्ति न निबध्यते’² इति च
भगवद्वचनाद् यथेच्छं पापाचरणमाशङ्क्यत इति चेत्, उच्यते—अस्य ज्ञानात्
पूर्वमिति । शरीररक्षणार्थमाहारादीनां यथानुवृत्तिर्भवति तथा शुभवासनानामे-
वानुवृत्तिर्भवति न तु पापवासनानामपि, पापवासनानां ज्ञानलाभात् पूर्वमेव
साधनानुष्ठानैः विनष्टत्वात्, अन्यथा ज्ञानलाभानुपपत्तेः । तस्माज्जीवन्मुक्तस्य
कदाचिदपि यथेष्टाचरणं न शङ्कनीयमिति भावः । यथेष्टाचरणशङ्कां निवर्त्तयितुं
शुभवासनानामेवानुवृत्तिमभ्युपगमवादेनोपस्थाप्य यथार्थस्वभावं प्रतिपादयति—
शुभाशुभयोरिति । वस्तुतो जीवन्मुक्तस्य द्वन्द्वरहितत्वाच्छुभाशुभयोरौदासीन्यमेव
वर्त्तते इति बोध्यम् । नैकर्म्यसिद्धिर्वावय’ वादयति—बुद्धाद्वैतेति । ब्रह्म-
त्वस्याभिमानोऽपि त्याज्य इति प्रतिपादयितुं पूर्वाचार्योक्तिं प्रमाणयति—ब्रह्म-
वित्त्वमिति । (३६)

Trans — In the case of such a person the good impressions, which he had before the advent of knowledge, only persist, as the persistence of eating, recreation etc. or there is indifference towards both good and evil Thus it is said : ‘If a man, who has penetrated into the truth of the non-dual Reality, should act wilfully, then what is the difference between the dogs and the knowers of truth in eating impure food ?’ Also ‘Discarding even the egoism of knowing the Brahman, such a person is the knower of the self, but none else.’ (36)

मूलम्—तदानीममानित्वादीनि ज्ञानसाधनान्यद्वेष्टत्वादयः सद्गुणा-
श्चालङ्कारवदनुवर्तन्ते । तदुक्तम्—³

‘उत्पन्नात्मावबोधस्य ह्यद्वेष्टत्वादयो गुणाः ।

अयत्नतो भवन्त्यस्य न तु साधनरूपिण’ इति ॥ (३७)

1—Upadeśa sāhasrī, 12, 13.

2—Bhagavadgītā, 18, 17.

3—Naiskarmyasiddhi, 4, 69.

व्याख्या—अमानित्वादीनां ज्ञानसाधनत्वेन ज्ञानलाभादनन्तरं तेषामनुवृत्तेरनावश्यकत्वेन निवृत्तिर्भवतीत्याशङ्क्य परिहरति—तदानीमिति । नियोगवशादनुवृत्त्यभावेऽपि तेषामलङ्कारवदयत्नतोऽनुवृत्तिर्भवतीत्यर्थः । नैष्कर्म्य-सिद्धिवाक्येन ब्रह्मयति—उपपन्नं इति । जीवन्मुक्तं प्रति तेषां साधनरूपत्वं नास्तीत्यर्थः, समाप्तसकलकर्तृव्यत्वात् तस्य । (३७)

Trans.—Then, humility and the rest, which are useful in the acquisition of knowledge and the good qualities like absence of enmity etc. follow him as mere ornaments. So it is said : ‘The qualities like absence of enmity etc. come to a man, who has got self-realisation without any effort ; but they are no longer means for acquiring some thing other. (37)

Comm—The way of life which Advaita vedānta teaches is not merely ethical, as morality is not the end of spiritual life, though it is the invariable antecedent of the latter. Some critics, without understanding this basic truth, make a charge against vedānta that it falsifies all the moral values. Describing the world as merely phenomenal, vedānta does not intend to say that the worldly transactions are unnecessary. On the other hand, it vauchsafes all our empirical activities from the practical point of view. So also it validates all our moral, social, scientific and aesthetic values from the practical standpoint of view or *vṛāvahārika satīā*. It merely states that all our worldly achievements are not ultimate ; some thing lies behind all these shows of the world, about which we should be conscious. So, morality is the *sine qua non* of the spiritual life, for which the writer says that in a liberated man there is

either the persistence of the good impressions only or there is indifference towards both good and evil. But spiritual life is never possible so far as the evil impressions persist. So a moral spirit pervades the man not only before the attainment of spiritual freedom, but also after getting it, though after the realization of the truth, it is no more a means for the attainment of some end. This is the intention of the writer when he says that good qualities follow him as mere ornaments.

It is noteworthy to see the difference between the moral attitudes before the realization of the truth and after realization of it. In the first stage, it is a means for the realization of some end viz. the attainment of enlightenment and this is to be cultivated with efforts also. But after the attainment of enlightenment it is nothing more than a spontaneous development, which comes itself without any effort, though it is not an end in itself. So morality is not only normative in character but is based on the very being of the Reality, which is not imposed from the outside, but inwardly discovered in the very being of the individual. In contrast to the assertion of the pragmatists vedānta advocates the perennial validity of the moral principles, but unlike the rigorists it does not admit of the fact that it is an end in itself. (36, 37)

मूलम्—किं बहुनायं देह्यात्रामात्रार्थमिच्छानिच्छापरैच्छाप्रापितानि सुखदुःखलक्षणान्यारब्धफलान्यनुभवस्ततः करणाभासादीनामवभासकः संस्तदवसाने प्रत्यगानन्दपरब्रह्मणि प्राप्ते लीने सत्यज्ञानतत्त्वायसंस्काराणामपि विनाशात् परमकैवल्यमानन्दैकसमखिलमेदप्रतिभासरहितमखण्डब्रह्मावतिष्ठते । 'न' तस्य

प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति',¹ 'अत्रैव समवलीयन्ते',² 'विमुक्तश्च विमुच्यते'³
इत्यादिश्रुतेः । (३८)

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यसदानन्द—

विरचितो वेदान्तसाराख्यो ग्रन्थः समाप्तः ॥

व्याख्या—जीवन्मुक्तिं निरूप्येदानीं विदेहमुक्तिं निरूपयति—किं
ब्रूनेति । सोऽयं जीवन्मुक्तः प्रारब्धफलभोगावसानं यावच्छरीरेऽस्मिन् वसन्
तदन्तेऽविद्यादीनामशेषतो विनाशात् परमानन्दानन्ताद्वितीयब्रह्मात्मनैवावतिष्ठते ।
तस्य प्राणा नोत्क्रामन्ति परंतु तत्रैव ब्रह्मणि लीयन्त इत्येतदर्थे श्रुतिं प्रमाणयति
—न तस्येति । प्राणादीनामविद्याकार्यत्वात्तस्या बाधितत्वे तेजामात्मन्येव लयो
भवतीति भावः । पुरुषप्राप्त्यैव संसारगतेश्चरितार्थत्वान्न पुनः संसरणमित्यर्थः ।
तथा च श्रुतिः—'स यथेमा नद्यः स्थन्दमानाः समुद्रायणाः समुद्रं प्राप्यास्तं
गच्छन्ति मिद्यते तासां नामरूपे समुद्र इत्येवं प्रोच्यते । एवमेवास्य पश्चिद्भुरमाः
षोडश कलाः पुरुषायणाः पुरुषं प्राप्यास्तं गच्छन्ति मिद्यते चासां नामरूपे
पुरुष इत्येवं प्रोच्यते स एषोऽकलोऽमृतो भवति तदेव श्लोकः'⁴ इति । एतदेवा-
भयन्वं नाम यद्ब्रह्मात्मनावस्थानं, भयस्य द्वैतमुलत्वेन निरस्तत्वात् । श्रुतिश्च—
'यदा ह्येवैव एतस्मिन्नदृश्येऽनात्म्येऽनिरुक्तेऽनिलयनेऽभयं प्रतिष्ठां विन्दते । सोऽभयं
गतो भवति'⁵, 'अभयं वै जनक प्राप्नोऽसि'⁶ इति । मोक्षाय परमपुरुषार्थत्वे
ब्रह्मात्मनावस्थानमेव संसारगतेः पर्याप्तिः—'तान् होवाचैतावदेवाहमेतत् परं
ब्रह्म वेद । नातः परमस्तीति'⁷, 'पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा परा
गतिः'⁸ इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः प्रतिपादितत्वात् ।

इति गूढार्थबोधि-व्याख्या वेदान्तसारव्याख्या समाप्ता ॥

Trans.—What to speak of more? Such a person undergoes the experience of pleasure and

1—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up, 4, 4, 6

2—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up, 3, 2, 11.

3—Kāṭha up, 5, 1.

4—Praśna up, 6, 5.

5—Taittirīya up, 2, 7, 1.

6—Bṛhadāraṇyaka up, 4, 2, 6.

7—Praśna up, 6, 7.

8—Kāṭha up, 1, 3, 11.

pain, the results of his *prārabdha karma*, whether desired by him or not or desired by others, only for the continuity of his empirical existence (bodily existence), illuminating the appearance of the internal organ etc. After this, the vital principle being lost in the supreme Brahman, the inmost bliss, *ajñāna* with its effects, the mental impressions, being sublated, there remains only the partless Brahman, free from all the appearances of difference, which is the absolute isolation, the sole essence of bliss. Thus it is said in the *śrutis* : 'His vital forces do not depart, here alone they lose their existence' and 'He gets emancipation already being released (from the bondage of ignorance)'. (38)

Comm.— In the concluding passage Sadānanda describes the state of *videhamukti*, which a *Jivanmukta* gets after the exhaustion of his *prārabdha*. After the end of his bodily existence, caused by the impulse of *prārabdha*, the vital of principle of such a man does not depart, unlike as it happens after death in the case of others, but is fully lost in the Brahman. The nescience being sublated with its effects the manifold phenomena, there only remains the Brahman, which is the real being of the individual. It is the state of infinite knowledge and bliss, free from the duality of *samsāra*, the condition of enlightenment and benignity. There are Some people who think that this vedāntic emancipation is a sort of self-annihilation. They also fear the loss of personality there. But this only indicates their feeble-mindedness, caused by inability to perceive the basic

truth of this doctrine. People are only sceptical because they do not understand. We have forgotten our divine nature through ignorance and are so much infatuated by the transient allurements of the world that we even fear to think of the interminable bliss of the Absolute, which is our true being, as in the story, Indra the king of the gods, who had become a pig with his pig-household through illusion, could not recognise his divinity even though he was told repeatedly by the gods regarding it. But when his pig-body was destroyed he recognised his true nature as the king of the gods and thought that he had been experiencing a horrible dream of becoming a pig. Likewise, when ignorance is sublated the true value of the state of emancipation can be understood. Thereafter man ceases to be a mere puppet in the hand of nature and asserts his freedom. The happiness of becoming one with the divine can only be realized not through speculation nor imagination but through becoming one with the divine, which is intended by the upaniṣad when it says : 'The knower of the Brahman becomes the Brahman'. (38)

...the ... People are only ...
 ...they do not understand ...
 ...the nature ...
 ...the transient ...
 ...that we even fear to think of the ...
 ...the Absolute which is our ...
 ...the more ...
 ...who had become a pig with his pig-hood ...
 ...could not recognize his divinity ...
 ...as well repeatedly by the ...
 ...when his pig-hood was destroyed ...
 ...as the king of the ...
 ...he had been expecting ...
 ...a pig. Likewise, when ...
 ...the true value of the state ...
 ...be realized. Therefore ...
 ...in the hand of ...
 ...his freedom. The ...
 ...the divine can only be realized ...
 ...not ...
 ...the divine, which is ...
 ...the ...
 ...the ...

Errata

Page	Line	Incorrect	Correct
Inner Cover	1	17 Commentary Commentary
„	18 readering rendering
i 26 aritecture architecture
ii 22 si is
iii 1	... verifisable verifiable
vi 23 contanct contact
8 7	... the	... The
22 13	... realised. realised
28 7	... existense existence
28 9 wirh with
34 25 rpārabdha prārabdha
39	Foot notes śārīreka śārīraka
43 17	... नीलाद्रयुज्ज्वल नीलाद्रयुज्ज्वल
43 19	... शिष्टाचारमनुसन् शिष्टाचारमनुसरन्
44 8 आत्मतः आत्मनः
44 17 ब्रम्हामित्र ब्रह्मामित्र
53 23 लणक्षाः लक्षणाः
53 23 पेक्षात्वात् पेक्षत्वात्
59 19 क्षुतेः श्रुतेः
73 14 विश्लेष विश्लेष
73 14 शक्तिद्वयत् शक्तिद्वयम्
73 15 शक्तिस्तावेदल्पोऽपि शक्तिस्तावदल्पोऽपि
73 15 मण्डल मण्डल
74	... 20 the cognitionby the cognition
98 5 says say
115 15 विरोप्यता विशेष्यता
116	... 14 eiscrepant discrepant
118 10 qualifiad qualified
138 24	.. Nidhyāsana	...Nididhyāsana
154	.. 20	... vital of	... vital
155	... 4	.. aliurements	... allurements

Haramohan Mishra was born in 1956. With a good career he graduated from Utkal University securing the first class first position in B. A. (Hons) in Sanskrit. He also secured the Best graduate position and was awarded L. N. Sahu gold medal by Utkal University. He completed his post-graduate studies in Utkal University and stood first in M. A. in Sanskrit, for which he was awarded university gold medal and Rohini Gadadhar gold medal by the university. Now he is serving as a lecturer in Sanskrit in F. M. College, Balasore (Orissa) and is engaged in intensive research in the field of Advaita epistemology under the guidance of Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan National Professor in philosophy, Madras.

